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INSTITUTIONS OR CULTURE? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Margit Tavits, PhD 
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The study examines competing institutional and cultural explanations of government 
performance. I use within country comparison of 125 sub-national governments in Germany and 
the U.S. and cross-regional comparison of these two countries. Government performance is 
conceptualized and measured on two dimensions – policy responsiveness and administrative 
effectiveness. I show that social capital is associated with the former but is unrelated to the level 
of administrative effectiveness. The latter is explained by the institutional factor of bureaucratic 
power concentration. 
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1. CHARTING THE VOYAGE OF INQUIRY 
 
 
 
The performance of government is a central issue in a democratic society. Many countries in the 
world are currently trying to make their new or old democratic governments work more 
effectively and responsively. Academics and professionals alike are arguing about the need to 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness in public sector. Citizens continue to expect their 
governments to provide public goods and services: clean streets, safe neighborhoods, job 
security, etc. These issues of government performance are ancient but continuously recurring and 
timely. Few, however, are confident that we know what and how makes governments work well.  
This is a study of the performance of democratic governments. The purpose of the study 
is theoretical. It builds on the Robert Putnam’s (1993) path-breaking study on social capital, 
institutions and government performance with a significant difference: using a disaggregated 
concept of government performance. More specifically, government performance is here 
conceptualized on two equally important dimensions: administrative effectiveness and policy 
responsiveness. Thus, the study moves beyond simply asking why some governments perform 
better than others, and tackles questions that the studies with a bipolar conceptualization of 
government performance have left unanswered. Are effective governments also responsive and 
vice versa as assumed by the uni-dimensional measure of government performance? Under what 
institutional, social and cultural conditions are governments more responsive and effective? If 
social capital is the key to well-performing governments, is its relationship to both attributes of 
performance similar? More specifically, what is the causal mechanism by which social capital 
 1
 produces “good government” on one dimension or the other? Does institutional structure provide 
an alternative or a complementary explanation of government performance? Which institutional 
structures influence the level of administrative effectiveness or policy responsiveness, and how? 
In the end, what matters more structure or culture? Answering these questions requires plowing 
through a diverse literature on conceptualizing and measuring government performance. The 
inquiry further leads us to the issues of social cooperation and the role of institutions inducing 
cooperation. The method of the study is empirical. The theoretical arguments are tested in two 
rather different national contexts – the U.S. and Germany – in order to provide a broader basis 
for generalizations. In the end, the study contributes to the discussion about cooperation, social 
capital, institutions and government outputs. 
 
 
 
1.1 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Government performance is not an easy and straightforward concept. It can be measured and 
defined quite differently as is evident from the diverse literature devoted to government 
performance and reviewed in Chapter 2. First, the students of public administration have 
developed a substantial body of literature on performance measurement in government.  On the 
theoretical level they conceptualize government performance as comprising inputs, outputs and 
outcomes, in the existing empirical measurement, however, the concept denotes administrative or 
organizational effectiveness. Second, the students of public opinion struggle with explaining the 
variance in citizens’ confidence in and satisfaction with government. Third, studies of 
democratic performance assess whether governments are doing what they are supposed to do: 
whether they are mobilizing and allocating resources to meet social needs. Essentially, all these 
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 research traditions attempt to assess, explain, or determine the effect of government 
performance. Yet, they do not communicate with each other: what is conceptualized, and 
consequently studied, as government performance in one research tradition is very different from 
that of the others. Additionally, even if government performance is conceptualized in a 
multifaceted manner, the empirical measures of the concept are often reduced to a uni-
dimensional index. 
This general confusion about the concept of government performance is also evident in 
the studies linking government performance to social capital. Putnam (1993: 63) defines 
government performance in a representative system as comprising “responsiveness to its 
constituents and efficiency in conducting the public’s business”. At the same time he and those 
replicating his study (Rice and Sumberg 1997, Cusack 1999, Rice 2001, Pierce at al. 2002, 
Knack 2002) construct a uni-dimensional aggregate index to measure the concept. By 
aggregating the components of either attribute of government performance into a uni-
dimensional index it is assumed that responsive government is by definition also efficient and 
effective. Yet, the two attributes need not necessarily capture the same latent concept. It is 
possible that a government is effective administratively, but is a laggard in terms of problem 
solving and service provision. Similarly, a government may be a leader in policy-making and 
innovation and yet face considerable management and administrative problems.  
This study conceptualizes government performance on two equally important 
dimensions: administrative effectiveness and policy responsiveness. Administrative effectiveness 
captures the extent to which a government possesses the means to conduct its internal operations 
effectively and promptly. Following the previous literature, it comprises the components of 
effectiveness of the different management subsystems (such as effective budget cycle and 
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 information services) (Pierce et al. 2002, Ingraham and Donahue 2000, see also Putnam 1993). 
Policy responsiveness, on the other hand, captures the extent of government allocation of 
recourses for various types of public goods and services (such as day care centers, agricultural 
and health spending etc.). It is concerned with government policy outputs (Wilensky 2002, 
Lijphart 1999, Putnam 1993). Chapter 3 elaborates the orthogonal conceptualization and presents 
the results of the empirical scaling of different indicators of performance to test the 
dimensionality argument with real data. 
 
 
 
1.2 SOCIAL COOPERATION AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Definitions of the concepts in theories are an integral part of the theories. That is, concepts and 
their measurement should not be thought of as exogenous to a theory. Thus, a uni-dimensional 
measurement of government performance is justified if according to the theory all explanatory 
variables relate to the different aspects of performance in a similar way.  
Putnam (1993) has framed the theory of government performance in terms of collective 
action and cooperation. “Good government” results from a deliberate collective action by the 
members of society who demand and act to get such government. Thus, getting good government 
becomes a problem of collective action. Putnam then introduces the concept of social capital 
defined as a feature of society, a shared resource that promotes social efficiency by way of 
“facilitating coordinated actions” (1993: 167). In his theoretical argument the concept of social 
capital has three different attributes: trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic 
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 engagement (Putnam 1993: 170-174).1 Putnam’s primary claim is that the level of social capital 
of a society strongly shapes the performance potential of democratic government. The causal 
argument runs as follows. First, because citizens with civic virtue are heavily engaged in their 
communities, they are more effective in demanding and acting to get good government. Second, 
social capital provides a strong social infrastructure for the community and instills democratic 
values within elites and masses. In doing so, social capital facilitates the kind of cooperation and 
collaboration needed to identify, adopt and implement effective policies for the community 
(Putnam 1993: 182). Consequently, in communities where the three components of social capital 
are widespread among the citizenry, democratic governments perform well. On the contrary, in 
communities where there is little social capital to be found and democratic governments perform 
poorly.  
Although Putnam (1993: 163-176) draws creatively upon different game theoretic 
arguments about cooperation, collective action, and public goods, his argument remains vague in 
that it is not clear how the various problems such as free riding, defection and perverse 
incentives are related to the specific components of government performance. For example, why 
is it necessary for building an efficient government information technology system or effective 
budget cycle that the potential for non-cooperation or collective action problem be overcome in 
society? Or if it is argued, as Knack (2002) does, that social capital helps to overcome the 
collective action problem that exists in monitoring government, it takes yet another set of 
                                                 
1 It should be pointed out that although Putnam lists these three components of social capital as of primary 
importance, his empirical measures of social capital actually consist of preference voting, referendum turnout, 
newspaper readership, and scarcity of sports and cultural organizations (Putnam 1993: 91-96). Thus, the measure 
actually captures associational engagement and political participation, trust and norms of reciprocity are measured 
only indirectly (if at all). Further, the original developers of the social capital argument defined social capital 
functionally: whatever facilitates individual or collective action. Such a definition, however, becomes very context-
dependent and subjective, which is why the definition comprising the three context independent attributes of social 
capital is preferred here.  
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 assumptions to create a link between overcoming the collective action problem and increasing 
the accuracy of revenue forecasting or hardware and software performance in government 
management, that constitute the components of his government performance measure. Indeed, if 
such a direct link existed, political institutions would be redundant. Furthermore, due to the 
research design employed, Putnam disregards the effect of (government) institutional design on 
performance claiming to hold this effect constant (1993: 10). Eliminating (prematurely) one 
potential determinant of performance, his causal argument has to rely on societal determinants of 
performance also in the case of those attributes of performance that concern the internal 
operations of government.  
The confusion surrounding Putnam’s argument about the relationship between “good 
government” and social capital is not only theoretical. Consider, for example, Jackman and 
Miller (1996), who reanalyzed Putnam’s data on the performance of Italian regions and found 
more than one latent concepts emerging from the data. They argued, “Putnam’s single-factor 
solution does not constitute a reasonable representation of most of the information contained in 
the 12 indicators” (639). Further, in the disaggregated analyses indicators of administrative 
effectiveness such as budget promptness and statistical services were not linked to the measure 
of social capital whereas the measures of housing development, health spending, day care 
centers, reform innovation – the indicators of policy responsiveness – were. Further, Rice and 
Sumberg (1997) replicating Putnam’s study with data from the U.S. states used three different 
sets of measures for government performance: “policy liberalism”, “policy innovation”, and 
“administrative effectiveness” (108-109). While they also aggregate these different sets of 
indicators into a single measure of government performance, they present, en passé, correlations 
between the different components of government performance and their measure of social 
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 capital. The latter had the strongest correlation with the measure of policy liberalism and the 
weakest with the measure of administrative effectiveness. These pieces of evidence indicate that 
the relationships between social capital and different aspects of government performance are not 
identical. They also imply that the uni-dimensional concept of government performance remains 
restricted and the theoretical propositions derived from such a conceptualization are incomplete. 
Thus, the dimensionality of government performance employed in this study is not an attempt to 
construct a concept for its own sake. Rather, it is driven by existing theoretical deficiencies and 
inconclusive empirical evidence with regard to the determinants of government performance.  
Chapter 4 develops an argument that the problems of cooperation and collective action 
within an institution are different in nature than the problems of cooperation in society. In terms 
of the approach of methodological individualism, the former resembles the situation descried in 
the principal-agent models, whereas the latter poses a problem of voluntary cooperation or the 
cooperation without a supportive institutional structure (or central authority). More specifically, 
this study argues that social capital is associated with the policy responsiveness attribute of 
government performance. Policy responsiveness has been defined here as the extent to which a 
government allocates and mobilizes resources for various types of public goods and services. 
The characteristics of public goods are that they are non-excludable, i.e. anyone can enjoy them 
whether they have paid for their provision or not; and they are jointly supplied, i.e. one person’s 
use does not diminish the supply available for others. These characteristics make it almost 
impossible for public goods and services to be provided on private markets. Thus, they may 
remain undersupplied relative to the levels that the members of society would prefer. The 
obvious solution to this problem is the public production of public goods and services. Yet public 
provision does not just happen. Political pressure must be mobilized to encourage the institutions 
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 of government to make this provision a matter of public policy: political actors must be 
persuaded to act. However, if the provision of a public good or service distributes some benefit 
widely, and if the enjoyment of that good or service is unrelated to whether a contribution has 
been made towards mobilizing politicians to act, then the immediate problem of free riding 
occurs. If many public services are like public goods, then their supply depends on individuals 
and groups successfully engaging in collective action to get the government to provide them. 
Since magic wands are not available, the public supply solution to the provision of public goods 
becomes a problem in collective action. The least costly and probably the most effective way to 
overcome collective action problem is the existence of norms of reciprocity and trust in society 
that are reinforced by ongoing social relationships, or by repeated games in more formal terms 
(see Axelrod 1984, Taylor 1987). Thus, higher levels of social capital within a society enable the 
societal mobilization necessary for the provision of public goods and services. 
The problem of cooperation and coordination within bureaucracy preventing efficient 
administration (including budget promptness, statistical services, accuracy of revenue forecast, 
existence of long-term planning etc.) is not equivalent to the problem of cooperation between 
citizens. The potential problem with bureaucrats is not their undesirability to contribute to the 
collective effort and public interest, but their incentives stemming from a potential for personal 
gain (Niskanen 1971). More specifically, administrative effectiveness is an output reflecting the 
behavior of bureaus and the behavior of politicians. Any theory of bureaus must be based on the 
relationship between bureaucrats and politicians where the former act as agents and the latter as 
principals. The nature of the “agency problem” between these two sets of actors is what defines 
the level of administrative effectiveness. Bureaucratic independence is understood as the 
possibility for bureaucracies to choose policies that differ from the preferences of the enacting 
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 coalition. Given the freedom of bureaucrats to interpret legislation freely politicians will prefer to 
restrict them ex ante, that is, to include procedural restrictions inside the legislation (McCubbins, 
Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989). Procedural restrictions, however, limit the administrators’ 
ability to coordinate people and other resources to achieve legitimate public objectives. 
However, politicians can monitor bureaucrats also ex post via oversight (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984). The smaller the number of agents the less costly would be the monitoring. 
Miller (1992) argues that delegation of administrative authority to more than one subordinate 
entity often leads to incoherent behavior, the more so when subordinate entities have specialized 
(or different) functions. Systems that confer institutionally strong powers to a chief 
administrative officer have the effect of reducing the number of agents to one. Moreover, from 
the bureaucrats’ point of view, the more principals they have the more they can not just play 
them one against the other (as the rational choice perspective would suggest) but also the more 
difficult will it be to coordinate between conflicting political objectives leading to less cohesion 
in management. Politically neutral chief administrative officer would not only reduce the 
pressure of compromising between conflicting demands that bureaucrats with multiple principals 
necessarily face, but also create a more stable administrative system, less vulnerable to electoral 
cycles.  
In general, as government performance is a collective output, the level of performance 
depends on the level of cooperation between the actors providing it. Both institutional design as 
well as societal attributes can foster or impinge the level of cooperation. The relative effect of 
these variables on government performance depends on the aspects of performance. These 
aspects, defined here as policy responsiveness and administrative effectiveness are, in turn, 
related to different kinds of problems of cooperation. More specifically, cooperation and 
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 coordination in society leading to government policy responsiveness requires social capital; 
cooperation and coordination in a bureaucratic organization leading to administrative 
effectiveness requires supportive institutional structures. Chapters 4 and 5 present an empirical 
inquiry into these relationships. The difference between the chapters is in methods. Chapter 4 
employs large-N statistical analyses and draws general conclusions about the factors that are 
related to either dimension of government performance. Chapter 5 presents the eight case studies 
– four from both the U.S. and Germany – that serve the purpose of providing additional evidence 
about the institutional and societal factors influencing the level of government performance on 
administrative effectiveness and policy responsiveness.  
 
 
1.3 METHODS OF INQUIRY AND THE SELECTION OF CASES 
 
The method of the study is empirical. As the study seeks to measure and explain government 
performance, it requires a cross-system comparative design. Furthermore, as the purpose of the 
research is to make general arguments about government performance, generalizability of results 
is a desirable criterion for case selection. These two considerations make subnational 
governments in a cross-national context a more attractive locus of analysis than national 
governments. However, in order for an analysis of subnational cases to be meaningful, these 
governments need to enjoy considerable independence in both administrative as well as policy 
matters, and be large enough to perform diversity of tasks. The U.S. and Germany are both 
federal and decentralized countries (see Lijphart 1999) with local governments having 
considerable power to decide upon their budgets and operations (see Sbragia 1996 for the U.S. 
and Gunlicks 1986 for Germany). These countries are appropriate for the analysis for another 
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 reason: they are different in many aspects relevant for government performance, thus, allowing 
to fulfill the generalizability criterion set for the case selection (Przeworski and Teune 1979).  
Compared to the U.S., Germany is much more legalistic, state-centered and adheres more 
to the equalization of living conditions. Each system specific feature constitutes a part of the 
robustness test the empirical analysis is facing in order for the results to form an adequate basis 
for general conclusions. First, the administrative organization and service provision in the 
German local government system is more uniform than in the U.S. local government system 
(Gunlicks 1986). The U.S. local government is managerially oriented and highly accountable to 
citizens; in Germany, however, local government is a part of the heavily regulated and culturally 
legalistic public sector (see Dafflon 2002). Second, public sector in Germany is larger and the 
sector has higher expectation to influence the lives of the people. There is an acute concern for 
equity that causes the German federal government to involve in fiscal equalization among local 
governments. The objective of this is to provide citizens everywhere with an equal level of 
public facilities and services, in spite of federal structure and decentralized administration. The 
U.S. federal government as well as state governments are much less involved in equalization 
grants. American city governments are also less bound by national level policy commitments, 
which allows for more variation in service provision and policy development at the local level. 
Third, Germans have a strong state-centered orientation: the state is seen as somewhat separate 
and probably superior to society; following the rules of the state seems to be the most relevant 
duty of the citizen. Political participation in any other form than voting is not highly valued. 
Most people prefer higher taxes and more public provision to lower taxes and less public 
provision (Grunow 1991, see also Almond and Verba 1963). In all these aspects Americans are 
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 almost polar opposites of Germans: there is skepticism towards too much government power and 
an active participation in the political system (Powell 1986, Almond and Verba 1963).  
In general, the German setting poses a much more conservative test for the 
dimensionality of government performance, since there may simply be less variance on the 
indicators capturing policy responsiveness (due to the commitment to equality) and 
administrative effectiveness (due to legal regulations). Yet, if the empirical dimensionality tests 
provide significant results in both settings, one can be more confident that two distinct 
dimensions of government performance truly exist. Similarly, finding empirical support for the 
hypothesized relationships in both national settings allows drawing more generalizable 
inferences from the analyses. On the other hand, if there are significant differences in the 
hypothesized relationships between these two settings, the distinct features of either system 
articulated above may prove useful starting points to find reasons for the divergent empirical 
results. 
Considering different systems for analysis arises another concern of the comparative 
method: the ‘traveling problem’ (Sartori 1970), or the question of how meaningful it is to use 
same concepts and measures across different political settings. Peters (1998) has identified two 
different levels where traveling problem can occur: the conceptual level of analysis and 
operational level of developing measures. On the conceptual level, government performance has 
clearly been a concern both in the German as well as American local governments.  
In the U.S. the quest for efficient administration, especially in the context of fiscal 
austerity, is timely both in the academic as well as professional discourse of urban affairs (Poole 
1980, Clark 1994). Since the beginning of the last decade administrative effectiveness and 
efficiency together with flexibility and responsiveness have also become the main concerns of 
 12
 German city governments (Klages 1995, Reichard 1997, Hendriks and Tops 1999, Wollman 
2000). Policy responsiveness has also a clear meaning in the case of the U.S. city governments. 
Since the World War II service delivery has become the raison d’etre of the American city 
(Herson and Bolland 1997). Fiscal consciousness in contemporary cities has not necessarily 
caused a uniform decrease in policy responsiveness. Rather, it has compelled activist 
governments to search for innovative ideas in service provision and policy development (Clark 
1994). German local governments also engage in meaningful local level policy-making. The 
most common areas of city government activism and innovation are: cultural activities, libraries, 
adult education centers, sports and recreation facilities, and economic promotion activities 
(Gunlicks 1986).  
Thus, conceptually, administrative effectiveness and policy responsiveness are expected 
to travel well between these two settings. However, this may not be the case for the operational 
definitions of these concepts. For example, measuring financial management capacity by looking 
at whether a government has mechanisms that preserve stability and fiscal health provides 
considerable variation in the case of the U.S. cities (Barrett and Greene 2000), but not in the case 
of German cities, since in Germany these mechanisms are provided in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Basic Law, and general municipal charter (Gemeindeordnung), and not decided by the individual 
cities. Similarly, spending on public safety may be an appropriate indicator of local government 
allocational policy responsiveness in the U.S. context, in Germany, however, this is a function 
performed by state governments with no possibility for local level initiative. 
With these operationalization problems in mind, there is no attempt to compare 
individual city governments across the two countries. This would lead to considerable difficulties 
in finding comparable indicators and create an additional source for extraneous variance. Instead, 
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 the level of analysis is within countries, the results are verified across countries. Of course, every 
effort is made to create operational measures corresponding to each other across countries as 
closely as possible.  
The sample sizes for the U.S. and Germany are 35 and 85 local governments 
respectively. The U.S. sample is restricted to the sample used in the Government Performance 
Project (Barrett and Greene 2000) and contains the largest cities by revenue. The German sample 
contains cities with population between 50 000 and 300 000, excluding the few largest cities to 
ensure comparability of cases in their functions and size. The cities in both samples are not 
geographically concentrated but represent regional diversities: the German sample covers all 
states (except the city-states) and although the U.S. sample falls short of representing every state, 
it covers all geographic regions. Overall the samples are expected to be representative of the 
large and medium sized communities in both countries. The analysis is cross-sectional, using 
data from one time-point within a general timeline of 1995-2002 depending on the availability of 
data. No analysis across time is attempted.  
The study uses multiple methods of inquiry. First, quantitative indicators of city 
governments’ performance are factor analyzed in order to determine whether these indicators 
form two distinct latent clusters: administrative effectiveness and policy responsiveness. The 
ordinary least squares regression analysis is the dominant method used in order to present 
patterns of relationships associated with each dimension of government performance. The data 
for the quantitative analyses were collected from a variety of sources. These include surveys of 
city governments performed by the Government Performance Project and German Association of 
Cities, mass surveys including DDN Needham Life Style survey and German General Social 
Study. Some data were also coded from the U.S. Census Bureau files, the Statistical Yearbook of 
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 German Local Governments, the U.S. City Charters, Municipal Yearbooks (the U.S.), German 
local government constitutions, and various other city documents. 
In addition to the quantitative analyses, comparative case studies were conducted on four 
cities from each country in order to examine in greater detail the possible factors behind different 
types of government performance. The selection of the four cases is based on the empirical 
scaling of the dependent variable. Based on the scale values of each city on both dimensions of 
government performance, a four-fold empirical typology of government performance is formed 
in Chapter 3. The four cases from both countries represent one type of government performance 
each. The case selection according to the typology of government performance facilitates 
comparison among different types and aid in the discovery of significant characteristics that are 
logically independent of the criteria defining the types but empirically associated with the 
different types (see Lijphart 1969). They also serve the purpose of triangulation in evidence 
provision and allow addressing questions that might arise as a result of the statistical inquiry. 
Several unobtrusive measures, such as study of the city documentation, media review, and 
observation were used for the qualitative data collection. Additionally, in each city 8 to 10 in-
depth interviews were conducted with city administrative department heads, City Council 
members and active community leaders. 
 
 
 
1.4 FINDINGS 
 
The evidence presented and verified across two different national settings indicates that 
communities with higher levels of social capital tend to be more effective in pressuring their 
governments to provide more public goods and services. The study also shows that social capital 
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 is less useful a concept for explaining the effectiveness and efficiency within the bureaucratic 
organization of government. The variance on this dimension of government performance is 
better explained by institutional and demographic variables. Chapter 6 discusses these results and 
draws comparative conclusions from the analyses performed separately for Germany and the 
U.S. It discusses the generalizability of the findings of this study given the most different 
systems setting in which the empirical test have been performed. 
The results of the study have important implications. First, the findings clarify the 
theoretical linkages, and to a certain extent, also the direction of causality between social capital 
and government performance. High levels of social capital facilitate overcoming collective 
action problems in society, which makes it easier for citizens to articulate their demands and 
exercise pressure on policy-makers. The danger that government activity may kill private 
initiative and lower the level of social capital is not confirmed in this study; rather on the 
contrary. Students of comparative politics may not consider this finding too counter-intuitive: 
social capital appears to be the highest in countries where government is actively involved in 
service provision, consider Scandinavian welfare states (Putnam 2000).  
Second, studies so far have left a rather bleak prospect in terms of the possibility of 
improving government performance, as increasing the level of social capital is a complicated 
enterprise (Putnam 1993, Knack 2002). The results of this study suggest that government 
effectiveness can and should be designed. Administrative effectiveness might be increased by 
favorable institutional arrangements and availability of resources. The efforts of administrative 
modernization are not necessarily doomed to failure in less civic communities. 
Third, concerning the debate between the cultural and the institutional explanations of 
government performance, the findings of this study suggest that both variables help to 
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 understand the level of performance, but on different dimensions. That is, administrative 
effectiveness is mainly associated with endogenous or institutional variables, and policy 
responsiveness is more closely related to exogenous or societal variables. Thus, certain 
reconciliation between the competing explanations of government performance has been 
achieved. Stated differently, the debate about the institutional and cultural variables as rival 
determinants of government performance seems to be misplaced, as it is the level of cooperation 
that is most directly linked to performance, and both variables can induce cooperation in 
different contexts. 
The study does not promise to provide a practical handbook for measuring and improving 
upon government performance. The contribution of this study is that it takes a more systematic 
approach to defining the relevant attributes of government performance, identifying indicators 
for each attribute, and using statistical scaling methods to confirm the empirical validity of the 
distinctiveness of the attributes. Only then does it start building a theory around either attribute. 
This way it has been possible to theoretically as well as empirically specify the significant 
relationships associated with either attribute and build a more complete picture of what 
determines government performance and how. 
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2. RECEIVED CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
The interrelated tasks of conceptualization and measurement of the dependent variable – 
government performance – serve as the initial stage of theory development. Thus, the purpose of 
the current chapter is to give an overview of the different conceptualizations of government 
performance as used in the political science literature. The chapter is organized into reviews of 
different research traditions: studies on government-citizen relations using public opinion data, 
studies on performance measurement in public administration, and studies on democratic 
performance that attempt to assess, explain, or determine the effect of government performance. 
Both conceptualization and operationalization of government performance will be the center of 
attention in the course of this review. 
 
 
 
2.1 THREE WAYS OF CONCEPTUALIZING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
2.1.1 Public Opinion and Government Performance 
 
 
Using public opinion data for measuring government performance has an intuitive appeal as 
some might say that the ultimate verdict of the performance of a democratic government is 
public opinion (see Pharr and Putnam 2000, Norris 1999, Lipset and Schneider 1987, Brudney 
and England 1982). Studies in this research tradition have considered the fluctuation in people’s 
confidence in government, their satisfaction with the enacted policies and their evaluations of 
government performance or that of certain services. 
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 2.1.1.1 Citizen confidence in government  
An extant literature has presented evidence that citizen satisfaction with the way 
government is working has been decreasing considerably for the past 20-30 years in the U.S. (see 
Blendon et al. 1997, Craig 1996, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001, Lipset and Schnider 1987, 
Miller 1974, Miller and Borelli 1991), Canada (Nevitte 2000), in the advanced industrial 
countries of Europe and Asia (see Cusack 1999, Inglehart 1997, Klingeman and Fuchs 1995, 
Norris 1999, Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997, Pharr and Putnam 2000 for the presentation and 
analysis of the relevant data), and in the fledgling democracies of the Central and Eastern 
European (Rose, Mishler, and Haepler 1998, Mishler and Rose 2002).  
Yet the relationship between government performance and citizen confidence in 
government remains at most speculative: it has neither theoretically nor empirically been 
confirmed. Several studies have used crude outcome measures (such as inflation, unemployment, 
budget deficit etc.) and attempted to compare variance in these “objective performance 
measures” to variance in public opinion about government in North America and Western 
Europe (Clarke, Dutt, and Kronberg 1993, Katzenstein 2000, McAllister 1999, Miller and 
Listhaug 1999). These analysts have contended that it may be simple economic change, not 
general government performance that influences political confidence.  
In addition, government and its institutions are not the only ones that are losing the trust 
and confidence in the eyes of people. Public confidence has also decreased in such institutions as 
private companies, medicine, universities, church, and the legal system both in the U.S. as well 
as in the west European context (see Blendon et al. 1997, Dalton 2002, Lipset and Schneider 
1987, Listhaug and Wiberg 1995, Nye 1997).2 Indeed, the very fact itself that public confidence 
                                                 
2 There is some contradictory evidence about Western Europe: some authors claim that contrary to the case of the 
U.S., confidence in private companies and education system actually increased over time (Listhaug and Wiberg 
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 in almost all public institutions (especially in the U.S.) has been steadily decreasing over the last 
20 to 30 years suggests that something more far reaching than poor performance must be 
responsible. 
Other explanations found in the literature undermine the validity of the assumption that 
public discontent with the government of the day bears one-to-one relationship to the 
performance of the latter. The economy in general, as alluded to above, and people’s perception 
of their own economic situation specifically, has been found to be one of the reasons for 
discontent. Citrin and Green (1986), Craig (1996), King (1997), Lipset and Schneider (1987), 
McAllister (1999), Miller and Borelli (1991), present the evidence that those people whose 
financial situation has worsened and who believe that the state of economy as a whole has 
become less favorable express more discontent with government. These relationships have been 
confirmed comparatively as well as in the U.S. context; the strength of the relationship is usually 
modest, but relatively consistent. At the aggregate level, while it is clear that some of the 
discontent can be traced to adverse economic conditions (see McAllister 1999, Miller and 
Listhaug 1999), Lawrence (1997) shows that such conditions are not a powerful explanation of 
discontent over time.3
Furthermore, trust in government institutions is closely correlated with the public’s 
perception of the ethics and morality of the leaders of those institutions (Lipset and Schneider 
                                                                                                                                                             
1995). More recent evidence from large European countries such as the U.K., France and Germany, however, 
indicates that there is decreased confidence in the leadership of business corporations (Dalton 2002). 
3 It is necessary to add that Lawrence tests his proposition in the U.S. context only. Thus, his results may reflect 
some of the American idiosyncrasies. Moreover, McAllister (1999), in his comparative test of the same proposition 
confirms Lawrence’s result that the relationship does not hold in the case of the U.S., which further proves the above 
speculation. McAllister further alludes to the possibility of the well-developed civil society in the case of the U.S. as 
an explanatory factor for why American people are less likely to blame government for economic downturn. 
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 1987, see also Orren 1997, for international evidence see della Porta 2000, Pharr 2000).4 This 
perception is most probably fuelled by the changing role of the media: the news has become 
more negative, focused more on conflict than on substance (Patterson 1993). Moreover, it has 
been argued that politicians themselves reinforce negative views about government. Orren (1997: 
95) states that, “the denuncification of government by political leaders and the press … is now a 
dependable and constant feature of the contemporary political culture”. Further, Ansolabhere and 
Iyengar (1995) have showed by controlled experiments that negative campaign ads are effective, 
but by using them politicians consequently increase cynicism. E. Berman (1997) has similarly 
shown that both the cynicism of media as well as politicians about the local government is 
positively and strongly related to the cynicism of the citizens towards the local government.  
Studies also suggest that satisfaction with the work of any institution depends on a 
relationship between personal expectations and performance (Miller and Listhaug 1999, Orren 
1997, Thompson 1993). Confidence may, thus, erode because expectations have increased, or 
simply transformed, although the performance has remained the same. In a similar vein, 
satisfaction may decline not because government is performing worse, but because it has decided 
to undertake, most probably with public consent, more difficult and controversial policies. Other 
authors have tied the loss of confidence in government institutions to the party polarization in the 
U.S. (King 1997) and realignment of political parties in general (Brady and Theriault 2001, Funk 
2001, see also Nye 1997). More sweepingly, Inglehart (1997) argues that increased cynicism 
about government is explained by a culture shift: eroding respect of authority is part of modern 
and post-modern values as people switch from survival to quality of life values. In sum, the fact 
that there are numerous factors other than government performance that account for citizen 
                                                 
4 Some observers, however, doubt that there has been increase in scandal (see Garment 1991) and question the 
persuasiveness of this proposition.  
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 satisfaction with government does not create confidence in this measure as an indicator of 
government performance. 
2.1.1.2 Public opinion and public policy  
The students of representation have attended the question of public opinion and policy 
congruence. While the research is abundant, the evidence is, again, inconclusive. The earlier 
studies pessimistically indicated quite low level of congruence of the opinion of representatives 
and their constituents (see especially Miller and Stokes 1963), thus amplifying the Burkean 
notion of the representative as a trustee and leading further to theories of elite manipulation of 
public opinion in order to explain some of the congruence (see Jacobs and Shapiro 2000 for a 
powerful argument). Later studies, moving away from the conceptualization of representation as 
a dyadic relationship between the representative and the represented, have demonstrated that the 
legislature collectively responds fairly well to public preferences, especially so on high salience 
issues (Monroe 1998, Page and Shapiro 1983, Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995); and that 
public, in the other hand, is able to recognize important policy changes (Wlezien 1995, 1996). 
The problem with opinion-policy congruence studies, however, is that these opinions have a 
strong ideological flavor and involve selective perceptional focuses. That is, people who find 
there to be a discrepancy between what government does and what they perceive government 
should be doing lose faith in government institutions not because the latter are doing a bad job, 
but because they are doing too good a job in advancing wrong policies (see Downs and Larkey 
1986, Miller 1974, Orren 1997). Yet there is no conceivable pattern of government spending that 
could be considered optimal by everyone. Each individual will always think it possible that 
government could produce a different (more valuable) set of outcomes and, thus, increase 
responsiveness in this specific case. Yet, when government performance and responsiveness is 
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 measured by the extent of congruence between its goals and those of our own, there will always 
be disappointment. 
Further, in terms of comparative evidence about the association between public opinion 
and public policy, Wilensky (2002) demonstrates that difference in “demand” or public 
preference for certain policies rather than others cannot explain the differences in taxing and 
spending patterns or the actual government policy choices. The argument is that there are simply 
no cross-space differences in public issue specific preferences (in aggregate terms): there is a 
uniform popularity of pensions, national health insurance, family policies, safety and security, 
economic growth and a similar uniform suspicion of public assistance targeted towards the 
nonworking, non-aged poor. Yet there are also considerable cross-space differences in policies in 
all of these areas. Public opinion, a constant in this equation, cannot account for the observed 
variance and, thus, does not serve as a useful basis for determining the specific policy choices 
made by governments. 
The representation research, more attentive of the methodological issues, has also 
generated considerable amount of criticism in terms of the validity and reliability of public 
opinion data in general, and the popular lack of attention and ignorance towards political 
information specifically (Abramson 1983, Converse 1964, Kinder and Sears 1985). One of the 
most unsettling findings of the public opinion research has been the large component of 
randomness in most people’s answers to survey questions (Zaller and Feldman 1992). “If the 
same people are asked the same question in repeated interviews, only about half give the same 
answers” (Zaller and Feldman 1992: 580). Numerous studies also record findings not only of 
random response variance, but also of a systematic variance from artifactual “interview effects”, 
i.e. people’s responses to interview questions are affected by the order of the questions asked, the 
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 nature of the question (open-ended vs. closed choice questions) and the like (see Bishop 1990, 
Krosnick and Schuman 1988, Tourangeau et al. 1989).  
2.1.1.3 Public opinion and quality of public service  
There are also studies that look at the public’s verdict on the performance of a specific (usually 
local) government or an agency. The assumption is that for assessing the quality of specific 
services and governments close to citizens’ everyday life, public opinion proves an accurate 
measure. Some studies have used public opinion data as the measure of their dependent variable: 
the performance of a (local) government (Cusack 1999, DeHoog, Lowrey, and Lyons 1990, Katz 
et al. 1975, Miller and Miller 1991, Rice 2001). Other studies have compared citizen satisfaction 
with some objective measures of local government service provision (Stipak 1979a, 1979b, 
1977, Swindell and Kelly 2000). Still others have compared citizen satisfaction with private and 
public services (Poister and Henry 1994), or compared citizen opinion to the officials’ perception 
of those opinions (Melkers and Thomas 1998).  
These studies, however, have also confirmed the extraneous nature as well as the 
unreliability of measures of citizen satisfaction with local government. Several authors have 
provided evidence that many people are in error about the facts (Bok 1997). Authors have shown 
that measures such as tons of garbage collected, proximity of schools and parks etc. do not bear a 
one-to-one relationship with shaping public satisfaction and that public evaluation of public 
services may lack solid grounding in reasoned appraisal (Brown and Cutler 1983, DeHoog, 
Lowrey, and Lyons 1990, Parks 1984, Stipak 1979b). Also, people often commit attribution 
error, i.e. citizens may believe that a government jurisdiction is delivering a service when it 
actually is not and vice versa (see Lowery, Lyons, and DeHoog 1990, Thompson 1997). The 
inconsistency of people’s preferences has further been demonstrated by the studies that show the 
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 evidence of incongruence between citizens’ preference for more (local government) services and 
their willingness to pay for these services (Beck et al. 1987, Glaser and Hildreth 1999, Lowery 
1985). Thus, people commonly show little knowledge of even the relatively observable local 
governments and their services.  
Furthermore, apparent inconsistency also exists between citizens’ judgments of the 
performance of specific agencies and those of the government as a whole: the assessments of the 
former tend to be more favorable (Bok 1997, Miller and Miller 1991, Thompson 1993). 
However, it is not at all that clear why this is the case and what is the basis of such evaluation.5  
Also, people’s direct contacts with officials tend to produce higher evaluations of the work of 
government (Stipak 1979b). Katz et al. (1975) have shown that, on average, two-thirds of people 
were satisfied or very satisfied with their agency encounters, most of those people thought that 
their problem had been taken care of, an overwhelming majority thought they had been treated 
fairly and that the agency had been efficient.6 Yet more general evaluations of government were 
considerably and consistently lower. Other studies have similarly demonstrated that negatively 
toned experience tends to move the preexisting neutral or positive attitude in the direction of the 
experience, while positive experiences do not have the same effect in changing attitudes in more 
positive direction (Katz et al. 1975, Nisbett and Ross 1980). Often people’s negative views are 
based on simply ‘common sense’ and they voice these negative opinions of bureaucracy even if 
they never had any personal contact with the officials (Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stokes 2001, see 
also Brudney and England 1982). More generally, it is not known on which aspects of 
government service citizens base their satisfaction or evaluation (Stipak 1979a, 1979b, 1977). 
                                                 
5 Fenno (1978) has demonstrated similar effect in the case of public attitude towards the U.S. Congress: when asked 
about Congress as an institution, a high proportion of citizens were very critical, but when asked about their own 
representative in Congress, a high proportion of respondents were highly complimentary. 
6 See also Goodsell (1994) on the argument that most personal encounters with bureaucracy are positive. 
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 That is, different respondents may base their assessments on different aspects of performance 
dependent on what they perceive as most salient or important. Studies using public opinion as the 
measure of government performance often make an implicit assumption that survey respondents 
share a common point of reference in evaluating performance.  
There is also the assumption that these evaluations will not become more critical as the 
actual level of service provision improves (i.e. they assume there to be a linear monotonic 
relationship between the public perception of performance and the actual performance). 
However, given the difficulties of measuring attitudes and opinions, these assumptions cannot be 
taken for granted. Further, several findings indicate that citizen evaluations of specific services 
and agencies may be affected by different demographic characteristics such as race and age, as 
well as income (see DeHoog, Lowrey, and Lyons 1990, Swindell and Kelly 2000, see also 
Brudney and England 1982). Thus, a mean comparison of performance assessment across 
government units, as frequently utilized in the analyses, may erroneously attribute differences in 
the perception of service quality to government performance, when the actual source is 
demographic differences across localities. 
There is still another set of studies that operationalize government performance in the 
manner often used for evaluating the performance of private sector organizations: considering 
employees’ opinion about their organization (Brewer and Selden 2000).7 Such a technique, 
however, does not eliminate the problems associated with measuring public opinion. Further, it is 
much more conceivable that employees’ perceptions about the performance of a private company 
are based on some objective indicators such as productivity. In the case of government agencies 
productivity measures are not readily available and the basis for employees’ perceptions of the 
                                                 
7 See Delaney and Huiselid (1996) for using the same method about private sector organizations. 
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 performance of a specific agency is not uniformly defined. Light’s (2002) review of the survey 
of public servants points to some of the intervening variables: employees who work in bigger 
organizations and in or near Washington D.C., tend to give more positive evaluations than 
employees of middle-size or small organizations who work in the field. Similarly, federal 
employees who work at the prestigious, traditionally inner-cabinet departments of Defense, 
Justice, State, and Treasury were much more likely to believe that all levels of their work force 
were improving, and more likely to describe their organizations as trusted. None of these 
variables is directly concerned with any service quality or productivity standard. 
The review of different sets of studies using public opinion as a measure of government 
performance raises concerns about the validity of this measure. Studies considering citizen 
satisfaction with government have identified a set of explanatory variables accounting for the 
variance in the level of satisfaction. Unless we are willing to force government performance into 
the residual category of these regressions, its relationship with public trust remains unknown. 
And even if we accept that some of the unexplained variance in public confidence in government 
is attributable to government performance, we still lack a conceptual and operational definition 
of government performance. Furthermore, there are several methodological issues related to 
measuring public opinion that increase the measurement error. Even when evaluating the 
performance of more tangible government activities, e.g. local government service provision, 
people’s ability to make knowledgeable judgments remains limited and the criteria on which 
people base their judgments remain unclear. In sum, it is not easy to infer the meaning and level 
of government performance from the public opinion data. 
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 2.1.2 Public Administration View on Government Performance 
 
 
Being the study of the art and science of management applied to the public sector, it is only 
natural to start to look for a proper definition and measurement of government performance in 
the public administration research tradition. The public administration literature considers 
performance measurement and improvement as a practical managerial task with the end of 
producing better managerial decisions. The general concept of government performance in this 
research tradition contains the notion of outcomes: the extent to which goals of the government 
activities are met. There are two ways in which the public administration literature has measured 
and studied the concept of government performance: the traditional public administration 
approach and the new public management approach.  
2.1.2.1 Traditional public administration approach  
The traditional public administration approach, revitalized recently, uses different, usually 
context-specific criteria that are judged to capture the essence of effective governments 
(Ingraham and Donahue 2000, Ingraham and Kneedler 2000, see also Meier 1994, Rainey and 
Steinbauer 1999). Such criteria based approaches on management practices share the assumption 
that organizations meeting most of the pre-determined criteria have the capacity to be effective 
and high performing, even if no specific performance measures are analyzed.  
Using a criteria-based approach, scholars have recently assessed the administrative 
effectiveness of different management areas – financial management, capital management, IT 
management, and human resources management – on different levels of government in the U.S. 
In order to assess the government capacity in these areas, 23 criteria were developed. For 
example, the criteria for assessing the quality of financial management were the following: 
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 government has a multi-year perspective in budgeting, government has mechanisms that preserve 
stability and fiscal health, sufficient financial information is available for policy-makers, 
managers, and citizens, government has appropriate control over financial operations.8 The 
fulfillment of each of these criteria was assessed based on the information gathered from a 
survey of governments. Depending on how well the criteria were met, each government was 
graded on the five management areas.  
The grades provide illustrative measures of the level of government capacity and can be 
used in further analyses. For example, Knack (2002) and Pierce et al. (2002) use these in order to 
test the relationship between government performance and social capital in American cities. The 
object of measurement and the unit of analysis are clearly defined: effectiveness, i.e. 
administrative and operational effectiveness (not the effectiveness of the general policies) and 
administrative functions of a government respectively. These measures are operational, and the 
levels of performance comparable across governments. This approach, especially in its recent 
applications, by restricting itself to the study of administrative effectiveness explicitly, seeks to 
explain the role administration plays in society. 
Other studies have used similar kinds of instrumental measurement in order to tap 
government capability (Bowman and Kearney 1988) or administrative quality (Barrilleaux, 
Feiock, and Crew 1992). The rationale is similar here: poorly developed structures and processes 
inhibit the ability of government to act effectively, efficiently and responsively. Bowman and 
Kearney (1988: 359) while assessing the capability of all branches of the U.S. state governments 
conclude that “factors such as staffing and spending, accountability and information 
                                                 
8 See Government Performance Project at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp/ for the results of the assessments of the 
U.S. federal, state, county, and city administrations. For the analysis of specific management areas see, for example, 
Ammar, Duncombe and Wright (2001), Ammar, Duncombe, Hou and Wright (2001): financial and capital 
management, Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham (2000), Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson (2001): human resource 
management. 
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 management, and executive centralization seem to capture the heart of capability”. Barrilleaux, 
Feiock, and Crew (1992), on the other hand, assess the quality of state administrations only, by 
predefining seven standards of quality administration: professional expertise, information 
processing, innovativeness, efficiency, representativeness, partisan neutrality, and integrity. 
Although the ultimate goal of such conceptualization and measurement is assessing 
government performance, what actually is measured is government capacity for performance. 
The measurement rests on the assumption that if there is no capacity for administration and 
implementation, successful outcome is very unlikely (see also O’Toole 2000), essentially 
equating capacity with performance.9 Also, this approach is concerned only with the internal 
operations of a government and does not consider what governments – the substantive policies.  
2.1.2.2 New public management  
Most of the rest of the public administration literature on performance attempts to go beyond 
capacity and tackle government performance more broadly. The new public management school 
stresses the importance of results and advocates the notion that organizations should be 
concerned with their outputs and outcomes, rather than simply with procedures through which 
the latter are produced (see Halachmi and Bouckaert 1996). Critics have pointed out deficiencies 
of an instrumental approach to the measurement of government performance: the traditional 
public administration consideration of administrative effectiveness as the measure of government 
performance assumes, rather than establishes, the link between process and outcome, and this 
                                                 
9 To an extent it is not wrong to equate government capacity with government performance because the measures of 
capacity capture explicitly government activities, factors that government can directly control and influence, while 
performance (defined as outcomes or goal achievement) contains factors exogenous to and not easily controlled by 
government (such as environment, region, economic situation etc.). 
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 assumption has been argued (though not proved) to be unrealistic (see Halachmi and Bouckaert 
1996).10  
In this research tradition performance measurement is most generally understood as the 
existence of clear objectives and assessment or measurement of outputs and outcomes in relation 
to these objectives (Hatry 2001). Much of the literature on performance measurement and 
management in government has been prescriptive, reflecting immediate concerns of practitioners 
in public sector and oriented towards identifying and advocating the spread of “best practices” 
rather than tackling with conceptual questions and systematically measuring and explaining the 
performance of specific governments. Because of the goal of finding a prescription for making 
public programs or agencies work better, this body of literature does not provide any operational 
measure of overall government performance.  
The performance management literature tells us the following:  how government 
performance should be measured (for example, Grizzle 1982, Hatry 2001, Schick 2001, Thomas 
2001); what conditions facilitate or hinder the adoption of performance measurement systems 
(Berman and Wang 2000, Boyer, Lawrence, and Wilson 2001, Broadnax and Conway 2001, de 
Lancer Julnes 2001, Grenier 1996); how widespread is the actual use of performance 
measurement systems internationally (Halachmi and Bouckaert 1996, Hegewisch and Larsen 
1996, Pollitt and Bouckaert 1995) as well as by different levels of government within the U.S (by 
federal agencies: U.S. General Accounting Office 1992; by states: Ingraham and Moynihan 
2001, Lee 1991, Melkers and Willoughby 1998, Willoughby and Melkers 2001; by counties: 
Berman and Wang 2000; and by cities: Poister and McGowan 1984, Poister and Streib 1989, 
Stipak and O’Toole 1990); whether and why this information gathered is also used by managers 
                                                 
10 However, see Wolf (1997) who provides support, by way of performing a meta-analysis of previous case studies, 
for the hypothesis that managerial capacity and entrepreneurial characteristics of a government agency are the keys 
to their effectiveness. 
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 (Greiner 1996, Ingraham and Moynihan 2001); and why measuring performance in the public 
sector is altogether dysfunctional creating extra financial costs (Bradley and Flowers 2001), cost 
in terms of moral hazard (Courty and Marschke 1997, Marschke 2001, Radin 2000) or goal 
displacement (Barnow 2000, Heinrich 1999, Perrin 1998). But it does not tell us how well or 
poorly any specific government performs.  
Performance measurement is a managerial tool serving managerial needs (Ammons, Coe, 
Lobardo 2001, Coe 1999, de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001, Greiner 1996, Halachmi 1996, 
Heinrich 1999, Poister and Streib 1999, Radin 2001). The wider use of such measures and the 
assessment of government-wide performance based on these measures are difficult if not 
impossible (Bradley and Flowers 2001, Downs and Larkey 1986, Halachmi 1996). That is, 
according to the performance measurement literature, measures of government performance 
should include indicators of outcomes and goal achievement. However, such a conceptualization 
calls for measures that are not easy to obtain on the overall government level (as opposed to 
program level). Consider the prescription for the operationalization of performance. The measure 
of performance should include: inputs, workload or activities, outputs or final products, 
outcomes, efficiency and productivity, workload characteristics (Hatry 2001). In operational 
terms this has meant the development of a myriad of specific indicators that ought to be used by 
agencies in order to determine whether and how well the objectives have been met. Pollitt (2000: 
133-134) provides illustrative examples about the bewildering number of performance indicators 
identified by different efforts of performance measurement: the Federal Productivity Program of 
1973 generated more than 3000 indicators, the list of indicators for the performance of the U.K. 
Next Steps agencies consisted of 314 pages by 1996. The list of indicators identified in the 
prescriptive scholarly work on measuring performance is also comprehensive in setting the 
 32
 standards for the measurement: Bouckaert (1993) identifies 20 criteria that should be met by 
good performance measures, Cohen (1993) needs almost five pages in order to present his list of 
management effectiveness indicators.  
It is relatively easy to comprehend that if 100% of a job training program graduates get 
new jobs then the program is performing well (although even here part of the outcome may be 
produced by exogenous factors), it is not easy to construct a metric by which all the numerous 
programs conducted by any single government at a given time can be aggregated into an 
outcome measuring government performance. While justified conceptually, such outcome 
measurement is almost impossible to achieve (at least by a single researcher with limited 
resources). Such a broad conceptualization of government performance, thus, remains but a 
theoretical construct with little empirical use.  
The few studies that have attempted to use these kinds of performance measures in their 
analyses have resorted to studying only certain government functions or programs for which 
easily aggregated data are available. For example, the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA) Comparative Performance Measurement project that compares the 
performance of city government basic services such as fire and police protection, street 
maintenance, parks and recreation, and the like use only 3-5 indicators for each service.11 
Heinrich and Lynn (2000) formulate hypotheses, in the context of job-training programs, about 
the relationship between organizational structures and performance measuring the latter by five 
indicators comprising the job placement rate and cost per entry into employment for different 
social groups. Similarly, Riccio, Bloom, and Hill (2000) investigate how management practices, 
                                                 
11 The measures used are usually: operating expenditures per capita, expenditure per output unit, and some outcome 
measure (number of violent crimes, percentage of road miles assessed to be in satisfactory condition) (ICMA 1998). 
See also Ammons, Coe, and Lombardo (2001) for a discussion of other comparative projects similar to the one by 
ICMA. 
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 organizational characteristics and service technology influence the performance of welfare-to-
work programs in local offices. The performance is defined as outcomes measured by earnings, 
labor force participation and welfare receipt. Hage and Dewar (1973) use innovation, i.e. the 
introduction of new programs, as the measure of organizational performance.  
In sum, the public administration literature provides two ways of measuring government 
performance. The New Public Management and performance measurement school is 
conceptually more ambitious including goal achievement and different stages of government 
activity (such as inputs, workloads, outputs, outcomes) into its concept of performance. It is 
intended as a practical guide for the measurement of the performance of specific programs or 
agencies. However, it does not provide an operational measure of overall government 
performance for analytic purposes. Another set of studies in public administration has considered 
government administrative capacity restricting the measure of government performance to the 
quality of government internal operations. This realm of study is better defined and more 
operational providing specific indicators that can be measured and compared across 
governments.  
 
2.1.3 Democratic Performance 
 
 
In addition to measuring public opinion and administrative effectiveness, studies have also used 
historical and comparative data about policy outputs and outcomes in order to get at an aggregate 
estimate of government performance. This literature includes studies measuring democratic 
performance or “democracy”, studies that measure certain aggregate societal outcomes, and 
studies that have developed certain specific indicators for measuring the (democratic) 
performance of specific governments in terms of what governments do.  
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 2.1.3.1 The performance of liberal democracy  
The first set of studies, those dealing with liberal democratic performance, usually takes a very 
broad approach to defining and measuring their dependent (or sometimes independent) variable. 
In these studies performance refers to “the degree to which a system meets such democratic 
norms as representativeness, accountability, equality and participation” (Lijphart 1993: 149). A 
focus on liberal democratic performance will exclude values that may provide proper measures 
of the efficiency and efficacy of any system of government (such as macroeconomic 
management or welfare provision or even system support and legitimacy) and concentrates 
instead on values listed above, values that are intrinsic to liberal democratic government 
(Foweraker and Krznaric 2000). This approach, thus, stands explicitly in contrast to the other 
two approaches of conceptualizing government performance: the public administration 
perspective examines specific measures of government efficiency while the public opinion 
approach largely measures government efficacy and public support.  
Researchers have developed an impressive collection of indicators of democratic 
performance.12 The measures usually capture some aspects of the nature of political rights and 
political liberties (see Bollen 1991) comprising, in some form or another, some institutional 
variables such as right to vote, party competition, electoral irregularity, freedom of the press etc. 
(see, for example, Banks 1972, Beetham 1994, Clarke and Kronberg 1971, Inkeles 1991, 
Jackman 1973, Lijphart 1999, Powell 1982, Powell 2000). While calling such indicators 
“measures of performance”, these studies are effectively measuring the extent of democratization 
of different political systems and not the level of performance of specific governments. 
                                                 
12 The purpose here is not to give an extensive overview of studies dealing with democratization and democratic 
performance, but review the literature to the extent that it speaks to the concept of government performance. See 
Beetham (1994), Foweraker and Krznaric (2000), and Inkeles (1991) for a comprehensive review of studies using 
measures of democratic performance as well as for critique of these measures. 
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 Measurement in these studies is expected to be on a very aggregate level comparing democratic 
and non-democratic (or less democratic, as the measure is not necessarily dichotomous, or 
different types of democratic) regimes. The aggregate regime-defining indicators are not able to 
capture differences in performance within democratic regimes.  
2.1.3.2 Societal outcomes as indicators of government performance  
Another set of studies conceptualizes and measures government performance with the help of 
some aggregate societal outcomes. These generally take historical and comparative approach to 
assessing society’s progress toward some generally accepted goals such as steady economic 
growth, or social policy and welfare provision. Bok (1996, 1997) has compared the U.S. with a 
number of other highly developed industrial nations across time on such outcome indicators as: 
clean environment, economic growth, pleasant neighborhoods, and protection from violence, 
poverty and disease. The logic of the argument is that these are the goals shared by large 
majorities of Americans as well as citizens of other developed nations and with these goals in 
mind, it is possible to map the progress of each country in the face of others. Various studies 
comparing subnational governments have also used quality of life indicators, indexing such 
measures as coverage with health services, kindergartens, average personal income, measures of 
mortality, level of education etc (see Hansen 1994, Lieske 1990) in order to assess and compare 
government performance. Other studies have used measures such as inflation, unemployment, 
budget deficit, economic growth and the like to provide comparative evidence of government 
performance in different countries or subnational units (see Alesina and Wacziarg 2000, 
Anderson 1995, Anderson 2001, Clarke, Dutt, and Kronberg 1993, Crepaz 1996, Fried and 
Rabinovitz 1980, Katzenstein 2000, Kronberg and Clarke 1992, Lijphart 1994, McAllister 1999, 
Miller and Listhaug 1999, Rice and Arnett 2001).  
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 All these studies concentrate on rather easily accessible, factual data, and rank high on 
the reliability and validity scale. However, conceptually the measures are disputable. Estimating 
the government’s contribution to the societal outcomes is extremely difficult. Air quality 
depends on factors such as industry, demographics, geographical location, and people’s habits in 
addition to government environmental policy. Exogenous factors influence also other policy 
areas and function towards partially determining social progress. Even if comparing seemingly 
similar systems such as highly developed democracies or subnational governments within one 
country, not all external conditions can be controlled for. Size of countries (or government units) 
varies considerably, as do their demographic composition and histories. Thus, there is a danger 
in committing an ecologic fallacy when using theses measures as indicators of government 
performance.  
2.1.3.3 Government policy performance  
Researchers have also attempted to construct a measure of government performance (in a 
democratic system) that, contrary to studies reviewed above, explicitly captures the activities of 
governments.13 These authors consider what governments are doing, i.e. government policy 
outputs, in order to assess their performance. Government expenditure in different policy areas 
and counting policy tools used by governments are common measures for capturing government 
policy performance (Jacob 1971, Kelly 2003, Swindell and Kelly 2000).  
The usual assumption in these studies is that governments that are more active in public 
service provision are the better performing ones. For example, Wilensky (2002) in his extensive 
study of 19 rich democracies considers the difference in public policies and system outputs 
                                                 
13 Using the distinction made in the public administration literature between government performance and 
government capacity (see section 2.1.2.1), these studies are effectively also measuring government capacity as the 
outcome measures are not included in the indexes. 
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 across these countries. His basic argument is that countries that have more participatory 
governing systems (corporatist arrangements) and that have social policies absorbed into general 
economic policy produce better system outputs such as economic growth, public health, clean 
environment, public safety and equality. That is, more active and participatory governments are 
better governments than the ones that are less participatory and laggards in terms of enlarging the 
state intervention. In a similar vein, Lijphart (1999) calls governments who actively pursue 
welfarist policies and social integration as “kinder, gentler” democracies also equating quantity 
with the quality of government performance. 
In sum, studies of democratic performance have proposed two conceptualizations for 
government performance. One of these considers broad societal outcomes as an indicator of the 
level of government performance. The deficiency of such measurement is the underlying but 
untested assumption that these outcomes are mostly or even entirely caused by government 
activities. Other studies have conceptualized democratic performance explicitly in terms of 
government activities: their direct policy outputs. Both sets of studies attempt to assess the 
product and not the process of government activity. 
 
 
2.2 SYNTHESIZING DIFFERENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS 
 
Broadly speaking, the literature has provided three different conceptualizations of government 
performance: it has been defined as citizen perception of performance, as the level of 
government administrative effectiveness, and as the extent of government policy outputs. All 
these approaches imply valuable elements for the measurement of the performance of democratic 
political institutions; however, each of them alone remains incomplete and cannot grasp all the 
relevant aspects of government performance. Some authors have recognized that and tried to 
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 integrate the different conceptualizations. Putnam et al. (1983) and Putnam (1993) combine 
administrative effectiveness and policy outputs into an overall index of government performance. 
Given that they want to capture government activities, public opinion is not factored into their 
measure, but serves, to an extent, as a validity test against which the results of the objective 
indicators are compared. 
More specifically, Putnam (1993: 63) defines government performance in a 
representative system that comprises “responsiveness to its constituents and efficiency in 
conducting the public’s business”. Policy responsiveness is defined and measured as the extent 
of government allocation of resources for various types of public goods and services (such as day 
care centers, agricultural and health spending, etc.). Administrative effectiveness or efficiency, 
on the other hand, is defined and measured as the extent to which a government possesses the 
means to conduct its internal operations effectively and promptly (such as effective budget cycle 
and information services). Stressing the criteria of a multifaceted evaluation of government, such 
as rigor, impartiality and persuasiveness, Putnam presents a 12-indicator index of government 
performance.14 The Putnam measure has been replicated also in the U.S. states (Rice and 
Sumberg 1997). This study uses several indicators of policy process, policy innovation and 
policy liberalism, and, like Putnam’s study, aggregates all the indicators into a single index of 
government performance.  
Such an aggregation may be problematic both conceptually as well as empirically. That 
is, by aggregating the components of either attribute of government performance into a uni-
dimensional index, it is assumed that responsive government is by definition also efficient and 
                                                 
14 The 12 indicators are: cabinet stability, budget promptness, statistical and information services, reform legislation, 
legislative innovation, day care centers, family clinics, industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, 
health unit expenditures, housing and urban development and bureaucratic responsiveness (Putnam 1993, 67-73). 
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 effective. This, however, need not necessarily be the case, and should be tested rather than 
assumed.  
Jackman and Miller (1996), who reanalyzed Putnam’s data on the performance of Italian 
regions, provide also empirical evidence that challenges the uni-dimensionality assumption of 
government performance. Putnam (1993) specified in advance that no more than one component 
be extracted from the analysis of his 12 indicators. Given this prior specification, it is obvious 
that his component analyses cannot be used in order to test the dimensionality of government 
performance.  Jackman and Miller (1996) followed a more conventional eigenvalue cutoff of 1.0. 
As a result of their principal component analysis, more than one latent concept emerged from the 
12 indicators of government performance. While the first factor remains the largest, only half of 
the factors load unambiguously on it. The general implication from these results is that the 
indicators “cannot be used to generate a coherent, uni-dimensional measure of institutional 
performance” (Jackman and Miller 1996: 640).  
Additionally, using the logic of construct validity, a theoretically relevant independent 
variable should be interrelated with all indicators of the dependent variable in a similar fashion. 
In Putnam’s (1993) study such an independent variable is social capital. Regressing the measure 
of social capital on each indicator of government performance, however, revealed that indicators 
of administrative effectiveness such as budget promptness and statistical services were not linked 
to the measure of social capital whereas the measures of housing development, health spending, 
day care centers, and reform innovation – the indicators of policy responsiveness – were. 
Similarly, Rice and Sumberg (1997) show with bivariate correlations that social capital has the 
strongest relationship with policy liberalism and the weakest with administrative effectiveness. 
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 These pieces of evidence call into question the bipolar conceptualization of government 
performance.  
 
2.3. SUMMARY 
 
The literature review of government performance in the three research traditions demonstrated 
the non-trivial degree of difficulty in defining and quantifying (even agreeing upon) the 
important activities, outputs and outcomes of a democratic government. Summarizing the 
different contributions: 
1. The students of public opinion struggle with explaining the variance in citizens’ confidence 
in and satisfaction with government. Using citizens’ satisfaction as the measure of 
government performance, these studies assume that there is a linear monotonous relationship 
between the concept and the measure, yet this is an assumption requiring empirical testing.  
2. The subfield of public administration has developed a substantial body of literature on 
performance measurement in government. On the theoretical level these studies 
conceptualize government performance as comprising inputs, outputs and outcomes, yet in 
empirical measurement the definition of the concept is reduced to denoting administrative or 
organizational effectiveness.  
3. The studies of democratic performance assess whether governments are doing what they are 
supposed to do: whether they are mobilizing and allocating resources to meet social needs. 
Yet, these studies pay less attention to the process by which the implementation of these 
allocations takes place. 
Given the concern with construct validity in the case of measuring government 
performance with public opinion data, we are left with two different conceptualizations of 
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 government performance: administrative performance and policy performance. These two 
aspects of performance are quite distinct and have been prominent within different research 
traditions. However, even if the different conceptualizations and measures are combined, 
researchers still stubbornly try to conceptualize and measure government performance in a uni-
dimensional manner. The complexity and the diversity of aspects of government performance 
might as well be modeled. 
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3. ONE YARDSTIC OR MANY? MEASURING PERFORMANCE 
 
 
This chapter proceeds with providing a two-dimensional definition of government performance 
based on the two attributes of the concept identified in the previous chapter: administrative 
effectiveness and policy responsiveness. It also presents an empirical test of the orthogonal 
definition of government performance using data from the U.S. and German local governments. 
The principal components analyses of different indicators of government performance suggest 
that two-factor solutions are optimal for both the U.S. and German cases. The two factors 
extracted are clearly interpretable as policy responsiveness and administrative effectiveness. 
 
 
3.1 THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL MEASURE 
 
The literature reviewed in the previous chapter offers two distinct conceptualizations of 
government performance. The public administration literature tends to define (and measure) 
government performance in managerial terms: in order for a government to perform well, it 
should be efficient and effective managerially. The studies of democratic performance define the 
concept of government performance in terms of outputs and substantive policies, by the extent of 
public goods and services provided by a government. Thus, government performance is 
understood both by the quality of its internal operations, and by the nature and extent of policies 
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 it is implementing. Further, both of these definitions are based on government activities and 
exclude perceptions and outcomes of these activities.  
Putnam (1993) combined, by assumption, these attributes into a bipolar index of 
government performance. The current study challenges this assumption. First, it is not obvious 
why different components of government performance should associate with each other. 
Openness and the inclusion of citizens into the decision-making process may slow down the 
administrative processes and paralyze the efforts to respond quickly to changing societal needs. 
A divided representative body may work inefficiently, while the implementation of decisions, 
based on the professionalism of the local bureaucracy, may be effective and efficient. Thus, it is 
possible that a government is effective administratively, but is a laggard in terms of problem 
solving and service provision. By the same token, a government may be a leader in policy-
making and innovation and at the same time face considerable management and administrative 
problems. Hedley (1998) provides an illustrative case study of the New York State Housing 
Finance Agency that was considered to be “the best run independent agency in the country” (p. 
254). However, it failed to meet the social and political expectation of providing adequate 
housing for low-income families (p. 255). Simultaneously, it is entirely possible that 
administrative ineffectiveness can exist without serious political problems (see Bovens, t’Hart, 
and Peters 2001).  
Thus, a concept of government performance that considers both being responsive to 
social needs and being affective in the internal operations of its organization as its desirable 
attributes, yet recognizes the distinctiveness of these attributes would better be defined in a two-
dimensional manner. Such a definition gives a more tangible substance to the concept. It moves 
away from the bipolar abstraction of high performance vs. low performance. Government may 
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 perform highly in terms of its administrative effectiveness, or policy responsiveness, or both or 
neither. That is, government performance is defined as a combination of the levels of 
administrative effectiveness and policy responsiveness of a government. 
Second, the dimensionality of a concept is also an empirical question. With the help of 
statistical scaling methods, an assortment of indicators measuring different aspect of government 
performance can be combined into a smaller set of variables that represent most of the 
information in the original set of indicators. Whether the smaller set contains one, two, three or 
more variables is a question of what is statistically optimal. Thus, the dimensionality need not be 
assumed but can be tested. A few such tests presented in the existing literature speak in favor of 
the dimensionality: the reanalysis of Putnam’s data by Jackman and Miller (1996) was already 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Additionally, Soos (2001) has factor-analyzed seven 
performance indicators of Hungarian local governments and finds more than one factors 
emerging from the data, in addition to responsiveness and operational efficiency he has a 
separate category for spending capacity of the state grants. As one might expect, he also finds 
that these different dimensions are explained by different sets of independent variables. 
In sum, government performance is here defined as a two-dimensional concept 
comprising administrative effectiveness and policy responsiveness. Administrative effectiveness 
captures the extent to which the internal operations of a government are conducted efficiently, 
promptly, and responsively. Following the previous literature, it comprises the components of 
effectiveness of the different management subsystems (Ingraham and Kneeler 2000, Knack 
2002, Pierce et al. 2002, Putnam 1993). Policy responsiveness, on the other hand, captures the 
extent to which a government allocates and mobilizes resources for various types of societal 
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 needs. It is concerned with government policy choices and outputs (Lijphart 1999, Putnam 1993, 
Wilensky 2002). 15  
Notice that the components of the two attributes capture explicitly government activities, 
rather than the effects or perceptions of these activities. On the one hand, this conceptualization 
attempts to avoid the fallacy of conceptual shrinking by including both process and output 
related attributes of the concept. On the other hand, it is trying to avoid the fallacy of blaming or 
crediting governments for something they did not do. For example, public perception of how 
government is doing may not necessarily reflect the actual government activity (see 2.1.1). 
Similarly, social outcomes measures conflate government activities with factor beyond 
government control (see 2.1.3.2).  
The two dimensions of government performance can further be combined into a four-fold 
typology of situations. The typology serves an illustrative and theoretical purpose of grouping 
more homogeneous cases under one label. However, the underlying dimensions are continuous 
and the cutting lines only suggestive. 
                                                 
15 In the language of public administration, what has been defined here as government performance may be called 
government capacity for performance, as the actual outcomes of government activities are not considered. No such 
differentiation is made here, as performance defined by outcomes is not operational (see 2.1.2.2) and thus adds little 
practical value to the conceptualization. To state it differently, definitions of concepts are integral parts of theories 
and should not be considered as exogenous to them (Kaplan 1964). The current study attempts to construct a 
definition and a measure of government performance that would allow the empirical assessment of the competing 
institutional and cultural explanations of differences between government activities. A conceptualization that is not 
amenable to such an empirical assessment does no service to the objective of the research. 
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Figure 3.1 The Typology of Government Performance 
 
 
 
The four categories presented in Figure 3.1 rest on the dimensions and are definable by 
their value on these dimensions. Thus, they form a mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive set of possible combinations of policy responsiveness and administrative 
effectiveness. The specific labels given to each theoretical category are illustrative. They do not 
carry an independent definitional purpose. A dynamic government is an administratively 
effective government that is also active policy-wise. It is called dynamic due to its presumed 
ability to respond to the need for more efficient management and at the same time to keep up 
with service provision developing innovative policies. Second, an efficient government, high in 
administrative effectiveness and low in policy activism, is a government that puts more stress on 
managerial austerity at the expense of developing existing and implementing new policies. An 
active government stands in contrast to the efficient government: it is active in problem-solving 
and service provision, however, its organization is inefficiently managed. Low on both 
dimensions is an apathetic government. Such a government stands in strict contrast to the 
dynamic government: while the latter is characterized by flexibility, the former is characterized 
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 by inertia: it is merely responding in its habitual way to inherently new structural, administrative 
and policy challenges. 
The purpose of providing the two-dimensions and four types of governments has 
explicitly been to construct an operational definition for the dependent variable. That is, the task 
that follows this conceptualization amounts to explaining why certain governments appear 
active, dynamic, apathetic or efficient as defined here. No normative claim is made about which 
government is “better” than another. Neither is the purpose to make an empirical claim about 
which type of government leads to what kinds of outcomes, i.e. to consider the dimensions as 
independent variables. This exercise would constitute a relevant and interesting, but a quite 
separate research project beyond the aspirations of the current study. The added value of the 
constructed typology for the current study is to facilitate comparison between different types of 
governmental performance. A case from each type of government performance is selected for the 
qualitative analyses presented in Chapter 5. When performing the case studies, the typology 
helps to discover significant characteristics that are logically independent of the criteria defining 
the types but empirically associated with them.  
 
3.2 GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. AND GERMANY 
 
The measurement of the various components of government performance follows Putnam’s 
(1993) study adjusting the indicators to the country contexts. Statistical scaling methods are then 
used to test whether and how well the indicators group to form two distinct latent concepts. The 
analyses are presented separately for each country, as the indicators used are country-specific.  
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 3.2.1 The Attribute of Administrative Effectiveness 
 
 
Administrate effectiveness was defined as comprising the efficiency, promptness and 
effectiveness of the internal managerial operations of a government. Putnam used indicators such 
as budget promptness and statistical services to capture this aspect of government performance.  
In the context of the U.S., the Government Performance Project (GPP) has evaluated the 
management capacity of the 35 largest U.S. cities. In addition to financial management and 
information technology management the study also included an evaluation of the human 
resources management, capital management, and managing for results. As the management 
subsystems represent the core functions of any government, they carry considerable face validity 
as measures of administrative effectiveness. The list of criteria, data in the form of “grade 
reports”, summary tables of the results for each management subsystem and criteria are 
presented in Barrett and Greene (2000). In most general terms, by stressing the capacity and 
sustainability of the management systems, the criteria concentrate on long-time perspective in 
management, flexibility, innovation, adaptation, and communication with legislators and 
citizens. The respective grades from the city grade report of 2000 are transformed into numerical 
values ranging from 1 (corresponding to “F”) to 12 (corresponding to “A”) for each management 
subsystem.16  
Several indicators of administrative effectiveness are also employed for the German 
cases. These capture the extent to which governments have implemented measures of enhancing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of different management subsystems: financial management, 
                                                 
16 Ammar, Duncombe, and Wright (2001) and Ammar et al. (2001) have re-evaluated GPP data on city government 
capital management and financial management capacity using the methodology of fuzzy rule-based systems 
(FRBS). The correlation between their final scores and GPP grades are .670 for capital management and .671 for 
financial management, both correlations significant at .000 level. This result increases the confidence in the 
reliability of the grades to a certain extent. As, FRBS rankings are not available for all management subsystems, 
grades have been used in the analyses presented in this chapter. 
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 human resources management, results oriented management, and information sharing with the 
legislature. The measures are based on the survey conducted by the German Association of 
Cities (GAC) on three different time-periods: 1996, 1998, and 2000. The data cover four 
management functions, each of which contains several subcomponents with information about 
whether or not a government is employing certain management techniques for enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness in that management function. Thus, the score for financial 
management captures whether a government uses cost-benefit analysis, accrual budgeting, 
budgeteering, and decentralized resource responsibility. The score for human resources 
management captures whether a government has implemented personnel training, organization 
development and personnel development. The results oriented management score contains 
information about whether a government uses controlling, quality management and management 
for results. The information sharing score notes whether a government employs measures of 
enhancing communication with citizens and measures of improving council-management 
relations.17 For each subcomponent, the scores are averaged over the three time-points and an 
additive scale is formed to create a composite measure for each management subsystem. 
 
3.2.2 The Attribute of Policy Responsiveness 
 
 
The second attribute of government performance – policy responsiveness – encompasses the 
extent to which governments allocate resources for public goods and services. Measuring this 
dimension is a complex enterprise, since ideally a measure of policy responsiveness should be 
                                                 
17 Information about budgeteering, decentralized resource responsibility (financial management), personnel 
development (human resources management), management for results (results oriented management) are coded 1 if 
the measure is employed and 0 otherwise. All other subcomponents are coded by a scale: 1=the measure has been 
fully implemented, .75=the measure is partially implemented, .5=the measure is under planning with high priority, 
.25=the measure is under planning, 0=the measure has neither been implemented nor planned. 
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 unaffected by differences in the substantive priorities between governments.18 Putnam (1993) has 
measured policy performance with quantities of policy outputs, justifying this approach on the 
grounds of the most similar systems design, i.e. by the fact that all the Italian regions had to 
counter similar policy issues. A similar justification can also be made when comparing the U.S. 
local governments: all cities are facing the tasks of lowering poverty, providing of public 
housing, increasing public safety, attracting businesses to increase the tax base etc. The German 
local governments are also facing similar challenges of deteriorating schoolhouses, providing 
adult education, public works and adequate day-care (Gunlicks 1986). Additionally, the urgency 
of certain problems still varying from city to city can be controlled for demographic indicators in 
the subsequent relational analyses. 
Probably the best-established comparative measure of policy choices is the budget: 
allocations to different policy areas are matters of distribution where competing interests, needs 
and requirements of societal groups are balanced. In the U.S., cities have substantial degree of 
freedom in shaping their expenditures and financing (see Sbragia 1996); thus, it is plausible to 
assume that the budget reflects the extent of responsiveness of city officials to societal demands. 
Expenditure on community development and housing serves the purpose of capturing 
redistributive policies, and expenditure on police and fire protection measures the allocational 
policy responsiveness. All cities included in the analysis are responsible for these policy areas, 
                                                 
18 Additionally, on the theoretical level responsiveness would require measuring whether a government provides 
public goods at an optimal level. This causes an undeniable difficulty in operationalization, which is why authors 
have resorted to measuring simply the quantities of government policy outputs, and in some cases compared these to 
the “preferred levels of policy outputs” inferred from various socio-economic characteristics of a jurisdiction (see 
Bergstrom and Goodman 1973). 
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 decreasing the usual concern when using city government expenditures for comparative purposes 
about the possible bias introduced by differences in functional requirements.19  
Additionally, Putnam (1993) measured government sophistication in the area of 
economic and industrial development by noting an array of potential tools of economic policy a 
government is using. There are also several activities available for the U.S. local governments to 
promote local development. These include (1) financial assistance to businesses (loans and 
grants), (2) tax incentives, (3) small and minority business assistance, (4) job training, (5) 
international business assistance, (6) public/private partnerships, and (7) downtown 
development. Further, local governments can also apply to the (8) empowerment zones’ program 
funded by the federal government.20 The measure for economic development is based on how 
many of the economic policy tools from the list above were actually deployed by the city 
governments. The measure is not exhaustive in terms of covering all possible areas of activity 
available for municipalities. However, the multi-item scale covers a broad range of policy 
instruments, increasing the confidence in its validity and reliability.21  
A further component of the policy responsiveness attribute is the creative ability of 
governments to meet pressing needs in terms of innovative legislative ideas (Putnam 1993, Rice 
and Sumberg 1997). The U.S. Conference of Mayors has developed a database for successful 
                                                 
19 The expenditure measures are standardized by population. Further, several of the cities considered in the analysis 
have merged municipal and county government activities. There is the danger that the expenditures measures are 
effectively capturing the consolidated form of government rather than policy choices by governments. In order to 
control for such a possibility, the expenditure of those local governments that perform county functions is weighted 
by the difference between the average spending on an item by city governments and the average spending on the 
same item by county/city governments. The data come from U.S. Bureau of Census, Annual Survey of Government 
Finances 1998-1999, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/govern.html (March 11, 2003). 
20 See Wolman and Goldsmith (1992) who identify “grantsmanship” – the ability of local governments to attract, 
through its activities, grant funds – as an important policy tool for enhancing local development.  
21 The information for the first seven items of the measure was obtained from city websites. Additional inquiries 
were made in the case the information could not be coded from the websites. The information about the designated 
development zones was obtained from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd (March 11, 2003).  
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 local level policy initiatives or best practices. These are policy innovations practiced in a city that 
have had a considerable positive impact on city development and improved citizen well-being. 
The projects reach across all local government affairs. The number of best practices listed for 
one city in that database is considered as a measure of city policy innovation.22 Thus, there are 
altogether four indicators of policy responsiveness for the U.S. city governments: community 
development and public safety spending, economic development policy tools and the extent of 
policy innovation. 
Similarly to the U.S. cases, for the German cities the output measures in those policy 
areas are chosen in which city governments have responsibility of policy-making. Gunlicks 
(1986) reports in his comprehensive survey of German local governments that the most common 
areas of city government activism and innovation are cultural activities, nursery and elementary 
schools, sports and recreation facilities, and economic promotion activities. These are the kinds 
of local public goods that governments provide from their own democratic voting procedures. 
Three indicators of policy responsiveness for German city governments were selected: number of 
kindergarten places per births, subsidy for local theater per person, and capital expenditure on 
schools per person.23  
 
3.2.3 The Empirical Scaling of the Various Indicators   
 
 
Factor analysis serves as a useful statistical tool for the empirical scaling of multiple indicators 
into latent variables (Kim and Mueller 1978). This method also serves as a test of the empirical 
consistency of the two dimensions of government performance. The expectation here is that the 
                                                 
22 The database is available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/best_practices/search.asp (March 11, 2003). It 
contains best practices of city governments since 1997. The number of best practices used for each city is the 
number of the innovative policies listed in the database as of October, 2002. 
23 All these indicators are coded from German Association of Cities (1999; hereafter GAC). 
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 various indicators of administrative effectiveness form a distinct latent concept from the 
indicators of policy responsiveness for both data sets. The test of sampling adequacy, the KMO 
statistic, is .643 for the U.S. sample and .667 for the German one. Considering the relatively 
small sample sizes, these statistics are reasonably high, indicating that there are likely to be 
patterns of correlations in the data and that a factor analysis is an appropriate technique to use 
(Kim and Mueller 1978). As presented in Table 3.2.1, two distinct factors indeed emerged from 
both the U.S and the German data set. The orthogonal rotation of factors was used to obtain the 
final factor loadings presented in Table 3.2.1.24
                                                 
24 Estimates from oblique rotations were very similar, suggesting that the two factors are reasonably treated as 
orthogonal. Further, other extraction methods such as maximum likelihood, principal axis factoring and alpha 
factoring were also used. The results of these analyses did not differ significantly from the ones presented in Table 
3.2.1, and with some techniques the factor loadings were even higher. 
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 Table 3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis of Performance Indicators  
 
 
The U.S sample  The German sample 
Indicator 1 2   Indicator 1 2 
Financial management  .852 -.020   Financial management .789 -.001 
IT management  .627 .442   Human resources  management .607 -.102 
Human resources 
management  .794 -.127 
  Managing for results .876 -.139 
Capital management  .785 .113   Information sharing .816 .132 
Managing for results  .872 -.062     
Community development  -.025 .703   Kindergarten places -.005 .671 
Public safety -.351 .613   Public theaters -.005 .734 
Economic development .275 .698   Investment on schools .002 .652 
Policy innovation .014 .516     
Eigenvalue 3.7 1.8  Eigenvalue 2.5 1.4 
Variance explained (%) 60  Variance explained (%) 56 
N 35  N 85 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. 
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 The variables measuring various forms of administrative efficiency and management 
capacity load high on the first factor for both countries. The extracted components reproduce 
60% of the variance in the original indicators for the U.S. analysis and 56% for the German 
analysis. The indicators that were expected to contribute to the policy responsiveness dimension 
of government performance also perform accordingly. The logical inference from these empirical 
results is that governments that score high on one dimension do not necessarily score high on the 
other one. That is, governments prioritizing the effectiveness of their internal operations do not 
necessarily prioritize the allocation of public goods and services on a high level.  
This result is further illustrated in Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Factor analysis allows us to 
represent each factor by a scale measure based on the empirical relationship among the indicators 
(Kim and Mueller 1978). These scores can then be used to determine the position of each case 
included in the study on the two dimensions and place the cases into the matrix of government 
performance presented on Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The factor scores are standardized variables 
with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The cutting lines are obviously somewhat arbitrary, 
but it is logical to assume that a negative factor score on a dimension indicates lower 
performance on that dimension and a positive factors score on a dimension indicates higher 
performance on that dimension. Figure 3.2.1 plots the relative position of the U.S. cities included 
in the study on the two dimensions; Figure 3.2.2 presents a similar matrix for the German 
cases.25 These factor scores are also saved as measures of the dependent variable for the 
subsequent analyses. 
 
                                                 
25 Due to the commitment made to the German Association of Cities the names of the cities on the figure cannot be 
made public.  
 56
 P
ol
ic
y 
re
sp
on
si
ve
ne
ss
 
30-3 
3 
0 
-3 
Boston
Washington
Philadelphia
Virginia
Indianapolis 
 Beach 
Austin 
SeattleNew York
Long Beach
San Jose
San Francisco
SaHouston n Diego
San Antonio
Rland ichmond PhoenixNew Orleans Cleve
Nashville
Minneapolis 
Milwaukee
MemphisLos Angeles
Kenver ansas City 
Jacksonville
Honolulu
Detroit
DBaltimore
Dallas
ColumbusAtlanta
Chicago
Buffalo 
Anchorage
Administrative effectiveness
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1 The Position of the U.S. Governments on the Two Dimensions 
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Figure 3.2.2 The Positions of the German Governments on the Two Dimensions  
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 3.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Defining government performance on two dimensions – administrative effectiveness and policy 
responsiveness – is an empirically justified way to represent the level of local government 
performance both in the U.S. and Germany. The theoretically proposed dimensionality of 
government performance is supported by the empirical analyses. Furthermore, data from two 
rather different settings provide similar and consistent results. The measurement frailties, 
differences in local priorities, and multiple potential influences on any single government 
activity within both countries, posed a great challenge to the expectation of coherence of the 
emerging dimensions even within one country. Thus, the demonstrated consistency in scaling 
both in the U.S. and Germany increases the confidence in the viability of the two-dimensional 
conceptualization of government performance even more. The results do not present 
idiosyncratic findings within one national setting. Rather, they provide a convincing argument 
for considering these dimensions as an informative way of presenting the level of government 
performance in even more large-scale cross national comparisons. 
As the factor loadings demonstrate and Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 graphically illustrate, 
governments that are scoring high on one dimension are not necessarily scoring high on the other 
one. That is, governments prioritizing the effectiveness of their internal operations do not 
necessarily prioritize the allocation of public goods and services on a high level. Moreover, there 
are considerable number of governments in both countries that have high scores on both 
dimensions (the dynamic governments), which undermines the potential criticism that the high 
levels of public spending may be an indication of wastefulness and financial mismanagement. 
Similarly, the fact that there are governments that have low scores on both dimensions 
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 demonstrates that low levels of public spending do not necessarily indicate the existence of a 
sound and effective management system.  
The results further indicate that studies using only one of these dimensions as their 
definition of government performance are effectively excluding a relevant attribute of the 
concept, as the different indicators of government performance used in the existing literature do 
not necessarily measure the same latent variable. Also, those studies that have used indicators 
measuring both attributes, but combined these into a single index may have lost some useful 
information for the explanatory relationships explored. 
The purpose here has not just been developing a concept. The purpose has also been 
empirical – the measurement of the dependent variable. The two-fold conceptualization of 
government performance allows a further and more detailed analysis of the possible causal 
mechanisms behind these two attributes. That is, the possible independent variables, whether 
institutional, cultural or social, influencing government performance may have different effects 
on the different dimensions of this concept.  
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4. SOCIAL CAPITAL OR INSTITUTIONS? 
 
 
 
The most powerful explanatory variable for government performance put forward in the political 
science literature is social capital (Knack 2002, Pierce et al. 2000, Putnam et al. 1983, Putnam 
1993, Rice and Sumberg 1997). Yet if the variance in the performance of governments occurs in 
two different dimensions, how effective is social capital in explaining either dimension? If social 
capital has the effect of facilitating collective action, how does this lead to an effective and 
responsive government? And if government performance is an outcome that depends on effective 
collective action, what is the role of institutional factors that transform individual incentives 
towards cooperation or non-cooperation? This chapter tries to answer these questions. In doing 
so it attempts to contribute to our understanding of the two important puzzles that the literature to 
date has left unanswered: the causal mechanism linking social capital to government 
performance, and the role of institutions as compared to the cultural variables in explaining 
performance. The chapter first develops a theoretical argument in line with the theories of 
cooperation that link social capital to policy responsiveness and institutional structure to 
administrative effectiveness. Then the chapter provides evidence from quantitative analyses to 
support these arguments.  
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 4.1. COOPERATION AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Government performance, both administrative effectiveness and policy responsiveness, is easily 
depicted as collective output. That is, cooperation of many individuals is necessary in order to 
achieve a responsive and effective government. However, the problem of cooperation that 
potentially hinders government policy responsiveness is different from the problem of 
cooperation that may occur in providing effective administration. The set of actors who face the 
challenge of cooperation and the institutional structure in which they operate are different. 
Demanding for, and monitoring the implementation of public goods and services presents a 
collective action problem to the members of society. In this situation the members of society in a 
democratic system usually operate without any central authority that would be able to induce 
cooperation. Thus, the incentive to cooperate must come from social resources. Social capital 
serves as such a resource for overcoming the collective action problem among the members of 
society. 
Achieving effective administration, however, involves a different set of actors and 
relationships – it involves bureaucrats and politicians in a principal-agent framework. It is fair to 
assume that bureaucrats themselves do not necessarily prefer efficient and effective management 
(contrary to the situation of the public goods provision described above, where most members of 
society would prefer the collective output but may lack the incentive to contribute to it). 
Bureaucrats as agents should act in accord with the preferences of their principals: politicians or 
senior administrators. Thus, it becomes the principals’ problem to secure cooperation form the 
agent. Here the incentive to cooperate is induced most effectively by a favorable institutional 
structure or a central authority. The following sections will explain both of these propositions in 
more detail. 
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4.1.1 The Social Dilemma of Cooperation and Policy Responsiveness 
 
4.1.1.1 Cooperation in the production of a collective good  
Policy responsiveness has been defined in this study as the extent to which a government 
allocates and mobilizes resources for various types of public goods and services. The 
characteristics of public goods are that they are non-excludable, i.e. anyone can enjoy them 
whether they have paid for their provision or not; and they are jointly supplied, i.e. one person’s 
use does not diminish the supply available for others (see Ordeshook 1986). These characteristics 
make it almost impossible for public goods and services to be provided by private markets. Thus, 
they may remain undersupplied relative to the levels that the members of society would prefer. 
The obvious solution to this problem is the public production of public goods and services. Yet 
public provision does not just happen. Political pressure must be mobilized to encourage the 
institutions of government to make this provision a matter of public policy. Bills must be passed, 
appropriations have to be made, and government agencies need to be created. That is, political 
actors must be persuaded to act. Yet if the provision of a public good or service distributes some 
benefit widely, and if the enjoyment of that good or service is unrelated to whether a contribution 
has been made towards mobilizing politicians to act, then the immediate problem of free riding 
occurs. If many public services are like public goods, then their supply depends on individuals 
and groups successfully engaging in collective action to get the government to provide them. The 
public supply of public goods, thus, becomes a problem of collective action. 
Collective action requires multi-person cooperation. The students of cooperation have 
long sought to explain what makes cooperation in societies possible. Most social situations, 
including the provision of public goods can be depicted as a classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
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 The dilemma in this game rises from the fact that although players would receive (collectively) 
the highest payoff if they cooperated, the highest individual payoff for either player would result 
from his or her defection given that the other player cooperates. This, in turn, creates an 
incentive to free ride. On the other hand, either player’s payoff would be the lowest if he or she 
alone cooperated while the other defected. The safest strategy in this situation for both players is 
to always defect, no matter what the other is doing, as this is the only way to avoid the lowest 
payoff. According to this game, then, cooperation is not possible. 
The evolution of voluntary cooperation in society, however, is possible, because societies 
consist of a series of repeated or continuous encounters, not one-shot plays of the game as 
depicted above. In a series of experiments Axelrod (1984) has shown, and others have confirmed 
(Hardin 1982, Olson 1971, Taylor 1987), that in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games “tit-for-tat” 
is the strongest strategy. Tit-for-tat strategy essentially means: cooperate the first time, the next 
time do whatever the other player did in the last time. That is, cooperate conditionally after the 
first play of the game. “The shadow of the future” – the prospect of the reward from cooperation, 
not just now but stretching out over the long term – make cooperative strategies very attractive.  
4.1.1.2 Social capital and cooperation  
The observation that each member of society is playing tit-for-tat strategy in the repeated play of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is very close to the claim that a norm of reciprocity exists in this society.26 
That is, by virtue of being embedded in an ongoing social relationship, the members of society 
find it in their interest to cooperate (Hardin 1982, Taylor 1987). This is essentially the argument 
of the authors who have embedded social capital in a rational choice framework (Granovetter 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that for securing the provision of public goods, it is not always necessary for each member to 
cooperate. Usually it is enough that some critical mass is mobilized for collective action. This, however, should not 
undermine the theoretical argument presented here. 
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 1985, Coleman 1988, see also Putnam 1993). Indeed, Coleman (1990) even defined social 
capital functionally – that is, social capital is whatever facilitates individual or collective actions. 
Defining social capital functionally, however, makes it impossible to distinguish between what it 
is and what it does (Edwards and Foley 1997). Also, when defined functionally, social capital is 
very context dependent: the measurement of the concept does not travel, as what constitutes 
social capital in one setting may not apply in another setting. This has prompted researchers to 
distill the core features of social capital and to find context-independent aspects of the concept 
that can be operationalized and measured in any situation. Such a general definition of social 
capital includes trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement (Putnam 1993: 
170-174, see also Newton 1997). These components of social capital are seen as mutually 
reinforcing and having the effect of facilitating cooperation.  
Note that the concept of social capital includes also trust and social interaction in addition 
to the norms of reciprocity that the theories of cooperation considered sufficient for the tit-for-tat 
strategy to dominate. However, note also that tit-for-tat strategy has a downside: if the 
relationship has a bad start – with one or more players not cooperating – then tit-for-that would 
echo this misfortune. That is, reciprocity would work on the opposite direction as well: as mutual 
punishment (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). Trust and social networks serve the purpose of 
preventing defection and securing the virtuous circle of mutual cooperation (Scholz and Lubell 
1998). Social capital is an ecologic characteristic. However, it stems from the individual 
behavior. The proportion of citizens that replicate nice, reciprocal strategies provides a rough 
indicator of a society’s level of social capital (Lubell and Scholz 2001). 
The causal argument that social capital helps to overcome problems of cooperation and 
collective action can easily be applied to explaining the level of policy responsiveness of a 
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 government. In order for public goods and services to be provided, citizens need to cooperate to 
identify, adopt and implement effective policies for the community. All members of the 
community are interested in the provision of effective policies. At the same time, every member 
of the society is tempted to defect from the social cooperation in demanding public policies from 
government and monitoring the implementation of these policies, as this way he or she would 
secure the highest individual payoff (benefit and no cost). The level of trust in the community 
and the repeated social interaction between its members allows for the norms of reciprocal 
cooperation to prevail, because the prospects of ongoing, long-term relationships may be too 
valuable to jeopardize by cheating at any one opportunity. Trust reduces the level of suspicion 
that others will not cooperate and decreases the temptation to defect. Consequently, higher levels 
of social capital within a society enable the societal mobilization necessary for the provision of 
public goods and services. In polities that are low in social capital the collective action problem 
is not overcome and the public goods remain undersupplied, or supplied according to the 
interests of special groups that are more organized and able to pressure governments to respond 
to their interests (Olson 1971).  
Some empirical studies have provided support for this linkage. It has been pointed out 
that social capital can become a useful basis for policy initiatives (Coleman 1988, Montgomery 
2000, Sandefur and Laumann 1998, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). Social capital also has 
been associated with greater potential for the co-production of public goods and services in areas 
such as public safety, public education, and environmental protection (Schneider 1987). Offe and 
Fuchs (2002) argue that trust helps to overcome free riding that causes the undersupply of public 
goods.  
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 4.1.1.3 A note on causality  
The direction of causality between social capital and government performance has remained an 
issue of debate in the current literature. The theoretical argument presented above implies the 
direction of causality form social capital to government policy responsiveness. But it has also 
been argued that the causality may run just the opposite. That is, government policies may 
promote trust and reciprocity in society (Levi 1998, Rothstein 2001, Stolle 2003, Stolle and 
Rothstein 2003, Tarrow 1996), or even that these same government activities may kill social 
capital (Berman 1997a, 1997b).  
The empirical research into the question of the direction of causality has not provided any 
conclusive answer yet, but the studies claiming that social capital is the cause of higher levels of 
government performance (however defined) clearly outnumbers the studies that claim the 
opposite. Only a couple of studies have performed empirical tests to the argument that 
government activities influence the level of social capital. Rothstein (2001) argues this in the 
context of the Swedish welfare state. He presents a study of one case and with the help of survey 
data and historical analysis he shows that the level of social capital has not declined in Sweden 
across time. He further speculates that the institutionalization of the universal welfare state is 
responsible for the sustained level of social capital. Of course, with one case, so many alternative 
hypotheses remain uncontrolled and the evidence provided remains unconvincing. Similarly, 
Rothstein and Stolle (2002) develop a theoretical argument according to which efficient and 
impartial government agencies influence the level of generalized trust in society. They are able 
to show that citizens develop different levels of trust dependent on their institutional experiences. 
But due to the static design of their research, they are not able to provide evidence about the 
causal arrow of the relationship. Even if one finds it convincing that government activity causes 
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 social capital to thrive or whither, a further question of what influences government activities 
and choices immediately occurs. No theoretical or empirical treatment linking social capital and 
government performance has developed an argument that would incorporate an answer to this 
subsequent question. 
On the other hand, several empirical studies have provided evidence to the argument that 
the nature of government activities results from the level of social capital in society. Knack and 
Keefer (1997) show, with the help of two stage least squares, i.e. controlling for the endogeneity 
of social capital, that economic performance is influenced by social capital not the other way 
round. Further, Rice and Feldman (1997) demonstrate that the level of trust and civic 
engagement of contemporary Americans with ancestral ties to European countries correlate 
highly with the level of trust and civic engagement in those European countries. This result 
strongly suggests that social capital is enduring and exogenous to government activity. Scholz 
and Lubell (1998) demonstrate that generalized trust increases tax compliance when controlling 
for internalized sense of duty, fear of getting caught, selection bias, and potential endogeneity. 
The implication is, again, that social capital, not government activity leads to cooperation in 
compliance. Whitely (1999) shows that individual values and psychological variables together 
with socialization processes within family and early adulthood experiences play the most 
important role in creating social capital. Further, the formal theoretical literature also argues that 
the cognitive mechanisms for solving social dilemmas are spawn during the genetic evolution of 
cognitive structures (Cosmides and Tooby 1994, Frank 1988), shaped by the historical 
experience of a given society and transmitted through socialization (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 
Coleman 1990, Hardin 1991, Lubell and Scholz 2001), much the way Putnam (1993) described 
in his study on Italian regions.  
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 The question of the direction of causality remains unresolved also in this study, and it is 
probably fair to argue that the direction of causality is reciprocal. At the same time, it is also not 
the objective of the current study to solve the complicated issue of causality. The theoretical 
explanation provided for the relationship between social capital and government policy 
responsiveness implies the direction of causality from the former to the latter. Indeed, the 
direction of causality also stems from the research question: the purpose is to explain 
government performance. However, the possibility of a reverse causality is fully recognized and 
in the empirical analyses, every effort is made to minimize the potential endogeneity problem.  
 
4.1.2 Leadership and Administrative Effectiveness 
 
 
4.1.2.1 Politicians controlling bureaucrats and the role of a manager  
The problem of cooperation and coordination within bureaucracy that prevents efficient and 
effective administration (including such operations as budget promptness, statistical services, 
accuracy of revenue forecast, existence of long-term planning etc.) is not equivalent to the 
problem of cooperation between citizens. Administrative effectiveness is an output reflecting the 
behavior of bureaus. Such a behavior by definition occurs in the context of an organization 
whose structure and objectives are in important respects imposed by outside actors (Bendor and 
Moe 1985, Moe 1984). An explanation of administrative effectiveness therefore has to include 
these institutional contingencies. The explanatory argument of administrative effectiveness 
presented in this section is embedded in theories of principal-agent and leadership. 
Administrative effectiveness results from bureaucratic cooperation: collective input is 
necessary to implement long-term planning, a performance measurement system, centralized 
statistical services etc. The objective of administrative effectiveness is the improvement of 
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 efficiency27 in the production process.28 In order for the efficiency to increase, someone has to 
have an incentive for it. Given that most of the latest administrative reform efforts have been 
driven by financial concerns in the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), it is fair to assume 
that due to the increasing budget constraint politicians have the collective incentive to optimize 
the production process, or reduce the bureaucratic slack and secure more resources for 
programmatic purposes. The actual reduction of slack, however, depends on the behavior of 
bureaucrats. Politicians, thus, face the problem of persuading bureaucrats to cooperate in 
reducing slack and controlling their behavior. Put differently, bureaucrats and politicians are 
engaged in a principal-agent relationship, where the former serve as the agents of the latter.  
Yet bureaucrats may be unwilling to reduce slack: many rational choice theories of 
bureaucracy consider maximizing slack (or discretionary budget) as the motivational factor 
behind bureaucratic behavior (Niskanen 1975). Given such an incentive, politicians face the 
problem of inducing cooperation from bureaucrats. However, due to the informational 
asymmetries between the principals and agents (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989), 
politicians are disadvantaged in observing and accurately interpreting the agent’s actions and 
consequently also the amount of slack. Verification is costly for the principal when an agent can 
observe some outcome more easily than the principal and may benefit from misrepresenting the 
outcome (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001). Such incentive incompatibility problems between 
principals and agents can be resolved by implementing institutional control mechanisms to 
ensure that the preferences of the principal are followed. One possibility of control is to include 
procedural restrictions inside the legislation (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989). Such 
                                                 
27 “Efficiency” is here used as an abstraction and should not necessarily be understood in monetary terms.  
28 Recall from Chapter 2 that enhancing managerial capacity – which essentially is the definition of administrative 
effectiveness here – is precisely the same: to improve the bureaucratic production process. 
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 restrictions, however, limit the administrators’ ability to coordinate people and other resources to 
achieve legitimate public objectives and as a consequence reduce efficiency (Bawn 1995, Meyer 
and Rowan 1977). Politicians can also monitor bureaucrats’ behavior ex post (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984). The smaller the number of agents the less costly would be the monitoring (Moe 
1984). Miller (1992) argues that delegation of administrative authority to more than one 
subordinate entity often leads to incoherent behavior. This danger is exacerbated when 
subordinates have specialized (or different) functions. Systems that confer institutionally strong 
powers to a chief administrative officer or manager have the effect of reducing the number of 
agents to one. Thus, a manager serves as a low cost alternative to the costly monitoring. 
Moreover, from the bureaucrats’ point of view, the more principals they have the more 
difficult will it be to coordinate between conflicting political objectives leading to less cohesion 
in management. Multiple principals and multiple tasks with unclear outcomes confound 
principal-agent relationships (Moe 1984). Administrative power concentration into the institution 
of manager, however, would have the effect of reducing the number of principals (for 
bureaucrats) and reduce the pressure of compromising between conflicting demands that 
bureaucrats with multiple principals necessarily face. With strong control of administrative 
apparatus, single principals can “overrule” bureaucrats at any time (Tsebelis 2002) reducing the 
need to implement rigid administrative procedures. 
The managers, of course, are also not necessarily passive and neutral agents, but players 
with their own interests and incentives. The behavior of managers is best evaluated by assuming 
that they maximize their personal gain from increased administrative effectiveness. That gain 
may be monetary, but perhaps more importantly, it has to do with building a reputation (Calvert 
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 1987, Moe 1984).29 Manager here becomes an equivalent to leader in cooperation and 
coordination theories. Kreps (1990) and Miller (1992) argue that leaders in organizations exist to 
resolve incentive conflicts. The role of the manager or a leader has been shown to be especially 
important in initiating cooperation (Bianco and Bates 1990). A manager who can reward and 
punish agents for cooperation or defection can effectively change the payoff structure of the 
agents and induce cooperation. Further, in a classic work on the nature of managerial work, 
Mintzberg (1973: 5), lists six basic reasons why organizations need managers: (1) to ensure that 
his organization serves its basic purpose; (2) to design and maintain the stability of his 
organization’s operations; (3) to take charge of his organization’s strategy-making system, and 
therein adapt his organization in a controlled way to its changing environment; (4) to ensure that 
his organization serves the ends of those persons who control it; (5) to serve as the key 
informational link between his organization and its environment; (6) as formal authority, to be 
responsible for the operating of his organization’s status system. All of these six points are 
concerned with effective monitoring and alignment of incentives. Also, Schwarz and Tomz 
(1997) show in their formal analysis that centralized institutions curtail free riding and increase 
efficiency more effectively than decentralized institutions especially in large organizations such 
as governments (see also Bendor and Mookherjee 1987). All these theoretical and empirical 
studies provide support for the argument that a manager has a positive effect on administrative 
effectiveness by inducing cooperation from bureaucrats. 
                                                 
29 Consider, for example, Frank Fairbanks, the Manager of the City of Phoenix, who has built a world-wide 
reputation as an effective leader and the City of Phoenix has earned a number of national and international awards 
for its administrative efficiency and effectiveness (see Kemp 1999).  
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 4.1.2.2 Administrative coordination and the role of manager  
Alternatively, one can argue that increasing administrative effectiveness is better described as 
not a problem of cooperation but a problem of coordination (Foss 1999). The argument about the 
social dilemma of coordination relaxes the motivational assumption of a budget-maximizing 
bureaucrat that many find objectionable. More specifically, the problem of cooperation manifests 
itself in a situation where an equilibrium strategy is Pareto superior (e.g. the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma). Coordination problem, however, occurs when all equilibriums are Pareto optimal, but 
the main challenge is to coordinate on one of these equilibriums. For example, there are two 
possible equilibriums in the smooth flow of traffic: driving either on the right or on the left side 
of the road. On either of these equilibrium drivers have no incentive to unilaterally change their 
behavior and put themselves in danger of being caught in an accident. Thus, contrary to non-
cooperative games explained above, there is no conflict in a coordination game. However there is 
still a social dilemma: the different players need to agree on which of these equilibrium to 
choose, i.e. which side of the road to drive on. To solve this problem certain coordination 
mechanisms (e.g. traffic regulations, simple communication etc.) are necessary. Such 
coordination problems may easily occur in organizations where there are interdependencies 
between people’s actions and where some concerted action needs to be undertaken, for example, 
in connection with a new initiative enhancing administrative efficiency.  
The manager helps the coordination process by generating common knowledge about the 
new strategic initiative. An event is common knowledge among a group of players if each player 
knows it, each one knows that the other players know it, each player knows that other players 
know that the other players know it and so on (Aumann 1976, Lewis 1969). Having such 
common knowledge about the efficiency enhancing strategy (e.g. a performance measurement 
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 system) in turn produces a level of commitment that cannot be easily produced through 
communicating individually (Foss 1999). In other words, it may make a difference that Paul 
knows that Peter knows that Paul knows etc. that performance measurement system is being 
implemented, rather than simply having Paul and Peter knowing about the initiative but not 
knowing that the other knows, etc. In sum, the argument about the positive effect of the manager 
on the level of administrative effectiveness does not really depend on the assumption about 
opportunistic bureaucratic behavior. 
The motivational assumption of politicians put forward earlier can also be disputed. 
Some theoretical work in political science has argued that politicians are not necessarily 
motivated by productive efficiency as here assumed (Moe 1984, 1995, Scholz 1991), at least not 
in the individual basis. Electoral considerations prompt their concern for constituency service, 
pleasing interest groups, rewarding contributors and so on (Fiorina 1974, Mayhew 1974). Thus, 
politicians face the problem of moral hazard among themselves in supporting administrative 
effectiveness. Consequently, while a single political executive would have power similar to the 
manager to overrule bureaucrats, his or her electoral incentive makes it more difficult to adhere 
to a stable and effective administrative apparatus. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992, 1997) 
provide a similar argument about the “political business cycle”, i.e. increased public spending 
before the elections, and its implications to effective financial management. Politically neutral 
manager, on the other hand, would create a more stable administrative system, less vulnerable to 
electoral cycles.30
One might also argue that the change in the motivational assumption of politicians 
contradicts entirely with their willingness to support an institution of manager. The literature on 
                                                 
30 That the commitment to effectiveness is less credible in the case of political or politicized organizations than in 
the case of independent agencies has also been argued in the context of regulatory policy in the EU (Majone 1996a, 
1996b). 
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 the role of a “political entrepreneur” in solving collective action problems (Taylor 1987, Wagner 
1966, see also Olson 1971), however, argues that a group facing such a problem might find it in 
their interest to constrain free riding by their members and on these grounds support “hiring” a 
political entrepreneur whose incentives are known to be different from their own (Miller 2000, 
Schelling 1960). Note also that such an argument has probabilistic not deterministic 
implications: a manager may or may not be institutionalized by a specific government. Yet once 
the institutionalization has taken place, it is supposed to have a positive effect on efficiency. 
In sum, an institutionalized bureaucratic leadership in the form of a politically neutral 
manager is expected to enhance the cooperation and/or coordination necessary to achieve 
administrative effectiveness. Some empirical evidence suggests this argument to be valid. 
Donahue et al. (2000) found that city governments that had a position of a professional chief 
administrative officer were more effective in the field of human resource management. Heinrich 
and Lynn (2000b) found in the case of job training programs that increased levels of 
coordination, centralization of authority, and a strong role of manager vis-à-vis the political 
executive increased program effectiveness. Feiock and Kim (2000) demonstrated, in the context 
of city governments, that electoral incentives make it less credible for a political executive to 
adhere to strategic plan as an example of effectiveness commitment. 
4.1.2.3 The effect of social capital on administrative effectiveness  
As Putnam (1993) developed his argument about the linkage between social capital and a uni-
dimensional concept of government performance, he was not able to specify how trusting people 
create more effective and responsive government (Boix and Posner 1998, Levi 1996, Rothstein 
and Stolle 2002). Indeed, according to Putnam’s assumption that social capital is shared by 
masses and bureaucratic elites, social capital might just as well influence the level of 
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 administrative effectiveness and not only policy responsiveness. More specifically, given this 
assumption, social capital helps bureaucrats to cooperate in carrying out their duties much the 
same way as it helps citizens to cooperate in voicing their demands (see Boix and Posner 1998). 
Better bureaucratic cooperation may lead to efficiency and effectiveness in the internal 
operations of a government.  
Further, social capital may make it easier to manage government organization as it 
reduces the agency problem, assuming that bureaucrats are tempted to act opportunistically in 
their job positions (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989). Given the potential for 
opportunistic behavior, senior managers need to spend considerable amount of resources on 
monitoring and/or creating and implementing rules to prevent such an opportunistic behavior. 
Both mechanisms have an unnecessary burden on the level of organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness as they increase rigidity in administrative processes.  
High levels of social capital among bureaucrats reduce the monitoring costs by affecting 
the expectations that the agents have about the behavior of their supervisors and fellow 
bureaucrats. Opportunistic behavior is resisted, because everyone expects everyone else to work 
hard for the success of their common enterprise. In an uncivic community, where the 
bureaucracy is also suffering from the deficit of social capital, the bureaucratic organization is 
trapped in a vicious circle. Because distrustful bureaucrats breed opportunistic behavior, they 
increase the supervisors’ incentive to invest in costly monitoring. In such a situation the 
administrative procedures will be slower and less efficient than in more civic polities (Boix and 
Posner 1998).31
                                                 
31 Other authors have considered the relationship between administration and trust. Peters (2001) argues that in 
societies where social and political trust is high, administrative structures are weak. Assuming a regulatory role for 
bureaucrats he states that in societies where the level of trust is high, fewer bureaucratic regulatory functions are 
necessary. On the other hand, in societies with low levels of trust, more rules and regulations need to be enforced 
 76
 According to this theoretical explanation we should be able to detect an empirical 
relationship between the level of social capital and the administrative effectiveness aspect of 
government performance. Figuring out, which of these causal mechanisms linking social capital 
and government performance (either the one that links social capital to policy responsiveness as 
presented in 4.1.1 or the one that links it to administrative effectiveness as presented here) is an 
intriguing question. Employing a two-dimensional measure of government performance makes 
the test also possible.  
Existing empirical evidence supporting the linkage between social capital and 
administrative effectiveness is not conclusive, though. Knack (2002) finds significant 
relationships between the U.S. state governments’ managerial capacity and some measures of 
social capital, such as trust and volunteering, but not others, such as informal socializing and 
participation in club meetings. Some public administration studies have proposed that an 
organizational culture that manifests itself in patterns of shared values and beliefs about 
appropriate behaviors increases organizational effectiveness. However, analyses have shown that 
strong culture may also make government impervious to external oversight and control and 
poorly adapted to its environment (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999), indicating the isolation of 
organization’s internal procedures from societal influence.  
In sum, the empirical analyses being performed in the second part of this chapter serve a 
two-fold purpose. First, they test the effect of social capital and institutional variables on the 
different aspects of government performance. Second, the tests also have the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                             
making bureaucracies more powerful than the political components of government. However, the relationship 
between the “administrative power” and administrative effectiveness is not clear, which is why it is difficult to apply 
this argument into the current context. One might assume, given the empirical classification of the U.K. as having 
low and France and Italy as having high administrative power, that the higher the power of administration the lower 
its effectiveness. This, in turn, would predict a positive relationship between trust and administrative effectiveness as 
proposed by the authors described above. The assumption, however, remains speculative. 
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 confirming or disconfirming the two rival causal mechanisms linking social capital to 
government performance that the existing literature has left unspecified. Specifically, the 
following hypotheses will be tested: 
H 1: The higher the level of social capital in a polity, the higher the level of government 
policy responsiveness in that policy. 
H 2a: The higher the level of social capital in a polity, the higher the level of government 
administrative effectiveness in that polity. 
Alternatively: 
H 2b: The more concentrated the administrative power of a government the higher the 
level of administrative effectiveness of that government. 
 
4.1.3 Additional Variables Explaining Government Performance 
 
The previous sections laid out the main theoretical arguments concerning the explanation of 
government performance on both dimensions. However, it would be naïve to conceive these 
relationships as bivariate. This section will add a number of control variables that potentially also 
affect policy responsiveness and administrative effectiveness. Some of these variables are driven 
by the nature of the empirical cases, i.e. local governments, employed. 
4.1.3.1 Policy responsiveness and institutions  
On the level of national government, institutional structure is one of the most powerful 
explanatory variables for the level of policy responsiveness (Lijphart 1999, Powell 2000). 
Although on the local government level the evidence is mixed, studies have shown, both in the 
U.S. and German context, that mayoral power is a significant predictor of municipal policy 
innovation, policy outputs, and citizen satisfaction with local government performance (Cusack 
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 1999, Kuo 1973, Svara 1990). Overall, a strong mayor may constitute a focal point for the 
community providing clear lines of accountability and making it easier to communicate the 
policy demands to the government. A city governed by a collegial body blurs the lines of 
accountability and remains less accessible for the citizens. Especially so with regard to those 
segments of population that most probably prefer greater resource allocation: the less organized 
and the less politically sophisticated. Mayors with more powers and more political clout are also 
in a better position to respond to the demands of the citizenry than mayors with less power. 
Further, strong mayors have the incentive to respond to the needs of the citizens at large as their 
political fortunes depend on the public verdict rather than the preference of the council.  
4.1.3.2 Socio-economic context  
The level of economic development and the demographic composition of the community may 
account for the level of government performance on either dimension. These variables are 
necessarily related and consequently considered here together. In a more modern society, 
government can take a more activist role in society, as it will have more resources available to do 
so. Similarly, in a more modern society government would have the incentive and knowledge to 
implement more effective administrative systems. A higher level of education provides a larger 
pool of talent from which government agencies can recruit and enhance their administrative 
effectiveness. Demographic variables would also account for the demand for more or less public 
service provision: a jurisdiction with more low-income and older people requires more public 
services, jurisdictions with higher income inequality require more public safety measures etc. In 
the U.S. context, the homeowners, on the other hand, have a strong incentive for restricting the 
provision of public goods and services, as they carry the burden of paying local property taxes. 
In general, the socioeconomic and demographic variables constitute the realistic demand aspect 
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 for policy provision that has to be accounted for if policy responsiveness is measured by 
quantities of policy outputs.  
City size is another variable potentially influencing the level of government performance 
on both dimensions. A larger population creates a larger tax base allowing governments to be 
more responsive. Larger cities also have more diverse interests creating demands for more 
service provision by the government. Additionally, larger cities may influence the level of 
administrative effectiveness as the governing structures become more complex and efficiency 
related modernization more prominent on the government agenda.  
4.1.3.3 Party Politics   
Party political and ideological preferences may play an important role in determining the policy 
responsiveness dimension of government performance (Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993). It is 
reasonable to expect that leftist parties are more favorable towards increasing the scope of public 
service provision than their rightist counterparts. With regard to the empirical cases used in the 
study, this variable is potentially important in the German local governments where the local 
branches of the national political parties gain most of the seats in City Councils. Party politics is 
less relevant in the case of the U.S. cities, as most City Councils and mayors are non-partisan 
(Carpenter 1996). Further, administrative effectiveness is considered to be unaffected by partisan 
politics as parties of all colors have supported efficiency-related modernization of local 
government administration in Germany (Reichard 1997). 
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 4.2 THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The factor scores of the two dimensions of government performance obtained from the analysis 
in the previous chapter serve as the measures of the dependent variables: policy responsiveness 
and administrative effectiveness. Recall that the indicators used in the factor analyses were 
measured within the timeframe of 1999 to 2002. The measures of social capital come from an 
earlier time period (see below). This time difference serves as an attempt to minimize the 
potential endogeneity problem in the relationship between social capital and government 
performance referred to in 4.1.1.3. 
 
4.2.1 The Measurement of the Independent Variables   
 
 
Recent literature has disaggregated social capital both conceptually and empirically most 
commonly into measures of generalized trust and measures of civic engagement (see Knack 
2002, Knack and Keefer 1997, Paxton 2002, Stolle and Rochon 1998). This measurement 
strategy is also followed here. All measures of social capital for the U.S. cases come from survey 
data collected by the DDN Needham Life Style survey on a yearly basis from 1975 through 
1998. The individual level survey data were aggregated according to the Metropolitan Statistical 
Area corresponding to the central city across the 27-year period. For each area the number of 
cases ranged from 300 to 600; the data were available for 33 cases. The level of generalized trust 
in a city was measured as a percentage of survey respondents who agree with the statement, 
“most people are honest”. Unfortunately, the survey does not contain a question about 
respondents’ organizational membership. However, as the organizational membership serves the 
purpose of engaging people into informal socialization and fostering collective action, two 
alternative measures were used to capture this aspect of social capital. First, an average score on 
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 respondent’s answers to the questions of how many times he or she had “attended a club 
meeting”, “entertained people at home” and “gave or attended a dinner party” within the past 
twelve months was used. This serves as the measure of the level of informal socialization in a 
community. Further, an average score on respondent’s answers to the questions about the 
frequency of “doing voluntary work” and “participating on a community project” within the past 
twelve months was used to capture the level of cooperation in a community. An average of both 
of these scores by city and across 27 years was calculated for the final measure. The three 
different measures of social capital are highly correlated (.586 < r < .751), which is why their 
effects on the dependent variables are estimated by separate equations. 
For the German cases the indicators of social capital were coded from the German 
General Social Survey (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung and Zentrum für 
Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen 2001). The bi-annual surveys were conducted from 1980 
through 1996. The survey provides information about the administrative district 
(Regierungsbezirk for the former West German districts, DDR-Bezirk for the former East 
German districts) of the respondent. The administrative district is a geographical unit smaller 
than the state and larger than the municipality. The information provided by individual 
respondents was again aggregated over the time-period and according to the administrative 
district corresponding to the city. The number of respondents by administrative district ranged 
from 150 to 400. The eastern districts of Germany had lower numbers of respondents as the first 
survey was conducted in those regions only in 1990. Two separate indicators of social capital are 
used for the German cases. First, respondents were asked to what extent they trusted their local 
government. This measure is used as a proxy for generalized trust based on the findings in the 
previous research that social trust and political trust are positively and highly significantly 
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 related.32 Second, an average score of respondent’s answer to the questions of whether he or she 
is a member of the following organizations: a choir, a sports club, a hobby club, a youth or 
student organization, a welfare society, any other society, was used to measure the organizational 
membership aspect of social capital. The bivariate correlation between these indicators is .831, 
thus, again the measures are used in two separate estimations.33  
The institutional variable of the chief administrative officer or the manager for the U.S. 
cases was coded from the Municipal Codes of the cities. There are two main forms of local 
governments practiced in the largest cities of the U.S.: the council-manager and the mayor-
council form of government. The characteristic of the former is that a professional city manager, 
not to the mayor, is responsible for the executive and administrative affairs of the government 
and he or she accountable directly to the City Council (Boynton and DeSantis 1999). Cities with 
such an institutional setup were coded 1. In a mayor-council form of government, the entire 
executive and administrative power is vested in the office of the mayor. Cities with this type of 
government were coded 0. More recently some cities with mayor-council form of government 
have introduced a separate City Charter-mandated position of a chief administrative officer who 
is a professional manager responsible for administrative coordination within the government. 
Cities with such an institutional arrangement were coded .5. The same measurement of the 
institutional structure of the local government is used for both predicting the administrative 
effectiveness as well as policy responsiveness, because under the mayor-council form of 
                                                 
32 Brehm and Rahn (1997) and Lipset and Schneider (1987) show that in the U.S. there is a strong reciprocal 
relationship between these two types of trust. Hall (2002), Kaase (1999) and Newton and Norris (1999) demonstrate 
a consistently positive correlation between the two types of trust using cross-national data. Stolle and Rochon (1998) 
use both political trust and generalized trust to capture the latent concept of social capital.  
33 The fact that the social capital measures for both countries are aggregated not on the city level, but on the level of 
a geographical region stretching beyond the central city causes a potential for measurement error. However, a city 
does not constitute a bordered polity and is opened to mobility, which in turn works to minimize any drastic 
differences in the level of social capital between neighboring and related communities. Thus, despite the caveats the 
measures are expected to be reasonably valid for the current analysis. 
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 government is also the most powerful institution politically possessing veto power over council 
decisions. Under a council-manager form of government, the political power is dispersed among 
council members, the mayor being only primus inter pares. 
There is no single easy measure for capturing both administrative and political power 
concentration in German local governments. Thus, two separate indicators are used for 
measuring either variable. The information about the allocation of the administrative power 
within the city was coded from the city constitutions (Gemeindeordnung). If the administrative 
power was vested in the chief administrative officer (Gemeinderirektor), the case was coded 1, if 
the administrative power was vested in a collegial body consisting partially or completely of 
professional managers (Magistrat) the case was coded .5, and if all the administrative power was 
concentrated to the office of the mayor, the case was coded 0. In order to capture the extent of 
political power concentration, the mayor veto power index compiled by Cusack (1999) is used.  
The various socio-economic and demographic variables for the U.S. cases are all highly 
intercorrelated with .667 ≤ r ≤ .730. Thus, only the percentage of people in poverty and the 
percentage of homeowners (r = -.332) are used in the analyses. In addition, the total population is 
also coded for each city.34 The only way the difference in the level of economic development 
between German cities can be accounted for is to include a dummy variable for the former East-
German cities. It is clear that the level of economic development and personal income is lower in 
the eastern regions. The city population is also coded and added to the pool of control 
variables.35 The party political variable for the German cities is measured by the share of seats in 
                                                 
34 All these variables are coded from the U.S. Bureau of Census American Community Survey Census 2000 
Supplementary Survey available at www.census.gov/acs/www/index.html (March 11, 2003). 
35 The data for both variables are coded from GAC (1999).  
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 the City Council held by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen), and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) – the leftist parties.  
 
4.2.2 The Regression Results   
 
4.2.2.1 The determinants of policy responsiveness  
Ordinary least squares regression analysis is used to determine the effect of the various 
independent variables on either dimension of government performance. First, the following 
equation will be estimated for both countries: 
 
Policy responsivenessi = α + β1social capitali - β2form of governmenti + Σβncontrolsi + εi
 
Where the controls include socioeconomic and demographic variables for both samples and left 
party control of the council additionally for the German sample.36 As three different measures of 
social capital are used for the U.S. sample, three different equations are estimated. For Germany, 
two measures of social capital are employed and consequently two separate models are 
estimated. Table 4.1 presents the results of the estimations predicting the level of policy 
responsiveness both for the U.S. and the German sample of local governments. 
Evidence presented in Table 4.1 supports the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, local 
governments tend to be more responsive where the levels of social capital are higher. This holds 
for local governments both in the U.S. as well as in Germany. Further, the relationship is 
insensitive to the measure of social capital employed: in all five equations presented the measure 
                                                 
36 In American politics, a rival concept to social capital is “political culture”. Some authors consider the latter as the 
manifestation of the former (Putnam 2000). The cities in this study were coded as “individualistic”, “moralistic”, 
and “traditionalistic” according to the map provided in Elazar (1994: 242-3). Moralistic political culture is positively 
and significantly correlated with all the variables measuring various aspects of social capital (.497 ≤ r ≤ .591) and 
the traditionalistic political culture is negatively and significantly correlated with social capital (-.590 ≤ r ≤ -.750). 
Due to this high intercorrelation and due to the confusion about its relationship to social capital, political culture is 
excluded from the analyses. 
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 of social capital appears a significant predictor of the level of policy responsiveness. The 
evidence, however, also shows that other factors influence the level of government performance 
on policy responsiveness dimension. Thus, employing multivariate analyses contrary to the 
bivariate correlations presented by Putnam (1993) presents a more mixed and less deterministic 
picture of the relationships associated with the level of government performance.  
Mayor veto power appears significant in the case of German local governments, falling 
short of statistical significance in the U.S. case. A powerful mayor constitutes a one-peak 
leadership for a local government. The office becomes visible, the line of accountability becomes 
clearer for the people and power concentration makes it easier to respond to societal needs.37 
This is especially so in the case of German local governments, where the city councils are large 
and politicized, creating more possibilities for deadlock (see Cusack 1999, Gunlicks 1986). 
Additionally, larger cities in Germany and cities from eastern Germany tend to have higher 
levels of public service provision. These findings are understandable considering the measures of 
the dependent variable: larger cities tend to have more theaters and schools, hence the higher 
spending levels; also, eastern cities need to spend more on renovation and reconstruction. In the 
case of the U.S. the primary local taxpayers, the homeowners, restrict the extent of public goods 
provision as expected. 
Given the differences in measurements units of the variables entered in the model, it is 
more informative to consider the standardized regression coefficients in order to get a better 
substantive sense about the effect of the different independent variables. Table 4.2 presents the 
standardized regression coefficients. In this Table each regression coefficient represents the 
change in response per standard unit (one SD) change in a predictor, and the effects of different 
                                                 
37 In the U.S. case the sign for the form of government is negative due to the way this variable was measured: the 
higher value was assigned to the form of government with a weak mayor. 
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 variables are easier to compare. Thus, in equation 1, one can observe that trust has clearly the 
strongest effect on policy responsiveness: one standard deviation increase in the level of trust is 
associated with .435 standard deviation change in the level of policy responsiveness of a city 
government. The alternative measurements of social capital – volunteering and informal 
socialization – exhibit also a strong relationship with policy responsiveness vis-à-vis other 
variables in equations 2 and 3. One standard deviation increase in volunteering is associated with 
.263 standard deviation increase in the level of government policy responsiveness. Informal 
socializing has the effect of increasing responsiveness by about 37%. These are all considerable 
effects and provide support for the hypothesized relationship between the level of social capital 
and the level of government responsiveness. The effect of the percentage of homeowners is also 
strong in all three equations: one standard deviation increase in this variable decreases policy 
responsiveness by about 50%. The effect of the form of government has a third-largest 
standardized coefficient. However, it does not reach the level of conventional statistical 
significance as stated above, thus it is difficult to infer a substantive effect of this variable with 
any certainty. 
The replication of the analysis in the German context confirms the strong relationship of 
social capital to policy responsiveness: one standard deviation change in the level of political 
trust is associated with .443 standard deviation change in policy responsiveness. The relative 
effect of the membership leisure clubs on policy responsiveness is only slightly weaker. That the 
measure controlling for economic development in both equations 4 and 5 has the strongest effect 
on policy responsiveness is quite understandable given the great socio-economic differences 
between the new and the old Bundesländer. 
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 Although replication is probably the best tool available for a social scientist to verify the 
empirical results, I have also performed several robustness tests in order to increase confidence 
in the insensitivity of the estimates. Due to the small sample size, especially for the U.S. 
analysis, diagnostics for detecting outlying observations were performed. Using the cutoff point 
of 2 (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980), studentized residuals revealed two potential outliers, 
Cook’s distance measure with the cutoff point 1 (Fox 1991) revealed none, and DFFIT measures 
with the cutoff point 2√(k+1)/(n-k-1) (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980) revealed one potential 
outlier for equations 1 and 2. The equations were then re-estimated without the two outliers 
detected by studentized residuals. In both cases, the strengths of “social capital” and “form of 
government” increased considerably while the significance of the rest of the parameters 
remained similar to the ones presented in Table 4.1. Further, iteratively reweighted least squares 
regression analyses were undertaken with all observations included. These provided essentially 
the same results as presented in Table 4.1. For equation 3, none of the diagnostics for detecting 
outliers described above found any deviant cases. Similar diagnostics were also performed on the 
German analyses. Both equations 4 and 5 had four potential outliers. Additional regressions 
without the outlying cases as well as robust estimations did not change the results presented in 
Table 4.1. 
Additionally, given, again, the small sample size in the case of the U.S. and the concern 
with the heteroskedasticity in the case of Germany as some of the independent variables (mayor 
veto power and social capital) have panel characteristics, I also estimated the models using 
robust standard errors (Greene 2002). The size of the robust standard errors did not differ 
significantly from the OLS standard errors presented in Table 4.1, and the significance levels of 
all the coefficients remained the same for all equations. Further diagnostics performed concern 
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 potential multicollinearity between the independent variables that might have the effect of 
inflating standard errors for some variables and producing inefficient estimates. I calculated 
variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance to identify such a possibility (Greene 2002). The 
tolerance statistics for the U.S. sample ranged from .621 to .863, and the VIF statistics from 
1.159 to 1.611 indicating that no significant multicollinearity is present. The estimations with the 
German data showed that there is potentially high multicollinearity between the social capital 
variables and the east-west dummy (VIF statistics for these variables ranged between 3.11 and 
4.01). Dropping the east-west dummy from the equations, however, did not change significantly 
the coefficients for the other variables in the models. Further, previous literature suggests there to 
be a significant relationship between the level of socio-economic development of a community 
and its level of social capital as well as the extent of government policy outputs in the given 
community (Putnam 1993, 2000). All the more important is, thus, to demonstrate that the effect 
of social capital on the level of policy responsiveness remains significant controlling for one of 
its main rival hypothesis. Also, almost all of the variables included in equations 4 and 5 reach the 
level of statistical significance, and the size of the coefficients do not change dramatically from 
one equation to the other, both of which indicate that multicollinearity does not pose a serious 
problem (Greene 2002). 
In sum, the statistical analyses and the subsequent robustness tests performed on the data 
from the U.S. and German local governments provide considerable support for the hypothesized 
relationship between the level of social capital in a community and the level of government 
policy responsiveness in that community. The relationship remains consistent across different 
national settings and is also insensitive towards outlying observation as well as to the threats of 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. 
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 4.2.2.2 The determinants of administrative effectiveness  
Five separate equations were also estimated for administrative effectiveness. The following 
equation summarizes the information included in the estimations:  
 
Administrative effectivenessi = α + β1social capitali + β2form of governmenti + Σβncontrolsi + εi 
 
Where the controls include socioeconomic and demographic variables for both samples. 
The results of these estimations presented in Table 4.3 do not confirm hypothesis 2a 
according to which there should be a significant relationship between the level of social capital 
and administrative effectiveness. The null hypothesis is sustained in all of the estimations 
performed: both for the U.S. and for the German analyses. Finding similar results upon 
replication across different settings is especially important in the case of proving no relationship. 
It indicates that the fact that significant relationship is not detected does not reflect the 
idiosyncrasies of a special national setting. It is theoretically possible that the coefficients remain 
insignificant due to an inefficient measurement. However, none of the measures of social capital 
appears significantly related to administrative effectiveness indicating the result of no 
relationship cannot simply reflect the measurement error. 
Regression diagnostics for detecting outlying observations described above were also 
performed on the models presented in Table 4.3. Again, by the most conservative criteria, two 
potential outliers were detected for equations 1 and 2. Re-estimating these equations without the 
outlying observations produced a better goodness-of-fit and increased the coefficient for the 
“percentage of people in the poverty” variable, leaving other results similar to those presented in 
Table 4.3. Using the German cases, very little change occurred in the parameters as a result of 
excluding outliers or performing iteratively reweighted least squares regression analyses. The 
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 results remained insensitive to robust standard errors and did not exhibit any more significant 
multicollinearity than discussed in connection with the previous model. Thus, the null hypothesis 
regarding the relationship between social capital and administrative effectiveness can be 
accepted rather confidently. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis about the positive effect of an institutionalized manager 
is supported by the data for both the U.S. and German local governments confirming the 
theoretical argument made above. In standardized terms, presented in Table 4.4, in the U.S. local 
governments with a position of manager, the level of administrative effectiveness is up to 37 % 
higher than in local governments without such a position. For the German cases the effect is less 
strong: the presence of a manager increases administrative effectiveness by about 20%.  
Additionally, cities with a high level of poverty tend to pay less attention to modernizing 
and streamlining their internal administrative operations in the U.S. exhibiting an intuitively 
sensible resource constraint. In Germany, larger cities tend to be more managerially oriented, 
possessing probably more resources, such as manpower and know-how in order to implement 
efficient administrative procedures. 
In sum, the analyses confirm the hypothesized relationship between the position of 
manager and administrative effectiveness. They also provide support for the argument that there 
is no relationship between social capital and the administrative effectiveness dimension of 
government performance, thus calling to question the elite-based causal argument about the 
linkage between the level of social capital and government performance. The results are, again, 
consistent across different national settings and robust against various statistical tests. 
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 4.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The current research has been motivated by the puzzles that the studies of government 
performance and social capital have left unanswered. These include the competing causal 
mechanisms linking social capital to government performance as well as the relative importance 
of institutional versus cultural variables explaining the level of performance. The analyses 
presented in this chapter shed some light to both of these questions. 
The evidence presented and verified across two different national settings indicates that 
more civic communities tend to be more effective in pressuring their governments to provide 
more public goods and services. The study also shows that social capital is less useful a concept 
for explaining the effectiveness and efficiency within the bureaucratic organization of 
government. The variance on this dimension of government performance is better explained by 
an institutional variable, i.e. the empirical tests show that the institution of manager has a 
significant effect on the level of government administrative effectiveness. 
These findings corroborate the theoretical arguments made in the first half of the chapter. 
The argument that high levels of social capital facilitate overcoming collective action problems 
in society, which makes it easier for citizens to articulate their demands and exercise pressure on 
policy-makers, is a plausible inference given the findings of the empirical analyses. Similarly, 
the argument about the positive effect of a manager who helps to overcome the dilemmas of 
cooperation and coordination in a government organization also suits the empirical findings 
presented. Although the tests of the theoretical arguments necessarily remain rather crude and 
indirect, the basic relationships implied by the arguments clearly hold. 
The two-dimensional measure of government performance employed in the analyses has 
made it possible to improve upon the current understanding of the relationship between 
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 institutional, cultural and government performance variables. First, the debate about the relative 
importance of cultural and institutional variables in relation to government performance has 
been, to an extent, reconciled. The government internal institutional setup is a significant 
predictor of the level of administrative effectiveness. Thus, the role of institutions structuring 
incentives, behavior and output clearly matters. At the same time, it is difficult to substitute the 
effect of cultural variables entirely by institutional factors. Social capital remains the most 
important predictor of the other dimension of government performance – policy responsiveness – 
in two considerably different national settings controlling for the effect of institutions. 
Second, disaggregating the measure of government performance into latent variables of 
policy responsiveness and administrative effectiveness has also made it possible to evaluate two 
alternative causal mechanisms proposed in the existing literature about the linkage between 
social capital and government performance. The empirical findings here do not provide support 
for the bureaucratic elite-based argument, as no relationship between administrative 
effectiveness – the indicator of bureaucratic capacity for efficient cooperation and coordination – 
and social capital was detected. Indeed, it remains somewhat counter-intuitive that the level of 
trust and norms of reciprocity in society should influence the effectiveness of the internal 
operations of governments. Rather, within an institutional setting, institutional contingencies, 
shaping the incentive structures, prove a better basis for inductively deriving a causal argument 
that, in the current case, also appears empirically valid.  
The results of the study have also more general important implications. First, the findings 
clearly show a positive relationship between social capital and government performance. Thus, 
the danger that government activism may kill private initiative and lower the level of social 
capital (Berman 1997a, 1997b) is not confirmed in this study. Rather on the contrary. That is, 
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 arguing that social capital and the extent of government service provision are positively related is 
not an articulation of an ideological belief. Conservative politicians may find it disturbing, but 
the results of the analyses presented here suggest more of a state-society synergy in societal 
welfare provision (see also Evans 1996). Students of comparative politics may not consider this 
finding too counter-intuitive: social capital appears to be the highest in countries where 
government is actively involved in service provision: consider Scandinavian welfare states 
(Putnam 2000, Rothstein 2001).  
Second, studies so far have left a rather bleak prospect in terms of the possibility of 
improving government performance.  The argument has remained very deterministic because the 
studies have considered social capital as the most important predictor of a uni-dimensional 
concept of government performance. Given its cultural and historical embedment, increasing the 
level of social capital, and consequently the level of government performance, is a complicated 
enterprise (Knack 2002, Putnam 1993). Although, at least in part, such a social and cultural 
determinism seems to be associated with the level of government policy responsiveness, the 
results of this study also suggest that government effectiveness can and should be designed. The 
efforts of administrative modernization are not necessarily doomed to failure in less civic 
communities, as it does not directly depend on the social resources of trust and mutual 
reciprocity. Administrative effectiveness might be increased by favorable institutional 
arrangements: by creating an incentive structure for developing a functional and efficient 
organization. This policy implication is very important as it turns our attention away from 
cultural determinism – enduring cultural syndromes – as the only means for advancing the 
performance of governments, and brings more attention to a flexible variable – the design of 
governments – as a factor influencing government capacities. 
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Table 4.1 The Determinants of Policy Responsiveness 
 
 The U.S. sample   The German sample 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3   Equation 4 Equation 5 
Independent 
variables Social trust Volunteering 
Informal 
socializing 
 Independent 
variables Political trust Membership 
Social capital 3.238*** (1.105) 
1.317* 
(.850) 
.883** 
(.405) 
 Social capital .814** (.325) 
2.924* 
(1.710) 
Form of 
government 
.397 
(.351) 
.357 
(.387) 
.329 
(.372) 
 Mayor veto .774* (.456) 
1.056** 
(.436) 
Log population .016 (.210) 
-.040 
(.234) 
-.110 
(.213) 
 Log population .992** (.407) 
.838** 
(.407) 
% in poverty .001 (.028) 
.001 
(.033) 
.003 
(.030) 
 East 1.728*** (.428) 
1.630*** 
(.520) 
% homeowners -.042*** (.014) 
-.047*** 
(.016) 
-.035** 
(.016) 
 % left parties in 
Council 
.815 
(.942) 
.844 
(.965) 
Constant -11.14* (6.155) 
-2.887 
(5.790) 
-4.568 
(5.143) 
 Constant -9.678*** (2.722) 
-6.580*** 
(2.245) 
N       
     
33 33 33  N 85 85
R2 .459 .348 .400  R2 .433 .412
Note: Dependent variable is factor score for policy responsiveness. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p<.10, **p<.05, 
***p<.01, two-tailed. 
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Table 4.2 Policy Responsiveness: Standardized Coefficients 
 
 The U.S. sample   The German sample 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3   Equation 4 Equation 5 
Independent 
variables Social trust Volunteering 
Informal 
socializing 
 Independent 
variables Political trust Membership 
Social capital    .435 .262 .370  Social capital .433 .399 
Form of 
government .173   
   
      
       
     
.155 .143  Mayor veto .198 .270 
Log population .012 -.029 -.080  Log population .230 .197 
% in poverty .010 .001 -.016  East .847 .819
% homeowners -.492 -.554 -.414  % left parties in Council .099 .103
N 33 33 33  N 85 85
R2 .499 .393 .441  R2 .433 .412
Note: Dependent variable is factor score for policy responsiveness.  
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Table 4.3 The Determinants of Administrative Effectiveness 
 
 The U.S. sample   The German sample 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3   Equation 4 Equation 5 
Independent 
variables Social trust Volunteering 
Informal 
socializing  
Independent 
variables Political trust Membership 
Social capital .208 (1.231) 
.665 
(.859) 
.277 
(.373)   Social capital
.166 
(.368) 
1.229 
(1.978) 
Form of
government 
 .868** 
(.377) 
.854** 
(.373) 
.874** 
(.373)   
  
  
  
       
     
Manager .462* (.246) 
.461* 
(.238) 
Log population .077 (.222) 
.113 
(.223) 
.059 
(.215) Log population
1.788*** 
(.433) 
1.757*** 
(.421) 
% in poverty -.060* (.029) 
-.054* 
(.030) 
-.060** 
(.029) East
-.186 
(.434) 
-.041 
(.550) 
Constant -1.461 (6.159) 
-3.574 
(5.236) 
-7.527 
(3.858) Constant
-9.465*** 
(3.013) 
-9.035*** 
(2.255) 
N 33 33 33  N 85 85
R2 .330 .343 .342  R2 .325 .326
Note: Dependent variable is factor score for administrative effectiveness. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p<.10, **p<.05, 
***p<.01. 
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Table 4.4 Administrative Effectiveness: Standardized Coefficients 
 
 The U.S. sample   The German sample 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3   Equation 4 Equation 5 
Independent 
variables Social trust Volunteering 
Informal 
socializing 
 Independent 
variables Political trust Membership 
Social capital    .037 .128 .041  Social capital .038 .108 
Form of 
government .372      
    
  
       
     
.365 .355  Manager .193 .181
Log population .055 .080 .019  Log population .407 .406 
% in poverty -.334 -.299 -.481  East -.157 -.087
N 33 33 33  N 85 85
R2 .330 .343 .342  R2 .325 .326
Note: Dependent variable is factor score for administrative effectiveness.  
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5. THE STORIES OF EIGHT CITIES 
 
 
 
The previous chapter provided evidence, with the help of quantitative analyses, that the level of 
social capital in a community is associated with the level of government policy responsiveness in 
that community. Similarly, the statistical analyses established a significant relationship between 
government administrative effectiveness and the strength of the managerial leadership. This 
chapter uses qualitative methodology to investigate further these relationships. While the 
previous chapter showed significant covariations between social capital and policy 
responsiveness, ceteris paribus, the theory developed argues that social capital helps to 
overcome the collective action problem in society in pressuring for government activism in local 
affairs. It is the sequential causal argument that the statistical analyses cannot really prove, but 
qualitative study of specific cases can shed some light to.  
Similarly, the theory argues that a leader plays an important role in an organization, 
increasing the probability of effective administration, by way of facilitating coordination and 
inducing cooperation from individual bureaucrats. The statistical analyses showed that the basic 
relationship between the existence of a position of manager and level of administrative 
effectiveness holds. But that evidence does not describe how the manager affects coordination 
and cooperation in an organization, or whether there are some other, non-quantifiable, 
mechanisms that could produce the same effect. Again, qualitative studies of some specific cases 
would provide interesting insights into this relationship. 
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The case studies also serve the purpose of an independent stream of evidence in order to 
verify the results of the previous analyses with a different method. Or if the verification is not 
possible, explain why some deviations might have occurred. The best is to treat these case 
studies as complementary to the statistical analyses and as an attempt to strengthen the empirical 
validity of the theoretical claims made in the previous chapter. 
 
 
5.1 CASE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
 
Altogether eight cities were selected for the case studies: four from the U.S. and four from 
Germany. The case selection for both countries follows the classification matrix presented in 
Chapter 3. According to their empirical values on the policy responsiveness and administrative 
effectiveness variables, all cities in both countries were classified into a four-fold typology: (1) 
cities that had positive values on both, (2) negative values on both, and (3) and (4) positive 
values on one variable but not on the other. One city for each country from each type was 
selected for closer analysis. Following the classification of the cities presented in Chapter 2, the 
two “dynamic governments” are Minneapolis and Aachen, the two “apathetic governments” are 
Memphis and Giessen, Detroit and Frankenthal are the examples of “active governments” while 
Virginia Beach and Saarbrücken have “efficient governments”. The selection of cases from 
within a category was random. It was assumed that any case from the same category should be 
similar in terms of their level of policy responsiveness and administrative effectiveness and, 
hence, be representative of that particular category. The possibility of having deviant cases 
among the four cannot, however, be excluded.  
Overall, such a case selection provides a suitable tool for analysis. Selecting one case 
from each category facilitates comparison: two cases of high level of policy responsiveness can 
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be compared to two cases of low policy responsiveness. In that way other factors in addition to 
policy responsiveness can be detected that the two similar cases share but the other two cases 
lack. If two cities that score high on policy responsiveness, also share a similarly active 
community that is involved in finding solutions to local problems, and the cities scoring low on 
policy responsiveness do not have active citizenry, then the relationship hypothesized in the 
previous chapter is supported. A similar logic of analysis can be applied to administrative 
effectiveness. Thus, the analysis of cases based on a classification scheme can aid in the 
discovery of significant characteristics that are logically independent of the criteria defining the 
types but empirically associated with the different types (see Lijphart 1968). 
The information for the case studies was gathered from several sources. These include the 
review of city documentation, council meeting protocols, materials available on city websites, 
review of local media, and the review of secondary literature. These unobtrusive methods for 
gathering information were used, as much as possible, both for cases in the U.S. as well as 
Germany. Additionally, visits were made to the cities and interviews conducted with the 
administrators, council members, and local community leaders, in some cases also with 
academics who had studied the specific city or were involved in local politics. The rate of 
response of these interviewees and the usability of the information they provided varied 
considerably from city to city and also between countries. 
An interesting observation in both countries, however, was that city officials from the 
“apathetic” governments were much less open and responsive to my inquiries than the officials 
from the other three types of cities. In these cities it took several phone-calls and emails before 
anyone responded. The officials kept referring me to other officials who would be “better 
informed about the questions” that I was inquiring about. The first reaction of the officials I 
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talked to tended to be defensive and loosened up only after they were absolutely sure that I was 
not a representative of a media outlet. This occurred despite the fact that I did not reveal the 
classification of the cities to the interviewees in any city. Thus, the responsiveness of cities 
governments to my inquiries should not have depended on city officials’ reaction to my 
classification. Rather, this observation supports the validity of the measure of the dependent 
variable. 
Despite this similarity, there were important cross-national differences in the interview 
process that may have affected the quality and the extent of information gathered for the case 
studies. In the U.S., the interview process is more informal: in most cases interviews could be set 
up over the phone or by email. In most cases, interviews were also granted after the first contact. 
All interviews lasted for about 45 minutes, were conducted face-to-face, and tape-recorded. The 
community leaders and academics were the most accessible and responsive interviewees. City 
officials were very responsive in all but the “apathetic” government, and the administrative 
leadership is especially accessible in the “efficient” and “dynamic” governments.  
In Germany, interviewing was much greater of a challenge in general than in the U.S. as 
the process of approaching city government was highly centralized. First, in order to get any 
response from a city, a letter endorsing the research effort had to be obtained from the Deutsche 
Städtetag. With this letter and with a detailed list of questions and request for any additional 
materials I approached the office of the mayor in the four cities. Successful face-to-face 
interviewing with administrators and politicians was possible only in one city. Another city 
responded by providing materials about the topics of administrative reform and citizen initiatives 
in this city and allowing face-to-face interviews with only city administrators. The third city 
refused to give any information on the grounds of “personnel shortage”. Fortunately, the denial 
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came early enough so that this city could be substituted with another from the same category. 
The substitute provided materials and agreed on face-to-face interviews with administrators only. 
Meetings with politicians were refused due to “an uneasy and intense political situation in the 
council”. The fourth city responded in writing only after five official contacts by letter had been 
mailed. Again, those two cities scoring high on policy responsiveness responded most quickly 
and provided the information necessary, an observation corresponding to the one made about the 
U.S. cities. The number of face-to-face interviews in the German cities is considerably smaller 
than the number of interviews with the U.S. city officials. Most of the information about the 
German cases was obtained from a short questionnaire that was sent to the mayor’s office of 
each city and any additional documentation provided by the city government. Every city 
provided one or two responses to the questionnaire. 
The interviews were semi-structured. They covered topics such as the process of 
administrative coordination, the role of the mayor in administrative coordination, the role of 
other senior officials in this process, and the citizens’ relationship to the administrative 
coordination in a city. The questions covering the topic of policy responsiveness concerned 
issues such as citizens’ activism in pressuring for certain city policies, or blocking city 
government initiatives, examples of citizen direct policy initiatives, the openness of the city 
council and administration for citizen participation. The interviewees in both countries were 
guaranteed anonymity due to the sensitivity of some of the topics and in order to increase the 
probability of more open conversation. The information about the number and type of 
interviewees in each city, the time of interviews, the list of interview topics and the English 
translations of the questionnaires used in Germany are presented in Appendix.  
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I will describe and analyze both dimensions of government performance separately as 
they are explained by different factors and, thus, form different dependent variables. I will first 
try to explain why the eight cities have a responsive vs. unresponsive government and then move 
on to consider the explanations for the different performance of these eight governments on 
administrative effectiveness. Thus, every city has two very different stories to tell: the story of 
policy responsiveness and the story of administrative effectiveness. 
 
 
5.2 RESPONSIVE VS. UNRESPONSIVE GOVERNMENTS 
 
5.2.1 The American Cases 
 
 
The two American cities that scored high on policy responsiveness and were selected for closer 
scrutiny are Minneapolis and Detroit. According to the measures used in Chapter 3, both of these 
cities spent more than an average city on community development, public safety, and also were 
more active in economic development and policy innovation. In contrast to these cities stand 
Virginia Beach and Memphis with less than average levels of policy activism. The case studies 
supported such classification. First, Minneapolis has been repeatedly recognized in both 
academic and journalistic studies as a progressive city with “good government” and egalitarian 
spirit (Fraser and Hively 1987, Baldinger 1971). The city is active not only in downtown and 
business development but also prioritizes redistributive economic programs (Martin 1989). There 
is in general great commitment to active government intervention into the economic and social 
life of the community and citizen demand for such intervention (Nickel 1995). 
Detroit is a city that once was the center of leftist movements, unions and reformist 
activism. The election of the first black mayor in 1970s brought this leftist ethos into the city 
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government (Bockmeyer 2000). “The city intervenes in social service issues beyond just the 
traditional city service issues. It administers a number of social assistance programs through its 
human services, employment and training and senior citizens departments” (academic 3, Detroit, 
personal communication, January 31, 2003). While keeping the issues of the poor on city agenda, 
Detroit has also aggressively engaged in downtown revitalization and development (Bockmeyer 
2000, Rich 1989, Lawless 2002). Further, contrary to the common perception of Detroit as a 
backward city suffering from chronic urban decay, it has been one of the leaders in policy 
innovation: in the Best Practices database of the U.S. Conference of Mayors38, Detroit is one of 
the cities with most entries. It has received recognition for its programs for youth at risk, health 
education campaign, innovative city/county partnership on brownfield development, best small 
business programs, and community policing, to name a few. In terms of policy innovation, only 
Minneapolis measures up to Detroit while Virginia Beach and Memphis have been recognized 
only for two policy innovations each.  
In the case of Virginia Beach, several interviewees stated that the most important issue 
for the city is to maintain the provision of core services with no ambition to engage in additional 
social or developmental policies. The priority for the city is to keep its expenditures at minimum 
and it has managed to do so by keeping the number of services small (The Virginian-Pilot, June 
29, 2003). A good example of this small government endeavor is the fact that Virginia Beach is 
one of only a few largest cities in the country without a housing authority (The Virginian-Pilot, 
January 13, 2003).  
Memphis is also a city with a penchant for providing only a minimum of public services 
(Pohlman and Kirby 1996). The stress has mostly been on business development explicitly at the 
                                                 
38 Available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/best_practices/search.asp 
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expense of attending the abundant social problems present in the city. “The lack of emphasis is 
reflected in the areas of housing, neighborhood development, mass transportation, and 
education” (Pohlman and Kirby 1996: 46). Overall, the initial classification of the four cities on 
policy responsiveness is confirmed with additional evidence. The following discussion will 
explore the role of social capital in determining such classification.  
5.2.1.1 Minneapolis and Detroit  
Minneapolis is praised as a well-working city where corporate and government leaders are tied 
closely into a community with a social commitment and memory (Fraser and Hively 1987, 
Martin 1989). Ouchi (1984) states: “What is remarkable in Minneapolis is a community. It is a 
community of people who are connected to one another, who place peer pressure on one another, 
who remember for 50 or 100 years who has been helpful in the past and who has not. Individual 
energies are balanced by a network of concerned peers, with an interest for the long-run health of 
the community.” 
Many people in Minneapolis are members of different organizations simultaneously, 
siding with one interest group in one setting and against them in another, bridging the gaps 
between groups of people advocating specific interests (Fraser and Hively 1987: 133, council 
member 3, Minneapolis, personal communication February 4, 2003). Thousands of residents 
participate in neighborhood, school, park or other type of organizations (council member 2, 
Minneapolis, personal communication February 3, 2003). Few public decisions are made without 
a lot of discussion by community organizations (Fraser and Hively 1987: 134). Additionally, 
business leaders participate in community affairs and through this participation they develop 
networks that transform narrow self-interest into a broader and more enlightened dedication to 
community interest (Fraser and Hively 1987). Thus, the community in Minneapolis possesses the 
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kind of bridging social capital (Putnam 2000) necessary for cooperation for achieving common 
good. 
Furthermore, in Minneapolis, this community activism has translated into government 
policy and the effects of some of these policies have fed back to fuel additional community 
activism and engagement. Cooperation has been the hallmark of renewal efforts in Minneapolis 
downtown and neighborhoods – cooperation between public agencies, political and labor leaders, 
and certain business interests. The story of neighborhood development in Minneapolis is largely 
a story of residential involvement. Since 1960s, during the most active renewal period, citizen 
organized into powerful neighborhood groups that were able to influence the planning decisions 
(Martin 1989: 85). This efficacy propelled the creation of further neighborhood organizations 
and community involvement in city policy-making. Further, the business leaders often found 
themselves supporting residents’ groups, or working with them once a plan of action was 
formulated (Martin 1989: 150). 
By 1980 there had been a shift in community development policies away from 
bureaucracy-centered to community-based development, more inclusive and responsive to 
community interests (council member 4, Minneapolis, personal communication, February 4, 
2003). Goetz and Sidney (1997: 497) state:  
“Indigenous community-based organizations formed and reformed throughout 
the decade, neighborhood activists won positions on the city council, and the 
city created a comprehensive form of citizen participation for community 
development, committing itself to creating and maintaining neighborhood 
organizations throughout the city.” 
 
Ultimately in 1991 the city settled with a community based planning and redevelopment 
called Neighborhood Revitalization Project (NRP) (community leader, Minneapolis, personal 
communication, February 3, 2003). NRP is an ambitious attempt to devolve policy making to 
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neighborhoods. With this program city has further raised stakes for participation, because NRP 
has substantial funds available for neighborhoods to carry out their comprehensive plans. More 
and more people participate in their community meetings, criticize city planning projects and 
push for more community involvement (Star Tribune, August 5, 1997).  
“People across the board get involved, not only certain parts of the population. 
This participation has taught people how to get what they want from city 
government. They can be more insisting and they know whom to turn to with 
their needs and are not intimidated by the city bureaucracy” (NRP director, 
personal communication, February 2003).  
 
The expanding electoral power and policy-making capacity of organized community 
groups has been a catalyst for policy activism in Minneapolis (Nickel 1995). Using its electoral 
clout, the local community movement has gained a foothold in the city’s governing alliance. 
This, in turn enabled community leaders to formulate and implement social and developmental 
policies and programs beyond core service provision and downtown development (personal 
communication, February 2003, Fraser and Hively 1987). Further, basic trust in government has 
supported public sector leadership allowing for the public provision of certain social policies that 
in other cities are left for voluntary or faith-based organizations (Fraser and Hively 1987). 
Egalitarian spirit, citizen demand for higher levels of public services, and large-scale 
participation in local politics has also led to the distribution of benefits of economic growth 
throughout the community rather than feeding the benefits back to downtown development and, 
thus, to selected groups only (Nickel 1995). In sum, Minneapolis serves almost as an ideal case 
for illustrating the hypothesis that high level of social capital and civic activism leads to more 
inclusive government policies, which in turn fuel additional participation from all social strata.  
The evidence of community activism in Detroit is mixed. There are authors who claim 
that community organizations, especially Community Development Corporations (CDC) in 
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Detroit have been very active, vocal and effective in pursuing neighborhood development and 
social policies (Bockmeyer 2000, DiGataneo 1999, Eisinger 2002, Lawless 2002, McCarthy 
1997, Neill 1995a). Detroit has about 100 CDCs, compared to only 6 in Memphis (see below), 
and about half of them were described as very strong and active bringing together neighborhoods 
and business leaders (council member 1, Detroit, personal communication, January 24, 2003). 
The neighborhood organizations in Detroit are considered to be well organized, knowledgeable 
of the strengths and needs of their neighborhood, and fostering a dense network of relationships 
with each other all through the city (City of Detroit: III.11). Bockmeyer (2000) suggests that 
these relationships have been eased by the horizontal trust that exists between people with 
similar social backgrounds and neighborhoods. 
There is also evidence that the community is not only organized, but also effective in 
influencing government policies. The Detroit empowerment zone planning process provides a 
good example. Bockmeyer (2000: 2418) states, “Detroit’s EZ planning process is characterized 
as having unusually high levels of community activism, driven by a powerful network of 
community development corporations.” During the initial stage of the empowerment zone 
bidding, neighborhood groups demanded access and won it: the city administration engaged in 
community consultation and consensus building (see Thomas 1997). As a result the Detroit 
application for the empowerment zone was widely regarded in Washington as one of the best 
planning documents to be submitted in the competition (Eisinger 2002). Because empowerment 
zone grants required demonstration of broad-based cooperation and support from business, 
government, labor, and neighborhood organizations, Detroit’s designation as one of six cities to 
receive a full empowerment zone grant was seen as a prime example of vibrant social capital and 
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community strength activism and efficacy in pressuring city government for inclusion 
(DiGataneo 1999).  
Community activism was stressed not only in the context of the empowerment zone, 
though. As one of the interviewer stated,  
“There are hundreds of community organizations. In any given neighborhood 
there are literally dozens of organizations that have formed across time. 
Anything from churches, block clubs, neighborhood organizations, coalitions of 
neighborhood organizations, group endeavors, all sorts. Those are the channels 
that people use to get things done. Citizens show up on council meetings and 
have their say about daily decisions. People are coming to the table asking about 
an issue, somebody else providing another view… There are a lot of attempts for 
being efficacious.” (academic 3, Detroit, personal communication, January 31, 
2003) 
 
Further, council members have close ties to community groups and some members have even 
initiated some groups. The ability of communities to mobilize and cooperate with political actors 
led to 1989 city charter revision that gave more power to city council vis-à-vis the mayor 
(Bockmeyer 2000). The presence of powerful CDCs and these political ties has led to active 
housing development and to the provision of a wide range of social service programs (academic, 
personal interview, January 2003). City officials argue that Detroit’s approach is designed to be 
inclusive: “We cannot have this rich city where we have areas of the city where we have these 
large concentrations of poverty” (quoted in Lawless 2002: 1340). During the 1993 mayoral 
election that community development advocates banded together to assist Dennis Archer become 
the new mayor (McCarthy 2002). After the election a lot of community activist entered the 
mayoral executive branch and became involved in planning and development. All this supports 
the argument that community leaders have real say in city policy-making. 
The city government is also actively soliciting stakeholder input. For example, when 
annual budget meetings were held in sections of town with large Mexican or Arabic populations, 
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translation was provided. The city also holds, in addition to regular public meetings, a youth 
meeting, in which students from different schools attend and can voice their ideas about city 
policies and programs (Barrett and Greene 2000). Further, the city has set up Neighborhood City 
Halls (NCH) to serve as an advocate for residents seeking services from City departments and 
assists block clubs and community associations in organizing and planning neighborhood events. 
NCHs interface with businesses and community groups in building strong relationships to 
promote positive, productive neighborhoods (council member 2, Detroit, personal 
communication, January 24, 2003). 
Yet being attentive to neighborhood issues and the needs of the poor has not necessarily 
meant that the city has been able to change the situation of the mostly black poor population in 
the city. The undisputedly visible urban decay in Detroit and the historically uneasy racial 
relations in the city have created an image that Detroit is anything but responsive to its 
community needs. In her study on community activism and trust, Bockmeyer (2000) argues that 
formal policies designed to embed less affluent communities within whatever benefits are 
occurring, have remained insubstantial. Furthermore, another study states that there is continuing 
inability or unwillingness on the part of development agencies effectively to engage with, and to 
provide concrete gains to, the community sector (Lawless 2000). Acknowledging the existence 
of active CDCs in Detroit, Bockmeyer (2000: 2419-20) states that distrust towards city 
government stimulates such narrow organizing only as a defense tool rather than a manifestation 
of high level of social capital in the community. 
Lawless (2002) further argues that race is still a prominent issue in Detroit politics and 
that this impedes consensus politics. Most interviewees confirm this view – blacks feel less 
empowered as business has substantial clout. Several authors find that the strong mayor form of 
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government is too authoritarian giving the mayor a potential to push forward policy unilaterally 
and a tendency to serve personal ends (DiGataneo 1999, McCarthy 2002, Eisinger 2002), which 
makes community involvement in local government decision-making difficult. Several 
interviewees stated that when it comes to city policy issues the neighborhood groups have been 
too weak and not mobilized enough to voice their opinion. “Neighborhood groups are isolated. 
They may or may not oppose the development ideas of business groups, but they don’t confront 
them or engage” (academic 1, Detroit, personal communication, January 23, 2003).  
“Neighborhood organizations get well-organized and noisy when they are at 
threat. With two exceptions, there are no regular on-going grass-roots initiatives 
that are constantly providing input to the city decision-making process. There is 
no organized force in neighborhoods to come out with certain ideas or plans. 
Even when the city government seeks citizen input on some planning effort, 
only a handful of people showed up in some districts. That shows the degree of 
frustration and alienation that people feel” (academic 2, Detroit, personal 
communication, January 30, 2003). 
 
The evidence of the political efficacy of citizens and indeed, the level of social capital 
and its policy consequences in Detroit remains mixed. Yet, even those painting a bleak picture of 
Detroit city policy-making process from the point of view of citizen engagement do not deny the 
active involvement of the business community in this process. The business interests are 
undoubtedly better organized, have secured relations with political leaders and have long term 
action plans that they pursue in coalition with public sector actors (Bockmeyer 2000). Yet 
alongside the economic downtown development, the advancement of minority and small 
business has always been a priority (Rich 1989). Further, Neill (1995b) states, “in general Detroit 
has profited a lot from local business elite who has been rather civic minded”. “The city has 
prioritized economic development because that’s where they think they can generate tax 
revenues, improve the image and create jobs” (academic 2, personal communication, January 30, 
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2003). Detroit historians have also suggested that the poor majority in the city endorses such 
development approach (Rich 1989). 
In general, Detroit community activism seems less pronounced than that of Minneapolis. 
Detroit city government is more responsive to the better-organized special interests of the 
business associations. At the same time, the efficacy of community organizations outlined above 
cannot be discounted entirely. First, because the evidence documenting the existence of social 
capital and its effect on government policies is provided by a variety of sources, while the 
opposing argument rests largely on the perceptions of the interviewees. And second, because the 
social capital variable provides a viable explanation for city government commitment to 
redistributive policies that could, in the absence of citizen demand for government provision, 
also be outsourced to faith-based or voluntary organizations as is the case in Memphis. 
5.2.1.2 Virginia Beach and Memphis  
The local government in Virginia Beach has taken a rather hands-off position towards 
intervention in individuals’ lives. Government activity is restricted mainly to those areas, 
primarily in the economic realm, which encourage private initiative and widespread access to the 
marketplace. After all, six of the eleven council members are successful business-people. The 
city officials are committed to giving the public what it wants, but not willing to initiate new 
programs or open up new areas of government activity on their own recognizance (city official 4, 
personal communication, August 5, 2003). The city government seems to be driven by the 
managerial ethos and business-like efficiency rather than by a responsibility to promote the 
general welfare through extending public good provision. The city takes pride in “trimming 
expenses every annual budget” and having “the ninth lowest spending per thousand residents 
among the 50 largest cities in the nation” (City of Virginia Beach, 2003). “With such a record, it 
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is difficult to become any more efficient. The next step is going to be very expensive. We will be 
talking about cutting services if we want to become more efficient, and I see some of that 
discussion already” (city official 2, personal communication, August 6, 2003). This illustrates 
well that city priorities are not in extending service provision. 
The fact that the city council has ignored public opinion on efficiency grounds serves as 
another example of the city government preference for business rationality over responsiveness. 
One interviewee tells the story:  
“There was a referendum about a development project a few years ago, and the 
results of the referendum came out against the issue. It was a totally citizen-
driven referendum. You get so many signatures, you can get something on the 
ballot, this is how it started. But the referendum was not binding for city council, 
and objectively there wasn’t much city could do. It was a development project 
and the city had already entered a contract, so legally city council could not 
object the development project or it would have been really costly. So the 
council decided against the referendum, which in turn created this unresponsive 
image. It was really kind of a business decision that had to be made” (city 
official 4, Virginia Beach, personal communication, August 5, 2003).  
 
Further, local newspaper has also voiced the problem of city council unresponsiveness to the 
community interests and citizen input on several occasions (The Virginian-Pilot, February 12, 
2003, January 14, 2002). 
Overall, however, the institutional constraints for participation are not high in Virginia 
Beach (Scavo 1993). Rather, community activism itself is spotty and very issue-dependent. 
“There are issue activists for certain things or if there is some sort of issue that impacts some 
neighborhood, then they get active. But it wanes down quite quickly, the neighborhood cannot 
stay focused for a very long time” (council member 1, personal communication, August 6, 2003). 
There is no community planning and cooperation on long-term basis. Virginia Beach 
neighborhood civic leagues have gathered under an umbrella organization – the Council of Civic 
League.  
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“This Council has tried to get more into influencing policy, but their 
membership is waxing and waning depending on what issue becomes topical. So 
far, they really don’t have any specific agenda or policy proposals for the city. It 
has not been easy to keep community organized and focused” (council member 
2, personal communication, August 6, 2003).  
 
One of the reasons for low broad-based community activism in Virginia Beach may be 
the fact that “folks in the resort city are richer than their cousins across the country” (The 
Virginian-Pilot, January 23, 2003). The majority of Virginia Beach residents are self-sufficient. 
The city is young and the population has not been fully urbanized yet. There are fewer problems 
with poverty and homelessness than in most other – older – American cities. Such a demographic 
situation has fuelled city’s business-like penchant for maximum efficiency. As one of the 
interviewees said, “I believe if there were some influx of poor or homeless people in the resort 
area, then certain community groups would form and citizens would become more active. But we 
do not have that issue yet, although we are moving in that direction” (city official 4, Virginia 
Beach, personal communication, August 5, 2003).  
In sum, with some reservations, the case of Virginia Beach fits the theory. One can 
observe the presence of both low policy activism and low community involvement in Virginia 
Beach. To a certain extent, one can also argue that the low policy activism is the result of low 
community activism. It is a perfect place to remind the reader that non-active government is not 
necessarily “bad” government. Rather than arguing that social capital has positive consequences 
in the normative sense, the argument is that social capital has consequences to the policy outputs 
of government. In the case of Virginia Beach, a government that enjoys 90% approval rating 
from its residents, the community is satisfied with low policy activism, and this may be the 
normative yardstick against which to measure whether a government is good or bad. Yet, this 
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does not prevent case of Virginia Beach from confirming that the level of social capital and 
government policy activism covary. 
Like Virginia Beach, the city government of Memphis has a penchant for providing only 
a minimum of public services. Contrary to Virginia Beach, however, Memphis is a city of much 
greater contrasts and much greater needs for higher levels of service provision. After all, it is the 
city with the largest proportion of people in poverty than any other large American city (Silver 
and Moeser 1995). Yet the city has a strong legacy of exclusion of citizens from governance and 
low levels of citizen community activism. In important ways Memphis stands in direct contrast 
to Minneapolis, and thus, also represents an ideal case for demonstrating the hypothesized 
relationship between social capital and public goods provision, but on the negative side. 
Memphis has a strong mayor form of government, giving the mayor almost unlimited 
power vis-à-vis other parts of government. Historically, Memphis has been run by a political 
machine (Silver and Moeser 1998). The machine did not leave much opportunity for citizen 
participation. The “Boss” controlled the city government and this has left a long legacy of apathy 
towards involvement in government affairs (academic, Memphis, personal communication, 
August 2003). As late as 1970s, there were still no real community organizations in Memphis 
(Pohlman and Kirby 1996). There were just little cells of the machine that did not allow for much 
real participation. The civic infrastructure has started to grow only very recently. “The first CDC 
started in 1995. There were no models and no resources, just the initiative and some active 
people. Now there are about 6 CDCs, and another 20 that want to get started. There are now also 
several neighborhood organizations” (community leader 2, personal communication, August 
2003). It was about 10 years ago when a group of community activists also started a community 
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volunteering organization Hands on Memphis. Both CDCs and this organization involve people 
in social service provision for the community.  
Interestingly, however, these organizations are not in any cooperative or consulting 
relationship with the city government.  
“The city of Memphis has never provided social services. In the 70s there was 
some talk about starting to provide some of these services, but it never realized. 
People in the city government really did not feel that it was their responsibility. 
This philosophy is still living” (academic, personal communication, August 11, 
2003).  
 
These policy choices also have historic legacies. The city is known for its long-lasting mentality 
of white supremacy and the cast system between the rich and the poor (Pohlman and Kirby 
1996). Historically, the city’s leaders had little interest in extending services beyond those that 
directly benefited them. Thus downtown streets were paved, but many streets in the less affluent 
areas of the city went without hard surfaces well into the 20th century (Wrenn 1998). Only after 
1991 election, when Memphis for the first time elected a black mayor39, did some of the 
“people” issues, such as housing, appear on the city political agenda (Pohlman and Kirby 1996). 
At the same time there is great citizen concern about the issues of poverty and call for 
government action (The Commercial Appeal, February 9, 2003). 
The non-profit community organizations are trying to fill in the gaps left by city 
government, but in a city with so many demands, voluntary sector cannot do much (community 
leader 4, personal communication, August 13, 2003). Further, even this modest community 
activism in Memphis is not led by ordinary Memphians: most volunteers are people who have 
moved to the city recently. Also, in the city of 60% black population, 80% of volunteers are 
                                                 
39 In fact, that the population of Memphis was 50% black already in 1980s, but the black community was not unified 
and was also very apathetic, thus failing to elect a black candidate in office earlier. 
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white (community leader 5, Memphis, personal communication, August 13, 2003). The legacy of 
apathy still lives among homegrown Memphians. 
In addition to the low level of civic activism, the city government is also not open for 
participation. “There is no interest in their part. Even as little thing as updating their website or 
making information available via the Internet, this does not exist. There is lack of information. 
And there is no real participation” (academic, personal communication, August 11, 2003). Silver 
(1998) argues that the city does not allow for any meaningful citizen involvement in developing 
and planning processes. The reluctance of the city government to open up has been observed also 
by others. The local newspaper reports: “At times, some [council] members just don’t seem to be 
listening to people. In fact, the reputation of the council has been scarred occasionally by 
downright rude treatment of people who have business to conduct before the body” (The 
Commercial Appeal, December 29, 2002). Citizen frustration with not only the city council, but 
also with the city government and complaints about decisions being made behind closed doors 
has been topical in the local news media in several occasions (see Fontenay 2002, 2000). Low 
levels of civicness and community involvement have also had some recent tangible 
consequences. Recall that Detroit was one of the first cities to receive an EZ designation. This 
was largely achieved due to its active community involvement. Memphis, on the other hand, has 
failed to win designation twice. This failure can be attributed both to the weakness of the 
government bureaucracy and the weakness of the community organizations (The Commercial 
Appeal, September 26, 1999). The city officials are not used to citizen participation, as it has 
never been very active, which is why they lack the predisposition for being open to participation 
even if they have declared it their policy or are forced to be inclusive. In sum, Memphis serves as 
a good example of low citizen participation leading to low levels of government service 
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provision. The lack of social capital in Memphis has fostered a government whose policies have 
not been responsive to the needs of the general public, and that has exercised the politics of 
exclusion.  
Overall, the story of each city illustrates that there is a causal relationship between 
civicness and the extent of government service provision. Both in Minneapolis and Detroit we 
saw that civic organizations had real impact on local decision-making and that civic activism has 
influenced the extent of certain public goods provision, most notably in the area of community 
development. Memphis was a good example of the negative end of this relationship: there is 
some evidence that the low level of concern with “people’s issues” in Memphis is attributable to 
the low level of trust and civic involvement of the Memphians. Also, in the case of Virginia 
Beach there is enough evidence to state that the extent of government outputs and social capital 
within the community are correlated.  
5.2.1.3 Alternative Explanations  
The stories of the citizen activism and participation in the four cities concur to the theoretical 
argument about the relationship between social capital and policy responsiveness. However, the 
stories presented so far do not consider alternative hypotheses. One might argue that the 
differences in the level of policy responsiveness in these four cities are accounted for by factors 
such as institutions, party politics, or the socio-economic situation in the city (see Chapter 4).  
The variation in the institutional structure – the power of the mayor – is not a strong 
explanation of government policy activism. According to the theoretical arguments laid out in 
the previous chapter, we would expect cities with strong mayors to have higher expenditures and 
higher levels of policy innovation than cities with weak mayors. However, of the two cities with 
strong mayors – Detroit and Memphis – one scores high on policy responsiveness while the other 
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does not. Furthermore, Detroit and Minneapolis score high on responsiveness, but only the 
former has a classic strong mayor form of government, while Minneapolis has a weak mayor. 
Thus, there is no clear pattern of relationships between the institutional structure and government 
policy activism.  
Second, although three cities out of four have non-partisan elections and the partisanship 
of the elected officials is private information, one may argue that party politics still plays a role 
in local government decision-making in terms of ideas, ideology and general predisposition 
about the role of government.40 One might argue that Democrats are more willing to expand the 
role of the local government in service provision, and, indeed, an overwhelming majority of 
council-members in Detroit and Minneapolis identified themselves as Democrats, however, so 
did most of the council-members in Memphis – a city rather stingy in public goods provision. 
Thus, no clear relationship between party politics and policy choices emerged on the basis of 
these four cases. 
The socio-economic differences between cities serve also as a plausible explanation of 
different patterns of public good provision. For example, in the case of Virginia Beach we saw 
that the absence of demand – the relative affluence of the city – could have accounted for the low 
levels of redistributive policy provision in that city. However, the evidence from the other city 
scoring low on policy responsiveness does not support this relationship: in Memphis there is a 
real need for social service provision, yet this has not compelled the local government in action. 
Rather, the community has to rely on sporadic volunteerism or the activities of the faith-based 
organizations to provide for the needy. This explanation, again, does not refute the relationship 
between government policy responsiveness and social capital.  
                                                 
40 This variable was not included in the statistical analysis, as there is no data available about he party identification 
of local elected officials for all cities. 
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There is one viable alternative explanation, however – the region. Both of the cities 
scoring high on policy responsiveness are located in the north (Midwest), while those cities 
scoring low are situated in the south. Yet, it is not clear whether this regularity represents a 
substantive explanation for the difference in government service provision or is an artifact 
created by selection bias. That is, there is no theoretical reason for why southern cities should 
have less active governments than cities in the north. The region might be a viable explanation if 
both southern cities were young, growing and affluent, as many Sunbelt cities tend to be. 
However, Memphis does clearly not qualify as a typical Sunbelt city with its high poverty level, 
history of urban decay and deep racial division. Furthermore, region would then probably also 
correlate highly with the socio-economic variable, as the typical southern Sunbelt cities tend to 
be more affluent. In sum, as none of the alternative explanations proves to be more powerful than 
the original explanation of social capital, one can be more confident that the case evidence 
indeed supports the original theoretical argument elaborated in the previous chapter. 
Last, but not least, as already hinted on in the previous chapter, the concept of “political 
culture” developed by Elazar (1994) to describe American states and regions may serve as an 
important alternative hypothesis for government performance on both or either dimensions. 
Indeed, Detroit and Minneapolis are both cities from regions with “moralistic” political culture, 
where “good government” and social innovation are prized. Virginia Beach and Memphis, on the 
other hand, are both from the regions of “traditionalistic” political culture where politics tends to 
be dominated by elites resistant to innovation and government activism.  
However, while moralistic regions tend to be innovative in public policy, focused on 
social and education services, administrations in these regions are also less corrupt, more 
managerial and effective (Johnson 1976, Kincaid 1982, Putnam 2000). Similarly, while in 
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traditionalist regions political leaders play conservative and custodial rather than initiatory roles 
and the role of government tends to be minimal, traditionalistic culture also resists building 
rational and efficient bureaucracy (Elazar 1994). Thus, even if political culture would serve as a 
potentially viable explanation to social capital in accounting for the variance in government 
policy activism, it remains inefficient for explaining administrative efficiency (see section 5.3). 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter, and as noted by other authors (Knack 2002, 
Putnam 2000, Rice and Sumberg 1997), there is a high correlation between the measures of 
social capital and those of political culture with moralistic regions having considerably higher 
levels of generalized trust than other regions. It is not clear from the existing literature, however, 
what the relationship between these two concepts is, and perhaps the measures are in essence 
capturing a similar latent concept. If the latter is true, the fact that political culture is performing 
well as an alternative hypothesis poses no threat to the theoretical argument developed here. 
Social capital just seems to be a concept more suitable for cross-national analyses as it has easily 
identifiable empirical referents in other contexts outside the U.S.  
 
5.2.2 The German Cases 
 
 
In order to avoid claiming the idiosyncrasies of one country as empirical regularities, this section 
will consider the relationship between policy responsiveness and social capital also in the 
German context. The sources of evidence here are more limited than for the U.S. cases leaving 
the stories terse and concentrating more on correlation than causality.  
The two German cities that scored high on policy responsiveness and were selected for 
further study are Aachen and Frankenthal. Aachen is the western-most city of Germany and 
belongs to the Land of North-Rhine Westphalia with a population of about 250,000. Frankenthal 
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is a city of 50,000 inhabitants in Rhineland-Palatinate. In per person terms, these cities are more 
active than an average city to spend on schools and public theaters as well as provide public 
kindergarten spaces (see Chapter 3). The two other cities selected for closer study – Giessen and 
Saarbrücken – serve as the opposites for Aachen and Frankenthal in that both of them scored 
negative on the scale of policy responsiveness. Giessen is a city with 73,000 inhabitants and 
belongs to the Land of Hesse. Saarbrücken is the capital of one of the smallest Länder in 
Germany – Saarland – and it has a population of about 200,000. As with the American cases, I 
am interested in whether Aachen and Frankenthal differ from Giessen and Saarbrücken also in 
the level of citizen activism. 
5.2.2.1 Aachen and Frankenthal  
The official means for citizen participation in the communities of North-Rhine Westphalia, 
including Aachen, are set up in the local government constitution (Gemeindeordnung). This 
document lists the following options for citizen participation: an office for citizen complaints, 
public question and answer sessions in the local council, the requirement for public consultation 
concerning city planning and construction issues, the right of petition. According to a local 
politician, all these methods are used very actively (council member, Aachen, personal 
communication March 18, 2003). The office of citizen complaints is handling also citizen 
suggestions and ideas about city issues. The number of these initiatives is very large and they 
cover a diverse set of issues including the quality of environment, traffic planning, the reduction 
of noise, the creation of day care centers etc (council member, Aachen, personal communication 
March 18, 2003). Citizens are especially active in solving local social problems but are also 
engaged in finding solutions to local economic problems alongside with regional professional 
associations and local entrepreneurs (ibid). Local politicians and administrators alike thought that 
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most people are engaged in community problem solving, without seeing any stronger impact by 
certain specialized interests or demographic groups. According to the interviewees, the general 
level of citizen participation has increased over time.  
There are several examples of specific policies and programs that have been implemented 
mostly or partially due to citizen initiative. The most recent rebuilding initiative in one of city’s 
neighborhoods – Aachen-Ost – involved high levels of citizen participation in the planning phase 
of the rebuilding effort. The engagement of citizens created a comprehensive plan that stretched 
beyond simple renovation and street-repair and included quality of life issues such as cultural, 
social, and educational development as parts of the renewal effort (city official 1, Aachen, 
personal communication March 18, 2003). The city government is currently implementing the 
plan, and citizens are still actively involved in implementing and consulting on specific issues 
included in the plan. Also, citizens’ concerns with clean streets and safety in the city at nights 
have prompted city government to actively look for government provided solutions to these 
problems. At the same time citizen monitoring as well as participation in the delivery of results 
has also been active (Stadt Aachen 1999). 
In addition to the neighborhood-based participation, Aachen also has a voluntary 
association called Initiative Aachen (Aachen Initiative) that brings together not only local 
citizens, but also local voluntary organizations who want to contribute to the local well-being. 
The primary purpose of this organization is to facilitate cooperation and induce local level policy 
initiatives. One of the latest of such initiatives was the street cleaning in the central business 
district of Aachen. With the help of Initiative Aachen the city was able to create four additional 
full-time jobs for street-cleaners, keep the center city clean and not raise taxes for this service 
(Stadt Aachen 1999). 
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In line with the responsive cities in the U.S., Aachen is also actively soliciting citizen 
involvement. Further, like Detroit, the city government of Aachen is concerned about the input 
of youth in the city decision-making. For example, school-children’s descriptions of the dangers 
they face on their way to school, to friends or to shopping and their suggestions about rebuilding 
some of the bike-routes with the objective of making them safer to use, have triggered more than 
100 changes in either motor-vehicle traffic, re-routing of bike route networks or pedestrian 
walkways (Oberbürgermeister 2002).  
Frankenthal, the other responsive city, engages its citizens in several ways including 
public meetings at least once a year, question and answer sessions in the city council, the right to 
file a complaint, and the right of petition. These official means of participation are used actively, 
as was the case in Aachen (city official 1, Frankenthal, personal communication, March 28, 
2003). The interviewees thought that most people in Frankenthal are very actively involved in 
solving local problems. No bias was seen as to special interests or specific demographic groups. 
Citizens were seen as the primary actors alongside with local party organizations and 
government officials in proposing solutions to local economic and social problems. Citizen 
initiative has become more and more active over time, and the relationships within the 
community were described as highly consensual and collaborative (city official 2, Frankenthal, 
personal communication March 28, 2003). 
As was the case in Aachen, several policies implemented by the city of Frankenthal have 
occurred due to citizen initiative and involvement. One of the latest examples was the problem 
with the increase of groundwater endangering buildings in some parts of the city. This caused a 
major citizen initiative for identifying the problem causing excess humidity, calling for city 
government action on this matter, and finally participating in the implementation of the 
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surveillance and regulation mechanisms for the level of groundwater. Similarly to Minneapolis, 
Frankenthal has recently institutionalized the process by which citizen initiated projects are 
implemented. The city has made a commitment to implement two citizen projects per year. All 
citizens in Frankenthal, all associations, societies, other groups in the city and entrepreneurs with 
different interests are participating in working out these project as well as helping to implement 
them. The monetary costs are usually covered by the city, but also from private sources. Having 
such a widespread participation does not allow focusing only on special interests, but issues that 
are widely desirable by citizens. The projects initiated and implemented so far include the 
creation of a reading-room café in the city public library, reconstruction of one of the open areas 
of the city, renovation of an old dock, and even building six new classrooms in one of the 
schools of Frankenthal’s sister city in Rwanda.  
The examples of Aachen and Frankenthal both corroborate the argument that more 
cooperative and active citizenry is associated with a broad-interest-based approach to local 
problem solving and high level of policy responsiveness. Although the evidence is less extensive 
than in the case of the two responsive cities in the U.S., similarities in the relationship between 
social capital and government policy activism are obvious. In both countries active citizenry has 
won an important position in the government policy-making process and has had real influence 
on policy outputs. In both countries, active and dynamic governments have also tried to 
institutionalize the process of citizen input in policy-making.  
5.2.2.2 Saarbrücken and Giessen  
The legal regulations about citizen participation in Saarland are similar to the other cities 
described above. What sets the city apart from the other examples here is the effort that the city 
government itself is taking to enhance citizen input. In 2000, the city government carried out a 
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citizen survey that made an inquiry into the extent of citizen participation and readiness to 
participate in local affairs (Amt für Statistik, Wahlen und Kundenberatung 2000). The results of 
this survey allow drawing several conclusions important for the current discussion. First, as 
pointed out in previous chapters, policy responsiveness measured by expenditures is not strictly 
comparable across communities, because of differences in substantive priorities. The results of 
Saarbrücken citizen survey, however, show that schools and kindergartens are on the top of 
citizen priority list, most people agreeing that expenditures on these items should be increased. 
These priorities have remained pretty stable across the decade of 1990s (Amt für Statistik, 
Wahlen und Kundenberatung 1997). Thus, Saarbrücken is not spending less than an average city 
on these items as a response to citizen demand. Indeed, it should spend much more if people 
were more effective in expressing their priorities and monitoring government activities in 
following these priorities.  
Second, the survey also indicated that despite the efforts of the city government, people 
are generally not aware of the options for participation. For example, there is a possibility in 
Saarbrücken to adopt a tree, a playground, a monument or something of a kind. The group or 
individual who adopts one of these entities has to take care of it with the help from a city 
department. Well over a half of Saarbrücken inhabitants, however, are not aware of this 
possibility (Amt für Statistik, Wahlen und Kundenberatung 2000). Another such example is 
Local Agenda 21, a worldwide local environmental protection initiative with which Saarbrücken 
joined in 1998. Drafting the Local Agenda 21 is supposed to be heavily driven by citizen 
participation and initiative, but 81% of people in Saarbrücken had never heard of Agenda 21 
(Amt für Statistik, Wahlen und Kundenberatung 2000). These examples of how little people take 
notice of the local issues are signs of relatively inactive cooperation by the citizenry. 
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At the same time, over 40% of citizens would be ready to participate in local affairs. The 
biggest obstacles they see to it is that their ideas, proposals and opinions are not taken seriously 
enough. It seems to be a double-edged sword: on the one hand, citizens want to be taken 
seriously by the city government, on the other hand, they seem to be poorly organized in voicing 
their opinion so that it could be taken seriously by the government. According to city officials, 
the participation is not uniform across the population. It was also suggested that the norms of 
reciprocity were not well developed within the community (personal communication, April 9). It 
seems that in Saarbrücken the citizenry is not active enough despite the efforts of the city 
government.  
It is difficult to assess the level of citizen activism in Giessen, as there is little 
information available about the city for an effective case study. Much like the apathetic 
government in the U.S. – Memphis –, despite multiple efforts to contact the city officials in 
Giessen, they failed to respond for a long time and finally provided answers only to selected 
questions from the query. As stated above, this fact itself is already an indication of the level of 
non-responsiveness, both bureaucratic and political, in this city. 
Certain observations can still be made. First, the local government constitution 
(Gemeindeordnung) in Hesse does not provide as many possibilities for citizen participation as 
the constitutions of the other three cities. There is still the possibility for citizen gathering at least 
once a year and the right of petition, but this is basically all the constitution prescribes. Public 
meetings were the main method of citizen participation also mentioned in the responses given by 
the city officials. Participation on these meetings was reported to be selective: some people and 
groups seemed to be more organized than others. Citizens and local church organizations were 
seen as participants in solving local social problems, but economic issues were mostly influenced 
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by local entrepreneurs and business associations (city official, Giessen, personal communication, 
April 10, 2003). This indicates that there is not a broad-based but special interest based 
cooperation in local problem solving.  
Furthermore, contrary to the other three cities Giessen does not have a separate office for 
citizen information (a one-stop-shop). In that sense, the citizens of Giessen are disadvantaged 
with regards to their possibilities to influence the decision-making in the city government. This, 
in itself, of course, does not mean that citizens could not mobilize and cooperate in their effort to 
express their preferences. At the same time, it expresses the overall attitude of the city 
government that is used to take action with little citizen engagement. A good example of this 
tendency is the ongoing large-scale project Giessen 2030. The objective of the project is to create 
a mission statement for the local government and to map the future development of the city until 
year 2030. One might think that such an initiative is pretty far-reaching and very topical for 
every citizen of Giessen. However, the whole planning process does not include any citizen 
participation (Stadt Giessen n.d.). More specifically, citizens are officially informed only about 
the outcomes of the project, i.e. once the mission statement has been developed by local 
government, universities, and entrepreneurs. Further, while in most cities the reform of local 
government has encompassed also more citizen orientation and increased the possibilities for 
citizen participation (Grömig 2001), Giessen has not prioritized these goals in their reform 
concept. This is probably due to the perception, as noted in the questionnaire response, that the 
government enjoys reasonable amount of citizen support already. 
In conclusion, the general pattern of policy responsiveness coinciding with more active 
citizenry seems to hold on the basis of these cases. The surveys indicate that the citizenry is more 
participatory, engaged and active in Aachen and Frankenthal. In these two cities, several 
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examples of policies carried out as a result of citizen initiative could be described. In 
Frankenthal, this sort of participation has even been institutionalized into yearly citizen projects. 
In these two cities, the citizens have been active in cooperation and engagement in local affairs, 
but local governments have also been active in soliciting citizen participation. Thus, it is quite 
difficult to separate the direction of causality in the relationship between government activities 
and social capital based only on these two cases. The case of Saarbrücken sheds some light to 
this causality issue. The city government there has been devoted to increasing citizen satisfaction 
and lately also citizen participation. However, the city initiative in itself does not seem to be 
enough for increasing citizen activism and cooperation. The comparatively low level of policy 
responsiveness still corresponds to the comparatively low citizen activism in engaging in local 
problem solving in Saarbrücken. Thus, citizen activism may be more decisive in affecting the 
level of policy responsiveness than government’s efforts to facilitate citizen input. The case of 
Giessen, although caution must be taken here due to lack of information, seems to confirm the 
association between low responsiveness and low citizen activism. 
5.2.2.3 Alternative Hypotheses  
As was the case with the American cities, alternative explanations of policy responsiveness also 
need to be considered for the four German cities. The statistical analyses in the previous chapter 
identified the institutional strength of the mayor as an important factor influencing the level of 
administrative effectiveness. This variable could not be held constant in the case studies: the 
institutional structure of the city governments varies considerably across the four cities. At the 
same time, no specific patter of relationship between these two variables can be identified on the 
basis of the four cases. The city with the strongest position of the mayor, Saarbrücken, is not as 
policy responsive as Aachen – the city with one of the weakest mayors (Cusack 1999). At the 
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same time, Frankenthal, that also has a strong mayor system of government scores high on 
responsiveness, contrary to Saarbrücken. The only city corresponding somewhat to the proposed 
relationship between the strength of the mayor and the level of policy responsiveness is Giessen. 
This city has a collective body – Magistrat – responsible for the political and administrative 
leadership of the city. The council elects the mayor but the latter is not superior of the other 
members of the Magistrat. Such an institutional structure in Giessen corresponds to the relatively 
low level of policy responsiveness in that city. However, in general, the relationship between 
policy responsiveness and the institutional structure of the local government in Germany cannot 
be conclusively confirmed here. 
Another potential explanation of policy activism in some cities versus non-activism in 
others may be that the political makeup of the city council in more responsive cities has been 
largely left-wing supporting more public expenditure and government intervention in general. 
According to this hypothesis we should observe a long-term left party ruling coalitions in 
Aachen and Frankenthal, while Saarbrücken and Giessen should mostly have been ruled by 
right-wing coalitions. However, contrary to this expectation, both Aachen and Frankenthal have 
had right-wing majorities in their city councils most of the time in 1990s. In both cities, the 
Christian-Democratic Union (CDU), the biggest right-wing party in Germany, has won the 
plurality of seats in the past few elections. On the other hand, in Giessen and Saarbrücken the 
majority of representatives in the city council have been members of a left-wing party: the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, or the Party of Socialist Democrats (PDS). Only as a 
result of the last election in 2001 did a CDU member become the mayor of Giessen. The mayor 
of Saarbrücken, however, has since 1989 been a member of SPD. The recent developments, in 
Saarbrücken have seen the emergence of a new CDU-Green coalition in the city council in 
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opposition to the SPD mayor. Thus, the political dynamics in these cities and their effect on the 
level of policy responsiveness is anything but clear-cut. 
Further, cities can also differ in their level of policy responsiveness because of the level 
of socio-economic development and the city size: a better off city has more means available to 
spend, and a smaller city offers better possibilities for citizen meaningful participation and 
cooperation. Again, neither of these potential alternative hypotheses holds in the case of the four 
cities. The two cities that are comparable in size: Aachen (population of 250,000) and 
Saarbrücken (population of 200,000) exhibit a contrasting record in policy responsiveness. So do 
the other two cities, Frankenthal and Giessen that are also comparable in size: 50,000 and 73,000 
inhabitants respectively. The level of wealth in the four cities is relatively comparable and might 
even be considered constant. All of these cities have the level of individual income at around the 
average of the western states of Germany. Of course, as the overall fiscal crisis of German local 
government unfolds, these cities are also suffering from current financial difficulties as responses 
from all four cities confirmed.  
In sum, the potential alternative explanations of policy responsiveness in the four cities 
do not perform as effectively as the main hypothesis about the level of citizen cooperation, 
activism and participation in the local affairs. Again, caution has to be taken in interpreting the 
result of these case studies and no far reaching implications can be conclusively drawn from the 
four examples alone. However, they have well served the purpose of confirming the main 
theoretical argument and the statistical results presented in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the 
relationship is supported cross-nationally. That is, communities with high level of citizen 
activism have responsive governments both in the U.S. as well as in Germany. Also, for all eight 
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cases, no alternative explanation outperforms the role of social capital in determining 
government policy activism. 
 
 
5.3 EFFECTIVE VS. INEFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
5.3.1 The American Cases 
 
 
The two cities scoring high on administrative effectiveness are Minneapolis and Virginia Beach. 
Both of these cities received an average grade of B+ for their financial, human resources, 
information technology, capital, and performance management from the Government 
Performance Project study (Barrett and Greene 2000). These good management practices of both 
cities have been recognized by other studies as well as national quality contests. Minneapolis has 
received credit for its “good government” and effective management (Fraser and Hively 1987, 
Nickel 1995). The city government of Virginia Beach takes pride in four different nationwide 
quality awards or recognitions for its effective management (Stackhouse 2002). 
In contrast to these two effective cities stand Detroit and Memphis, both of which had a 
below average score on the administrative effectiveness dimension. The Government 
Performance Project found that Detroit suffered mostly from poor capital management, but could 
also considerably improve all other management sectors, while Memphis had a good record only 
in financial management (Barrett and Greene 2000). The interviewees also confirmed the low 
level of management capacity in both cities. Several people from inside and outside Detroit city 
government expressed their concerns about the administrative effectiveness of the city. As one 
city official put it: “All administrative reforms and managerial innovations are a sham. These are 
only buzzwords with no substance. There is no actual change in ways how the city is managed, 
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there is just rhetoric” (city official 4, Detroit, personal communication, January 23, 2003). Then 
interviewees found that the local bureaucratic process is very slow and needs reengineering. In 
his study of economic development in Detroit, Lawless (2002) reports that department heads 
criticize the quality and motivation of staff and the systems and personnel with which they work. 
DiGaetano (1999: 571) writes: “Certainly Detroit never developed a managerial governing 
structure.”  
These opinions were echoed in Memphis. People outside city government were 
concerned about the openness and transparency of their city. The interviewees inside government 
stated that there was little coordination between administrative units. The city seems to suffer 
mostly from poor human resources management that leaves a mark on the quality of the 
personnel. Dissatisfaction with city employees is clearly voiced by citizens in the Memphis Poll 
and was repeated by the interviewees. Also, the city is only now starting to develop performance 
measures and compare itself to other similar cities on certain outcomes (city official 4, Memphis, 
personal communication, August 11, 2003). At the same time, Memphis has had an excellent 
record in financial management, some of which can probably be attributed to the low level of 
public service provision in this city as discussed above. In sum, relative to each other, 
Minneapolis and Virginia Beach have built higher management capacity than Detroit and 
Memphis. The question that will further be explored is whether this observed difference could be 
attributed to the role of the city manager.  
5.3.1.1 Minneapolis and Virginia Beach  
The city of Minneapolis has a unique form of local government: a weak mayor-council system 
(in contrast to the more common strong mayor-council system). Such an institutional structure in 
itself poses an obstacle for effective management, as was pointed out by several city officials 
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(see also Barrett and Greene 2000). To a certain extent the weak mayor system resembles the 
council-manager form of government with the city council being the most important policy-
making body. Following the council-manager scheme, the city of Minneapolis has created a 
position of city coordinator, who is appointing all of the non-charter department heads and, in 
practice, is also responsible for recruiting the charter (or operating) department heads, who are 
then appointed by the mayor. The city coordinator, thus, has substantial control over the internal 
management of the city. All city officials interviewed stressed the positive role of the city 
coordinator on the administrative effectiveness of the city government.  
“If there were no city coordinator, the whole managerial coordination would be 
very chaotic. We wouldn’t be able to do what we are doing now in the field of 
performance management. The communication with the council would be 
sporadic and so on. Ideas about administrative reform either start or are 
coordinated through the city coordinator” (city official 2, Minneapolis, personal 
communication, February 5, 2003).  
 
“The position of the coordinator was created to increase efficiency and 
managerial coordination. The mayor is not an administrator; it is not where his 
strengths are. With good managerial coordination we have been able to secure 
good information technology management and good financial management, we 
are effectively reforming human resources management and improving 
performance measurement, long-term strategic planning and better budgeting. 
There would be a chaos if there were no coordinator” (city official 3, 
Minneapolis, personal communication, February 5, 2003).  
 
Thus, in Minneapolis, the high level of management capacity is clearly attributed to the role of 
the city coordinator. As suggested by the title of the position, the greatest positive effect of a city 
coordinator is indeed coordinating between different management subsystems and 
communicating with the city council.  
The case of Virginia Beach is very similar to Minneapolis in terms of the positive effects 
of a manager on administrative effectiveness. The city of Virginia Beach has a council-manager 
form of government, which resembles the weak mayor type of government in Minneapolis. The 
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city officials stressed the importance of this form of government for managerial innovation and 
effective implementation of administrative reforms. “The impact of the city manager on the way 
the city government functions, has been substantial” (city official 1, Virginia Beach, personal 
communication, August 5, 2003). The most frequently mentioned positive effect of a city 
manager was the ability to share information and coordinate resources between different 
departments. “Without the coordinating role of the manager, the department heads tend to 
become territorial and adversarial” (city official 2, Virginia Beach, personal communication, 
August 6, 2003). The city manager is also an important link between the city council and the city 
administrative units. The current manager, James Spore, “started planning retreats for the city 
council to set the next year’s agenda and gauge past performance. Today those sessions are 
standard practice” (Skog 2001). Some of the positive effects of the manager on the 
administrative effectiveness in Virginia Beach can, thus, be attributed to the specific person 
occupying the position. However, it is mostly the institutional structure that facilitates 
coordination and capacity-building in the government organization as stressed by the 
interviewees. The city is more committed to efficiency and business-like management, because 
the institutional structure of the government has freed the position of the leader of the 
administration from political incentives and invested the position with an incentive to build a 
reputation of an efficient manager. In both Minneapolis and Virginia Beach, the current 
coordinator and manager respectively have been recognized both locally and nationally (city 
official 2, Minneapolis, personal communication, February 5, 2003, Skog 2001). 
5.3.1.2 Detroit and Memphis  
The cities of Detroit and Memphis are even more similar in their institutional structure and 
governing histories than Minneapolis and Virginia Beach. Both cities have a strong mayor-
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council form of government. The mayor is the major policy-maker as well as the chief 
administrator of the city. Being an elected official with such powerful position, mayor’s 
incentives are clearly driven by electoral politics. Both Detroit and Memphis have long histories 
of machine politics dominated by authoritarian leaders distributing personal favors to their 
political supporters (Bockmeyer 2000, Darden 1987, Neill 1995a, Pohlman and Kirby 1996, 
Woodford 2001). This bred the culture of clientilism and corruption in city government 
(DiGaetano 1999, Pohlman and Kirby 1996). The interviewees in both cities stated that the 
legacy of this machine politics still lives and there is little emphasis on efficiency beyond 
popular rhetoric. In both cities, the mayor is supposed to initiate administrative reform and 
change in the way the organization is managed, but “the mayor simply has not recognized that it 
is important” (city official 3, Detroit, personal communication, January 23, 2003). Similarly in 
Memphis one interviewee stated:  
“The mayor is distant from management. His role is to appoint managers, 
department heads, but nothing beyond that. He does not take the role of the 
coordinator. The range of his interests includes some political issues, but not 
administrative efficiency” (city official 1, Memphis, personal communication, 
August 11, 2003).  
 
Both cities have created a position for a chief administrative officer. However, in Detroit 
by the time of interviewing that position had existed only for 6 months and no one could 
comment on the effectiveness of this position. Some city officials expressed serious doubts about 
the extent of administrative power that the position of the chief administrative officer will be 
allocated and about the capacity of this officer to effectively coordinate the city management. In 
Memphis a similar position has existed for some time already, but the interviewees said that the 
CAO had no real administrative power: no power of appointment or any other mechanisms to 
enforce managerial coordination. “Division directors have all the administrative authority. The 
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previous CAO tried to pull things together, but with no success. The current CAO is part-time 
only and has almost no presence and voice in city management” (academic, Memphis, personal 
communication, August 11, 2003). Due to the fact that this position has no real standing within 
the administration, it has not attracted “good” managers. “There has been a lot of turn-over on 
this position. The CAOs have not been good managers, with the exception of perhaps the last 
CAO, they have been rather hands-off and have left the city government soon” (city official 2, 
Memphis, personal communication, August 13, 2003). 
The role of the city council in both cities is rather muted. As no one really imitates the 
role of the manager as administrative advisors to the councils in Detroit and Memphis, the goal 
setting of these representative bodies has no policy outlet. “There is nobody to draw the link 
between the “what to do” and “how to do it”” (city official 3, Memphis, personal 
communication, August 11, 2003). Furthermore, as already stated, in both cities the mayor’s 
commitment to administrative effectiveness is non-credible. For example, the city officials in 
Detroit stated:  
“We have performance measurement in place, but nobody is monitoring it. 
Nobody is challenging the measures that any department uses, which is why 
some measures are clearly substandard. Even if performance is measured, 
decisions are not made based on the measures. People are not promoted 
according to performance. Nobody enforces the implementation of the 
recommendations of the audit report etc. All this is the responsibility of the chief 
administrator – the mayor has to initiate change, but it is not happening” (city 
official 4, Detroit, personal communication, January 23, 2003). 
 
Even the leadership change in Detroit in the beginning of 1990s with the election of a more 
managerially oriented mayor Dennis Archer did not bring the anticipated change in the city 
administration. Crain’s Detroit Business (Ankeny, 1998b) reports “Ten months into the second 
term of Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer, some business and neighborhood leaders are asking: Can 
Archer tame the city's bureaucracy? More important, does he want to?” Another rather telling 
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example of the non-credibility of the political leader in managerial affairs is the fact that Detroit 
business leaders organized (and paid for) a benchmarking study of selected city operations. The 
results of the study were not pretty, several city departments were found to be dysfunctional. 
However, instead of publicizing and implementing the recommendations from the study, the city 
officials were hiding the study from the public (Ankeny 1998a 1998b). Except for prudent fiscal 
management, the credibility of the mayor to commit to the effective coordination of other 
management subsystems has been called to question also in Memphis (academic, Memphis, 
personal communication, August 11, 2003, The Commercial Appeal, February 4, 2000). 
In sum, Detroit and Memphis stand in contrast to Virginia Beach and Minneapolis in 
their low level of management capacity. They also differ from the latter two cities by their 
institutional structure: neither Detroit nor Memphis has a functioning position of a chief 
manager. Furthermore, the case evidence from all four cities indicates that there is not only 
covariation between these two variables, but that there is reason to believe that the institutional 
structure has an impact on the way city is managed. More specifically, the four case studies 
allow concluding that the administrative power concentration in the hands of a city manager 
increases managerial coordination within government organization and facilitates the 
communication and cooperation between the city administration and elected officials. An elected 
administrative officers – the mayors – are less credible in their commitment to administrative 
efficiency and coordination due to their electoral incentives. 
5.3.1.3 Alternative Explanations  
As was the case with policy responsiveness and social capital, there are also potential alternative 
explanations for government administrative effectiveness. More specifically, the previous 
chapter argued that the socio-economic and demographic composition of a city as well as city 
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size might have an effect on administrative effectiveness. The latter was argued to increase 
effectiveness via the extent of knowledge and expertise available for the city while the socio-
economic condition of the city determines the extent of more urgent demands on city 
government than building managerial capacity. 
The size of the city per se does not provide a viable alternative explanation for the level 
of administrative effectiveness in the four cities considered, as all cities are roughly similar in 
size. Further, if socio-economic situation would put strains on city government and limited their 
ability to enhance managerial capacity, only Virginia Beach would appear as an efficient and 
effective city. Despite the issues with poverty and race (Goetz 2000, Martin 1989), Minneapolis 
has managed to become and stay effective, efficient and non-corrupt. The potential regional 
effect can be refuted easily this time: one of the effective cities is from north – Minneapolis – 
while the other is from south – Virginia Beach. 
The main rival hypothesis to the administrative power concentration – the level of social 
capital – is also not correlated with administrative effectiveness in these four cases. Detroit is 
suffering from dysfunctional management despite its active citizenry, while Virginia Beach is a 
prime example of an efficient city without much citizen involvement. Indeed, the interviewees in 
all cities stated that there was no citizen pressure for administrative reform, innovation or 
managerial capacity building. Citizens are more interested in polity issues than city 
administration. One government official in Virginia Beach clearly stated: “The extent of public 
support for government or citizen activism has not much to do with administrative efficiency” 
(city official 3, Virginia Beach, personal communication, August 7, 2003).  
In addition to these alternative explanations, the case studies provided information about 
other potential correlates of administrative effectiveness: the quality of the personnel and 
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turnover. Interviewees both in Virginia Beach and Minneapolis stressed the high quality and 
commitment of their employees. “We have good strong professional staff. We are able to attract 
people who like to accomplish things professionally. Turnover among department heads is very 
low” (city official 3, Minneapolis, personal communication, February 5, 2003). “We have a lot 
of talented people in government and a lot of people who want to get things done. Some of them 
have come from the private sector and have made their fortune already, now they want to do 
something that matters and they are very committed” (city official 2, Minneapolis, personal 
communication, February 5, 2003). Similarly, the interviewees in Virginia Beach stated: “Our 
city employees are very committed, they take pride in working for the government. The level of 
expertise among the leadership is also very high. The turnover is very small both among the city 
employees and management. This committed workforce has helped us to create the kind of 
integrated management system that we have” (city official 3, Virginia Beach, personal 
communication, August 7, 2003). On the contrary, the interviewees in Detroit and Memphis 
expressed concerns and complaints about the quality of the work force. “People do not have 
satisfactory understanding of their area and management. People are promoted to become 
department heads not on the basis of best practice but on the basis of the length of their tenure in 
city government” (city official 3, Detroit, personal communication, January 23, 2003). “The 
problem is in Detroit bureaucratic agencies. They are big and do not have enough skilled people. 
Operational competence is partly a manpower problem” (academic 1, Detroit, personal 
communication, January 23, 2003). An official in Memphis said: “The city uses a lot of 
temporary employees who are not committed. The quality and the skill-level of the city 
employees are, in general, low, especially in some departments. The general public is highly 
dissatisfied with city customer service. There is a lot of turnover in higher ranks of 
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administration, which is not good for carrying out reforms and for long-term commitment. Many 
department heads retire early and this creates loss of expertise and talent” (academic, Memphis, 
personal communication, August 11, 2003).  
One might, thus, argue that in addition to the institutional structure of a government the 
quality of its personnel is also crucial for administrative effectiveness. The argument seems 
logical, as the administrative innovations designed by the management have to be implemented 
by all city employees. The literature on policy implementation is full of examples about how the 
best policies can become shattered by non-committed personnel who have to implement them. 
Also, in order to build long-term management capacity, certain stability within the administrative 
leadership of an organization is necessary. High turnover rates undermine this stability. 
However, while there is little doubt that the quality of personnel and government administrative 
effectiveness are related, it is not at all clear which of these is a cause and which is an effect. It 
may be that governments with high level of administrative effectiveness are more attentive to the 
working condition of their employees and willing to invest more in high-quality employees. It is 
very plausible that a manager, whose reputation depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
his or her organization is more concerned about investing in good people, while government 
organizations headed by a political leader care less about the city employees and more about 
voters. This clearly seems to be the case in Memphis that uses extensively temporary employees 
instead of investing in permanent and committed work force. The causality issue remains 
unresolved here, yet the case study method has clearly provided us with an additional 
explanation of administrative effectiveness difficult to capture with statistical analyses but 
worthwhile taking into consideration.  
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5.3.2. The German Cases 
 
 
Since the beginning of 1990s, the idea of a broad-based administrative reform promoted mostly 
by the German local government association for management Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle 
für Verwaltungsvereinfachung (KGSt), has been spreading across the communities in Germany 
(Reichard 1997). These reform ideas have largely encompassed the New Public Management 
ideology of effectiveness, efficiency and performance. The implementation of the prescribed 
structural and procedural changes in administration is widely accepted as a prerequisite for 
administrative effectiveness (Bänner 2002). Interviews in the cities also confirmed this 
assumption: the cities that had implemented large-scale reforms reported considerable efficiency 
and effectiveness gains. The measurement of administrative effectiveness in Chapter 3 followed 
this line of thinking and considered the extent to which a city had implemented the reform tools 
in order to capture its level of administrative effectiveness.  
The two cities scoring high on effectiveness are Aachen and Saarbrücken. These cities 
have been more active than an average city in modernizing their administrative structures. 
Indeed, Saarbrücken has also won a prestigious international quality award for its managerial 
innovations (Hill and Klages 1995). In opposition to these actively reforming and effective cities 
stand Frankenthal and Giessen that, although being influenced by the current administrative 
reform movement in Germany exhibit less commitment to implementing measures of efficiency 
and effectiveness in administration. 
5.3.2.1 Aachen and Saarbrücken  
The city government of Aachen has been an attentive student of KGSt. Aachen has not been one 
of the leaders of administrative reform in Germany, but it has implemented an impressive set of 
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measures of administrative effectiveness since 1996, covering such areas of management as 
finance, human resources, capital, and information technology. As a part of the overall reform, 
the organizational structure has been changed to make the administrative coordination smoother, 
and the tools for management for results have been implemented (Steuerungsdienst 1997). 
Until 1999, the city of Aachen had a position of a city manager (Stadtdirektor) as an 
official head of administration. It was an appointed position, and this position alone was 
responsible for the administration in the city, while the mayor, also an appointed position, served 
as a symbolic political leader of the city. Since 1999, the mayor has been directly elected and due 
to such a direct mandate the powers of this position have been increased to also cover the issues 
of administration. Thus, the current mayor of Aachen serves as a political as well as an 
administrative head of the city. However, it is important to note that when the administrative 
reform initiative started, the city administration was still effectively led by the city manager. This 
served as a key to the coordination and successful implementation of the administrative reform 
(Stadt Aachen, 1999).  
The key strategies in creating a more efficient and effective administration in Aachen 
were successful coordination between different organizational units and inducing cooperation 
from employees (Steuerungsdienst 1997, city official 2, Aachen, personal communication March 
18, 2003). The endorsement of the reform effort by the mayor was necessary for the whole 
process to start off, but the subsequent coordination was mostly done through the office of the 
city manager and the department of personnel and organization. The continuous commitment by 
the leadership helped to overcome the skepticism that arouse among the employees about 
performance management and efficiency-enhancing measures such as cost-benefit analysis. If 
the whole modernization process had been delegated to the individual offices, the undertaking 
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would have lost its credibility in the eyes of the bureaucrats who actually had to work towards 
providing the end result: a more effective and efficient government (city official 1, Aachen, 
personal communication March 18, 2003).  
The assessment on achieving the goals of more efficient and effective administration and 
better-motivated employees was mostly positive (city official 2, Aachen, personal 
communication March 18, 2003). One of the most important achievements was considered to be 
the clear functional difference between administration and politics. The pre-reform 
organizational structure in the city government was built to reflect the sectoral interests: every 
department was prioritizing their policy area. This, in turn, posed an obstacle for bureaucratic 
cooperation on the one hand, and allowed for political manipulation and credit-claiming on the 
other (city official 2, Aachen, personal communication March 18, 2003, see also Bänner 2002). 
The new results-oriented administrative system was more sensitive to citywide goals and made 
the effective coordination of one department to be in the interest of all the other departments as 
well (Stadt Aachen 1999). The central role in coordinating the results-oriented management has 
remained in the office of personnel and organization, despite the fact that the city manager does 
not serve as the sole leader of the administration any longer.  
The other effective city – Saarbrücken – has been one of the leaders among German local 
governments in carrying out administrative reform. The reform process started already in 1991 
and followed a somewhat different route from the one proposed by KGSt. The modernization in 
Saarbrücken followed the idea of total quality management (Hirschfelder 1998) that stresses 
administrative capacity and the quality of government outputs alongside with structural change.  
The structure of the city government in Saarbrücken is set up as follows. It is a strong 
mayor system: the lord-mayor (until 1997 appointed by the council, currently directly elected) 
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serves both as the chairman of the council and the administrative head of the city. There are also 
six deputies to the mayor (Beigeordneten) who are appointed by the council, but enjoy little 
independence from the lord-mayor. In addition, there are department heads for staff functions, 
such as personnel and organization, legal issues etc. In the course of the reform the former office 
of personnel and organization was restructured into an administrative department 
(Verwaltungsdezernat) to coordinate the administrative functions in the city: financial 
management, controlling, marketing, and information technology management. The head of this 
administrative department is a professional manager. It is this department that has played a 
central role in the successful implementation of quality management in Saarbrücken (Broekmate, 
Dahrendorf, and Dunker 2001). 
The initiation and implementation of the administrative reform in Saarbrücken has not 
been a painless enterprise. Even though the administrative leadership (Gesamtverwaltung) – the 
lord-mayor, deputies and administrative department heads – expressed their initial enthusiasm 
and understanding of the necessity of such a reform, their enthusiasm evaded as no immediate 
results occurred (Hirschfelder 1998).  
“The standard excuse among this administrative leadership was: we know we 
should do something, but we really do not want to, and we also do not have 
enough leeway to carry out any substantial reforms. Several members of the top 
leadership still believed in the “old methods” of developing bureaucratic 
competence and responsibility” (city official 1, Saarbrücken, personal 
communication, April 2, 2003).  
 
This, in turn, bred skepticism among the bureaucrats about the usefulness of the reform.  
“Several bureau heads thought that people are already over-burdened by regular 
tasks and they should not be expected to commit to the quality improvement 
initiative voluntarily. Some others though that through continuous discussion 
people can always work towards quality improvement and no official total 
quality management was necessary” (city official 2, Saarbrücken, personal 
communication, April 2, 2003).  
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Politicians shared largely the view that the total quality management was a dead-end initiative 
(Lessel and Hirschfelder 1998). Thus, none of these actors alone would have been able to 
successfully complete the reform initiative and achieve an efficient and effective management. 
At the same time, administrative department heads, especially the head of the 
administrative department for quality management (formerly the department of personnel and 
organization) recognized the great necessity for the total quality management activities to be 
institutionalized. The initiation and coordination of the reform as well as the subsequent steering 
of the on-going quality management has, thus, effectively taken place in this office (Hill and 
Klages 1996). The head of the administrative department has served to guarantee the cooperation 
by the administrative leadership and the bureaucrats and coordinated the implementation of the 
total quality management (Hirschfelder 1998). The coordination between the different actors 
involved in the reform process was understood as one of the key concepts of the reform in 
Saarbrücken (Hirschfelder 2000, Hirschfelder and Lessel 1994). Due to the fact that effective 
coordination was possible, the modernization could take place as a series of individual projects 
in different city departments with the engagement of employees in the reform process as 
decision-makers (within their own departments) and implementers (Hill and Klages 1996). In 
these projects decisions could only be made by unanimity, i.e. consensus and compromise had to 
be found.  
A clear evidence of the centrality of the head of the administrative department for quality 
management in the modernization process is the fact that he has continuously distributed his 
expertise and knowledge to the academic and professional community about the experience in 
Saarbrücken (Hirschfelder 1997, 1998, 2000, Hirschfelder and Lessel 1994, Lessel and 
Hirschfelder 1998). Having such a special organizational unit as well as the institutionalized 
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administrative leadership made the implementation and continuity in the quality management 
possible (Hirschfelder 1997). Most importantly, it helped to continue with the modernization 
process despite the lack of immediate tangible results, that would have been much more difficult 
had the process been led by a political leader. Indeed, during the modernization process since the 
beginning of 1990s, the position of the administrative departments as the central units of 
management and coordination has strengthened and now constitutes the institutionalization of 
the on-going quality management (Hirschfelder 2000). The three main achievements of the 
reform have been: improved customer orientation, higher motivation by bureaucrats and increase 
in efficiency (Hill and Klages 1996: 22). 
In sum, given the strong mayor form of government, Saarbrücken should not fit the 
theoretical argument made in the previous chapter. However, it is the administrative department 
and not the mayor that is responsible for steering and coordination of the administrative 
functions. This department has considerable leverage in administrative decision-making in order 
to induce the incentive from the leader of this department to build a reputation as a manager. As 
mentioned above, the current head of the administrative department has indeed built a national 
recognition as an effective manager. The example of the administrative reform in Saarbrücken 
confirms the theoretical argument that for a successful administrative reform, or more 
specifically, for the high level of administrative effectiveness, managerial leadership is essential.  
5.3.2.2 Frankenthal and Giessen  
Frankenthal started its administrative reform in 1995. In contrast to Aachen and Saarbrücken, the 
scope of the reform in Frankenthal was considerably less ambitious, hence its score on the 
administrative effectiveness. The city government has not been overly enthusiastic about 
pursuing efficiency and effectiveness, and the reform initiatives were mostly undertaken because 
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of peer pressure form other cities and local government associations (city official 1, Frankenthal, 
personal communication, March 19, 2003). Thus, the initiative came mostly from outside the 
organization, not from inside, already indicating a shortage of interested actors who could have 
coordinated the pursuit for efficiency and effectiveness. 
Further, although there were several initiatives, such as controlling and effective 
reporting of results, these initiatives were not implemented mainly due to inadequate planning 
and prioritizing (city official 1, Frankenthal, personal communication, March 19, 2003). 
Frankenthal lacked a central position for a managerial leader who could have followed the flow 
and timing of different projects. However, the structural changes that resulted from the earlier 
stages of reform suggest that the city has increased its potential for effective administration. 
Namely, in 1998 an office of general administration was created that concentrates most of the 
central managerial functions of the city in one structural unit. The rationale for this change was 
to increase management coordination and efficiency (city official 2, Frankenthal, personal 
communication, March 19, 2003). The head of this unit has the potential of becoming the 
managerial leader similar to the example in Saarbrücken. 
Giessen has not engaged in a local government reform in the similar manner as other 
cities. That is, it has neither introduced the New Public Management style reforms common in 
most German local governments nor designed its own efficiency and quality enhancing reforms 
as in Saarbrücken. Some small-scale efforts to improve efficiency have involved the adjustments 
of the operations of specific offices, such as the office of social aid. But the overall strategy has 
been to wait and see what happens in other cities that are implementing large-scale reforms (city 
official, Giessen, personal communication, April 10, 2003). This is even despite the fact that 
Giessen has been under fiscal stress as most other local government and the city officials feel the 
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need to increase customer orientation (city official, Giessen, personal communication, April 10, 
2003). The biggest obstacle for the successful implementation of the reform was considered to be 
the political resistance. This observation complies with the evidence from other cities: 
administrative reform is usually not on the priority list of local politicians either because it does 
not provide immediate political payoffs (Bänner 2002, Kersting 1996).  
Further, the small-scale efforts for efficiency in Giessen were not coordinated centrally: 
they were carried out in the specific offices with certain engagement of the office of personnel. 
The administrative leadership – Magistrat41 – has not been triggering the reform effort, which 
might have been a reason for little commitment to enhancing administrative effectiveness and the 
small scale of the reforms. Evidence from other cities with a collective administrative leadership 
(Magistrat) indicates that there exist considerable conflicts between the staff or general-purpose 
departments and the functional departments. This conflict is best handled on the level of 
Magistrat, whereas delegating coordinating functions to an office at lower organizational level 
breeds skepticism and feelings of incompetence (Ridderbusch 1996). The lack of full 
engagement of Magistrat and its professional department heads might have worked against 
achieving support form the politicians as well as solving the conflicts between bureaucrats. 
In sum, the stories of the four German cities on administrative effectiveness echo the 
stories of the four American cities in support for the hypothesis that managerial leadership is a 
necessary condition for ensuring administrative effectiveness. First, experience in almost all of 
these cities was that politicians generally lack the incentive to pursue administrative 
effectiveness. This has been convincingly argued also in previous studies on German local 
government efficiency and effectiveness (Bänner 2002, Ridderbrusch 1996). Second, the stories 
                                                 
41 Magistrat is a collective administrative leadership consisting of mayor and department heads, where the former is 
not the superior to the latter. The department heads, and sometimes also the mayor, are professionals (Gunlicks 
1986). 
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also indicate that managerial coordination is a prerequisite for successful engagement and 
cooperation of bureaucrats. This managerial coordination is most effective where a leader exists 
who can make credible commitments to the continuity of the administrative modernization effort 
and ensure positive payoffs for the participants. 
5.3.2.3 Alternative Hypotheses  
The political make-up of the council, the level of socio-economic development and city size 
could serve as potential alterative explanations of the cross-city differences in administrative 
effectiveness. The level of socio-economic development can effectively be held constant across 
the four cities as explained in 5.2.3.2. Further, financial difficulties are often cited as the reason 
for introducing more efficiency and effectiveness in administration. Saarbrücken reported fiscal 
crisis as one of the triggers of reform in their city, but so did Giessen and Frankenthal – the two 
cities that scored low on the overall scale of effectiveness. Thus, the effect of fiscal crisis at time 
t does not necessarily guarantee an efficient administration at time t+1. 
The political make-up of the city councils in all four cities was also explained in section 
5.2.3.2. If one assumes that right-wing parties are theoretically more committed to efficiency 
than left-wing parties, we should be able to observe right-wing majorities in the two effective 
cities: Aachen and Saarbrücken. In Aachen this has, indeed, been the case. In Saarbrücken the 
picture is mixed with an unconventional coalition between CDU (right-wing) and the Greens 
(left-wing) in the city council and a mayor who belongs to SPD. Also, Frankenthal scores low on 
administrative effectiveness despite long-term rightist majorities in the city council. Further, all 
cities except Frankenthal reported certain level of obstructionism from the politicians in the city 
government commitment to efficiency, regardless of the specific political make-up of the 
council. 
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The third alternative hypothesis, the size of the city, poses the only real challenge to the 
main hypothesis proposed in this study. It is especially challenging in the case study analysis, 
because it is almost impossible to determine to what extent the original relationship remains 
significant when an alternative hypothesis is accounted for. The four cities fit perfectly to the 
hypothesis according to which the larger the city the more actively it is pursuing effective and 
efficient administration. Indeed, Aachen and Saarbrücken are three to four times the size of 
Frankenthal and Giessen. Thus, the size of the city, via its effect on the availability of expertise 
and other necessary resources remains a valid alternative hypothesis to the role of the managerial 
leadership as a guarantor of effectiveness. Previous studies on German local government 
administration have also confirmed the effect of the size of the city (Klages and Löffler 1998, 
Wollmann 2000). However, it is generally acknowledged that it is not the sole predictor of the 
level of administrative effectiveness, and some forceful arguments made in the previous 
literature support the main hypothesis about the positive effect of the managerial leadership 
made in this study (Bänner 2002).  
 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The cities selected based on the typology of governments exhibited considerable contrasts in 
both countries confirming that classification based on two dimensions of performance is a useful 
tool for comparing governments. The case studies provide a good illustration about how the two 
dimensions of government performance relate. The best outcomes perhaps occur in Minneapolis, 
lauded as having a good government both in terms of its policy decisions as well as in terms of 
management strategies. Poor administrative effectiveness can cost a government its image; 
especially on the local level where the way government does its business is more visible. This 
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would explain contrasting images of Detroit on the one hand and Virginia Beach and 
Saarbrücken on the other, although all of them are scoring high on one dimension of 
performance only. Low score on both dimensions seems to threaten not only the image, but also 
the well-being of the population. 
Overall, the examples of the eight cities from two different countries tell a similar story. 
Communities with high levels of citizen activism have more “caring” governments both in the 
U.S. and Germany. Similar results in both countries indicate that the relationship is robust not 
only against alternative explanations considered above, but also against the cross-national 
differences between the U.S. and Germany. Further, government organizations that have 
concentrated administrative power in the hands of a politically neutral manager enjoy high level 
of administrative coordination, efficiency and effectiveness. Again, the cross-national differences 
do little to undermine the relationship. Institutions matter for government administrative 
effectiveness both in Germany as well as the U.S.  
The conclusions based on the qualitative analysis should be taken with certain 
reservations as the case material may have been selective and is definitely not complete 
especially for the German cases. However, as here the case studies are not the sole source for 
drawing inferences, but, rather, serve the purpose of providing complementary evidence to the 
statistical analysis, it is still noteworthy that the stories of the eight cities unfold in confident 
support for the hypothesized relationships. Case studies may be less powerful for testing any 
theoretical arguments, in the current case their power rests in providing an illustration of the 
relationships and causal mechanisms that is more tangible than an abstract large-N analysis. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
 
This study explored the role that social capital and institutional structure play in determining the 
performance of governments in Germany and the U.S. The exploration was inspired and guided 
by the theoretical and empirical writings of scholars whose work articulates two competing 
explanations of government performance. I have developed measures of government 
performance for both countries and showed that these measures can be reduced to a clear two-
dimensional pattern on the basis of the contrast between the policy performance and 
administrative performance of a government. The analyses in previous chapters have traced the 
connections between the civic activism, the organizational structure of a government and the 
level of performance on either dimension. In this chapter I recapitulate my earlier findings and 
discuss where to go from here, i.e. consider the issues for further research. 
 
 
6.1 CAPACITY VS. PERFORMANCE 
 
The study presents three major findings. The first is that the enormous variety of policies, 
procedures and rules that we find in governments and that make up their capacities can be 
effectively reduced to a clear two-dimensional pattern on the basis of the contrast between what 
governments do (policy performance) and how they do it (administrative performance). 
Administrative effectiveness captures the extent to which the internal operations of a government 
are conducted efficiently and promptly. It comprises the components of effectiveness of 
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managerial strategies. Policy responsiveness, on the other hand, captures the extent to which a 
government allocates and mobilizes resources for various types of societal needs. It is concerned 
with government policy choices and outputs. These dimensions are separate, but not entirely 
divorced as both of them are expected to contribute to the outcomes of government activity that 
affect people’s lives. The purpose of this study was to explain what determines the type of 
government that emerges based on the two dimensions of performance. Further research could 
also consider the “so what?” question: What is the role of these government capacities on both 
dimensions for the actual societal outcomes, for the quality of life? 
The reason for choosing capacity rather than performance measures in the first place was 
that the usual outcome measures described in Chapter 2 – the measures influencing quality of 
life, such as crime rates, levels of infant mortality, poverty, clean environment etc. – are not 
solely determined by government policy. Many influences upon the economy and quality of life 
are outside the control of even national governments, let alone subnational ones that clearly 
depend on policies made on other levels of government and by neighboring local governments. 
However, it is intuitively appealing to consider outcome measures as measures of government 
performance. Furthermore, it is intriguing to find out whether and which government capacities 
matter for improving quality of life. 
It is not the purpose of this study to develop a full theoretical model about the linkage 
between government capacities and performance. As stated, this would be an interesting avenue 
for further research and only some preliminary evidence can be presented here. Arguments 
existing in literature state that both policy responsiveness and administrative effectiveness should 
be important for outputs and impacts on society. The equal importance of both capacities for 
democratic governance has also been asserted by democratic theorists (Dahl 1967, 1971). 
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Cross-national comparative studies have established a robust relationship between 
government policy outputs and the quality of life. That is, governments with well-developed 
welfare states produce better system outputs and higher quality of life for their citizens (Lijphart 
1999, Wilensky 2002). The theoretical basis for this correlation is intuitive: government 
intervention in terms of spending and regulation provides a more equitable allocation of 
resources among people, and produces public goods that otherwise would be under-produced. In 
other words, it is just logical to expect that government policies produce the effects that they are 
intended to produce: welfare policies alleviate poverty, environmental policies reduce pollution, 
safety policies reduce crime etc.  
The link between administrative effectiveness and societal outcomes is less 
straightforward. As explained in Chapter 2, students of public administration argue that 
organizations meeting the criteria of effective administration have the capacity to be high 
performing. That is, poorly developed structures and processes inhibit the ability of government 
to act effectively, efficiently and responsively (Barrilleaux, Feiock, and Crew 1992, Bowman 
and Kearney 1988, Ingraham and Donahue 2000, Ingraham and Moynihan 2001, see also Meier 
1994, O’Toole 2000, Rainey and Steinbauer 1999). Although, to my knowledge, no empirical 
tests have been performed on the relationship between administrative effectiveness and societal 
outcomes, the arguments presume that the actual effect of government policies is conditional 
upon the effectiveness of governing structures. Thus, in terms of outputs, administrative 
effectiveness should have a positive effect on increasing quality of life since if there is no 
capacity for administration and implementation, desired outcome of government policies is very 
unlikely.  
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In order to take a preliminary look at the empirical patterns of capacity and performance, 
I have assembled data on the U.S. local governments on the following outcome measures: infant 
mortality as an indicator of public health (deaths per 1000 births), crime rate (number of serious 
crimes per 100,000 people), poverty level (share of families with incomes below poverty level), 
and environmental pollution (index computed based on the annual mean of carbon monoxide and 
particulate matter air concentration).42  
Table 6.1 presents bivariate correlation coefficients for different components of policy 
responsiveness and administrative effectiveness in their relation to the four outcome measures. 
The results are surprising. On the first hand, the measures of policy responsiveness perform as 
expected. That is, expenditure on public safety and housing/community development are 
associated negatively and significantly with almost all outcome indicators. Higher spending on 
both of these items is associated with lower infant mortality rates, lower crime rates, decreased 
poverty and lower levels of pollution. Although both of these expenditure items are in theory not 
necessarily related to all of the output indicators, both of them most probably correlate with 
higher levels of government spending in general, which is why we are able to detect the positive 
effect of spending on these items on a broader range of quality of life issues. The number of 
economic policy tools employed by a government has no significant association to any of the 
outcome measures: all correlation coefficients are close to zero, which is why it is also difficult 
to infer the direction of the relationship. This indicator of government capacity has perhaps more 
important influence on economic development and growth, difficult to measure on the local 
government level. The sign of the relationship between policy innovation and different outcome  
 
                                                 
42 Unfortunately, no equivalent measures were available for Germany. The data are coded from U.S. Bureau of the 
Census (2000) for 1998. 
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Table 6.1 Bivariate Correlations Between Capacity and Outputs 
 
  Capacity
 Policy responsiveness Administrative effectiveness 
Outputs Safety spending 
Housing 
spending 
Economic 
policy 
Policy 
innovation 
Financial 
mgmnt 
Human 
resources 
mgmnt 
IT mgmnt Capital mgmnt 
Mgmnt for 
results 
Infant 
mortality -.474***         -.199 .018 -.111 .376** .137 .138 .469*** .219
Crime rate -.230*         .006 .016 -.093 .001 .049 .397** .277 .016
Poverty          -.190 -.300*** .017 -.279* .448*** .374** .206 .408*** .210
Pollution          -.295** -.313** -.014 -.047 -.096 .075 .030 .115 .068
Note: *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01, one-tailed; N = 35. 
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 measures is negative indicating the positive effect of this capacity measure on quality of life 
issues. Only one of these coefficients, however, is statistically significant. Overall, government 
policy choices tend to be associated with outcomes in the right direction and often this 
association is significant. 
The story of the administrative capacities is, however, confusing: an overwhelming 
majority of coefficients are positive and several significantly so. That is, communities with high 
level of government financial management, human resources management and capital 
management capacities also have higher poverty levels. Further, crime rates are high in 
communities with efficient information technology management. These results seem counter-
intuitive. One would have expected there either to be a negative relationship or no relationship at 
all. One way to interpret the result is to think of increased managerial capacity as a result not a 
cause of societal outcomes. That is, governments observing appalling situation in terms of public 
health, crime or poverty may have found it necessary to streamline their administrative processes 
in order to better tackle with these problems. Several interviewees in the city of Minneapolis, for 
example expressed this kind of urgency. The strength of the effect of government policy choices 
on outputs may also be conditional upon the administrative capacity. In that case, there is no 
sense to study the direct correlations between outcomes and administrative capacity, but to 
consider its interaction with the policy responsiveness indicators. 
The arguments remain speculative here, and no firm conclusions can be drawn based on 
bivariate correlations with a limited number of cases from one country. The main purpose, 
however, has been to illustrate the importance of investigating the relationship of government 
capacity to govern and respond to societal needs to the actual outcomes that affect people’s lives 
and quality of the community. The results of this study become even more meaningful once we 
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 have a better understanding what impact government performance, however measured, is not 
only supposed to have but actually has on the lives of the people. 
 
 
6.2 A CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERN? 
 
The second important conclusion has to do with the alternative, and often competing 
explanations of government performance. Using the two-dimensional measure of government 
performance, I have been able to show that cultural and institutional variables are associated with 
the two dimensions differently. The level of government policy responsiveness is most strongly 
associated with social capital. Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses show that in more 
civic communities, people are able to pressure governments for more equitable and favorable 
distribution of public goods and services, whereas in less civic communities governments are 
passive. Further, this effect is not produced, contrary to what the enthusiasts of the idea of civil 
society sometimes seem to imply, by social capital alone. The institutional structures of 
government and what was most evident from the case studies, the underlying principle of 
universal citizenship, play an equally significant role.  
Further, the smoothness of government internal operations is independent of the level of 
civic activism and commitment. Rather, better performance on this dimension is associated with 
the institutional structure is able to induce cooperation. The third conclusion of the study is 
related to the previous one: reconciling the competing causal mechanisms linking social capital 
to government performance. The finding that social capital is related to only the policy 
responsiveness dimension of government performance supports the causal argument according to 
which social capital increases the level of political sophistication and facilitates the cooperation 
within society, helping people to voice their policy demands better. Further, the fact that the 
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 analyses find no empirical link between the level of social capital and administrative 
effectiveness implies that a competing causal argument linking social capital to government 
performance via the behavior of bureaucratic elites is incomplete. 
The strength of these conclusions lies in the confluence of independent streams of 
evidence used in the study. Statistical analysis allowing simultaneous comparison of many 
different governments was used to reveal the general patterns of relationships between 
government performance, social capital and institutions. The evidence was then complemented 
with insights from disciplined field observation and case studies. The latter helped to create the 
stories about how the different types of government fit together and adapt to their environments. 
In the end, the evidence and insights complemented and supported each other rather well, 
increasing the confidence in conclusions.  
Even more important than the methodological triangulation, has been the cross-national 
comparative aspect of the study. Essentially, this study has followed the most different systems 
design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The attempt has been to determine how robust the 
relationships among government performance and its explanatory variables are – do they hold up 
in varied places? The fact that I was able to detect similar relationships across two systems – 
Germany and the U.S., different in many important aspects including the autonomy of 
subnational governments and the level of civic activism – increases the confidence that the 
relationships are true and not produced by some unmeasured variables that exist within one 
system.  
Of course, any comparativist would be intrigued to find out whether similar patterns of 
relationships also emerge on a cross-national analysis. That is, does social capital have a 
different effect on government policy responsiveness than on government administrative 
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 effectiveness on the national, rather than only subnational level? Making this argument and 
testing it would be another interesting avenue for future research and would also help to 
strengthen the generalizability of the results and draw more powerful conclusions. 
The general theoretical argument developed in this study is mostly derived from the 
individual level behavior, and, thus, should be applicable to levels of government other than sub-
national. That is, it is possible to argue that the level of civic activism has a positive effect on the 
governmental provision of public goods and services also on the national level. The causal 
argument would remain the same: social ties and trust among people helps to overcome the 
collective action problem in pressuring government for more equal distribution of life chances. 
One limitation still applies: Theoretical arguments have been developed for advanced 
democracies only and there is no attempt to stretch it to cover countries with different forms of 
government and levels of economic development.  
As was the case with the sub-national governments in Germany and the U.S., we would 
expect this effect to be complemented by an institutional structure conducive to accommodating 
different societal interests and consensus building. This is in line with previous research that has 
found a strong positive relationship between consensus democracy and government policy 
provision (Crepaz 1996, Lijphart 1999). Furthermore, it would also be possible to test whether 
social capital is associated with government administrative effectiveness on the national level. 
The institutional structure conducive to increased coordination within government organization 
could, again, be approximated with the measure distinguishing between consensus and 
majoritarian democracies (Lijphart 1999).  
Without developing a full model of the determinants of government performance on the 
national level, I will present preliminary evidence of such an analysis using data from 22 OECD 
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 countries. For the dependent variable of administrative effectiveness I will use the governance 
indicators developed by the World Bank Institute (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003, 
Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999a, 1999b). The cluster of indicators labeled 
“government effectiveness” comprising such indicators as the quality of bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of government’s commitment to policies, will capture the administrative effectiveness 
dimension of government performance. The data for creating these measures were collected on 
polls of experts and public opinion surveys (see Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999a, 
1999b for more full description of the data sources and coding). The cluster indexes were 
computed with the help of an unobserved components model. The final scores are standardized 
with a mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. The World Bank data are available for multiple years; 
I will use the indicators for 1998.  
The measure for policy activism can be approximated by using the general level of 
government expenditure as a percent of GDP. The measure captures the extent of public goods 
and services provided by government, and its willingness to produce what Lijphart (1999) calls 
“a kinder, gentler democracy”.43 Social capital is measured by the level of trust computed from 
the World Value Study.44 In order to create more realistic models, additional controls are 
introduced: administrative effectiveness may be influenced by the level of economic 
development45, and partisan composition of government.46 While the measure for policy activism 
                                                 
43 The expenditure measures are coded from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) for 1998. 
44 The measure is based on answers to the question “Do you think most people can be trusted?” I computed percent 
of respondents expressing agreement as the measure of the level trust in a country.  
45 Economic development is measured by GDP per capita for 1998. The data come from Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2002). 
46 Partisan composition of government is measured by the share of cabinet seats by social-democratic and other left 
parties, coded from Armingeon, Beyeler, & Menegale, (2000) for 1994-1998.  
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 is already weighted by the level of economic development, it may be influenced by the partisan 
composition of government, federalism, and the size of the country.47
 
Table 6.2 The Effect of Trust on Government Performance 
 
 Policy activism Administrative effectiveness 
Independent variables b (SE) b (SE) 
Trust 23.579** (10.281) 
.968 
(.750) 
Consensus democracy 2.438* (1.353) 
-.085 
(.080) 
Left party in government 3.228*** (1.106) 
.075 
.061) 
GDP per capita  .0063** (.0027) 
Federalism -.823 (.775)  
Population (logged) .748 (.836)  
Constant 27.928*** (9.642) 
.125 
(.308) 
R2 .495 .561 
N 22 22 
Note: *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
 
                                                 
47 Lijphart (1999) coding of countries on the federal/unitary dimension is used. The size of the country is measured 
by the population, coded from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). 
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 Table 6.2 presents the results of two regression models: the association of both 
responsiveness and effectiveness with social capital and controls. This very crude analysis seems 
to corroborate the hypothesis that social capital is a relevant predictor of certain aspects of 
government performance: it has a significant positive relationship with government policy 
activism and not with the quality of bureaucracy also in the case of cross-country analysis. Of 
course, more careful modeling and theorizing is necessary about the institutional and cultural 
effects on government performance on the national level, however, the preliminary pattern 
detected here at least points to potential relevance of the arguments developed in this study for 
comparative government and politics. 
 
 
6.3 IMPLICATIONS 
 
The conclusions driven from the main results of the study have several important implications. 
First, recent debates about the trends in civil society have often featured the view that the growth 
of the welfare state has diminished social capital and that public policy has crowded out private 
initiative (Berman 1997a, 1997b, Fukuyama 1995). The findings of this study, however, support 
the opposite view. That is, I have found a positive relationship between social capital and 
government performance. Thus, if anything, the government activism may have helped to sustain 
social capital rather than eroding it. Furthermore, arguing that social capital and the extent of 
government service provision are positively related is not an articulation of an ideological belief, 
as the results of the analyses presented here clearly suggest a state-society synergy in societal 
welfare provision (see also Evans 1996). Students of comparative politics may not consider this 
finding too counter-intuitive: social capital appears to be the highest in countries where 
government is actively involved in service provision, consider the Scandinavian welfare states 
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 (Putnam 2000, 2002a, 2002b, Rothstein 2001). While the issues of causality between policy 
responsiveness and social capital remain unresolved in this study, it is perhaps not wrong to 
assume mutual positive reinforcement between these variables. Trust and civic activism may 
lead governments to distribute public goods and services more equally. At the same time, 
redistributive and other policies can encourage solidarity, both symbolically and practically. 
Further, as the Minneapolis example well illustrated, public policies can be designed specifically 
to encourage community volunteering. Previous studies have argued that given its cultural and 
historical embedment, the prospects of increasing the level of social capital, and consequently 
the level of government performance, are bleak (Knack 2002, Putnam 1993). Government 
reinforcement of social capital by implementing more equalitarian policies may be the necessary 
boost to get the virtuous cycle of civic activism and government performance spinning. 
Second, moving away from the uni-dimensional concept of government performance 
helps to recognize that cultural determinism has not the monopoly over making governments 
work. The results of this study also suggest that administrative effectiveness, the smoothness of 
the internal operations of a government can and should be designed. The efforts of administrative 
modernization are not necessarily doomed to failure in less civic communities, as such 
modernization does not directly depend on the social resources of trust and mutual reciprocity. It 
is more important to create an institutional incentive structure for inducing cooperation and for 
developing a functional and efficient organization. This policy implication is very important as it 
turns our attention away from enduring cultural syndromes as the only means for advancing the 
performance of governments, and brings more attention to a flexible variable – the design of 
governments – as a factor influencing performance. 
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 In sum, government influences people’s lives in two ways: by the policy decisions it is 
making and by the way it carries out these policies. This study has shown that politics and 
administration form two sides of the performance coin, but it has also argued that, as usual with 
coins, these sides bear different imprinting. The sweeping argument of the unprecedented power 
of social capital to make democracy work acquires much clearer and more plausible boundaries 
if it is not forced to explain both aspects of government performance. Indeed, that trusting and 
socially active community can persuade democratic governments to provide more goods and 
distribute them more equally is intuitive, while making the capacity of public administration 
conditional upon social capital is not. After all, administration can be efficient and effective in 
democratic as well as in non-democratic societies, where social capital has no way to manifest 
itself on the governing arena. Rather, institutions as incentive structures shape the processes 
within the government organization. Building civicness and building institutions are, thus, the 
two complementary ways to influence what governments do and how they do it. 
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APPENDIX. INFORMATION ON INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEWEES  
 
Detroit 
City official 1, January 23, 2003 
City official 2, January 24, 2003 
City official 3, January 23, 2003 
City official 4, January 23, 2003 
Council Member 1, January 24, 2003 
Council Member 2, January 24, 2003 
Academic 1, January 23, 2003 
Academic 2, January 30, 2003 
Academic 3, January 31, 2003 
 
Minneapolis 
City official 1, February 3, 2003 
City official 2, February 5, 2003 
City official 3, February 5, 2003 
Council Member 1, February 3, 2003 
Council Member 2, February 3, 2003 
Council Member 3, February 3, 2003 
Council Member 4, February 4, 2003 
Community leader, February 3, 2003 
 
Virginia Beach 
City official 1, August 5, 2003 
City official 2, August 6, 2003 
City official 3, August 7, 2003 
City official 4, August 5, 2003 
Council Member 1, August 6, 2003 
Council Member 2, August 6, 2003 
 
Memphis 
City official 1, August 11, 2003 
City official 2, August 13, 2003 
City official 3, August 11, 2003 
Community leader 1, August 11, 2003 
Community leader 2, August 11, 2003 
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 Community leader 3, August 13, 2003 
Community leader 4, August 13, 2003 
Community leader 5, August 13, 2003 
Academic, August 11, 2003 
 
Aachen 
City official 1, March 18, 2003 
City official 2, March 18, 2003 
Council Member, March 18, 2003 
 
Saarbrücken 
City official 1, April 2, 2003 
City official 2, April 2, 2003 
 
Frankenthal 
City official 1, March 28, 2003 
City official 2, March 28, 2003 
 
Giessen  
City official, April 10, 2003 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS/TOPICS  
 
Administration 
1. From where and how does administrative innovation originate? 
2. What are the factors that facilitate and hinder efficient administration in Your City? Why? 
3. Please, bring specific examples of successful management innovations and describe how they 
came about. 
4. What has improved as a result of these innovative measures in city management? 
5. How would you evaluate the performance of your city government?  
6. Who and/or what determine the policy agenda in the city? 
 
Elected officials 
7. How are civic groups involved in policy-making? 
8. Who are these civic groups (business, neighborhood, special interest, other) and what are their 
main interests?  
9. Is your community organized? Are there groups that are better organized? 
10. Please bring specific examples of policies or programs that emerged solely or mostly due to 
community initiative (or were kept from emerging due to that initiative)?  
11. Are there a lot of conflicting interests in the community? Is it easy to reach compromise 
about local issues?  
12. Are there a lot of personal contacts with council members? What are the main reasons for 
contacting city officials? 
 
 169
 Community Organizations 
13. Are residents active in participating in Your Neighborhood/Community/Voluntary 
Organization? 
14. Are local government agencies responsive to your organization/ to people’s encounters? 
15. What kind of people participate in Your Organization?  
16. What is the relationship between Your Organization and the local government? 
17. Does Your Organization exist to fill the gaps left by government activity or to support the 
activity? 
Note: This is a rough segmentation of topics according to the interviewees. Interviews with 
academics covered most of these topics. Depending on a specific interview, additional questions 
may have been asked. 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  (distributed to the four German cities) 
 
1. What do you think are the most important problems facing this community now (please 
provide key words)? 
 
2. For each of the following areas please check whether they currently present for your 
community a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, or no problem. 
 
 Very serious problem Somewhat serious problem No problem 
Quality of education    
Unemployment    
Poverty    
Health services    
Housing    
Improvements in public 
infrastructure 
   
Recreation and culture    
Public safety    
Environmental pollution    
Social services and 
welfare 
   
Costs of local 
government 
   
Asylum seekers    
Efficiency of local 
administration 
   
Local government 
finance capacity 
   
Other (please specify)    
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 3. Please check the areas where in the last two or three years effective action, some action but 
with no success, or no action was taken within your community. 
 Effective action Some action but with no 
success 
No action 
Quality of education    
Unemployment    
Poverty    
Health services    
Housing    
Improvements in public 
infrastructure 
   
Recreation and culture    
Public safety    
Environmental pollution    
Social services and 
welfare 
   
Costs of local 
government 
   
Asylum seekers    
Efficiency of local 
administration 
   
Local government 
finance capacity 
   
Other (please specify)    
  
4. Which of the following often come with proposals for solving local economic problems? (You 
can check off more than one of the possible answers.) 
 
Party organizations         
Local community citizen initiatives       
Regional professional organizations       
Regional economic groups, chamber of commerce etc.     
Local business people and entrepreneurs      
The city government bureaucracy       
Colleagues in neighboring cities       
A government al bureaucracy at a higher level (Land or Bund)   
The city council         
Local newspapers         
Unions           
The public in general         
Local church groups         
Other (specify)         
 
5. Please provide specific examples of such proposals. 
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 6. Which of the following often come with proposals for solving local social problems? (You can 
check off more than one of the possible answers.) 
 
Party organizations         
Local community citizen initiatives       
Regional professional organizations       
Regional economic groups, chamber of commerce etc.     
Local business people and entrepreneurs      
The city government bureaucracy       
Colleagues in neighboring cities       
A government al bureaucracy at a higher level (Land or Bund)   
The city council         
Local newspapers         
Unions           
The public in general         
Local church groups         
Other (specify)         
 
7. Please provide specific examples of such proposals. 
 
 
 
 
8. Which of the following groups have leading influence on the local economic policy? (You can 
check off more than one of the possible answers.) 
 
Party organizations         
Local community citizen initiatives       
Regional professional organizations       
Regional economic groups, chamber of commerce etc.     
Local business people and entrepreneurs      
The city government bureaucracy       
Colleagues in neighboring cities       
A government al bureaucracy at a higher level (Land or Bund)   
The city council         
The mayor          
Local newspapers         
Unions           
The public in general         
Local church groups         
Other (specify)         
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 9. Which of the following groups have leading influence on the local social policy? (You can 
check off more than one of the possible answers.) 
 
Party organizations         
Local community citizen initiatives       
Regional professional organizations       
Regional economic groups, chamber of commerce etc.     
Local business people and entrepreneurs      
The city government bureaucracy       
Colleagues in neighboring cities       
A government al bureaucracy at a higher level (Land or Bund)   
The city council         
The mayor          
Local newspapers         
Unions           
The public in general         
Local church groups         
Other (specify)         
 
10. Local communities confront a variety of problems and the responses to these problems may 
differ across communities. How would you characterize the situation in your community? 
 
A majority of citizenry is highly engaged in joint efforts to solve local or other problems   
 
The extent of citizenry engagement in joint efforts to solve local and other problems is at best 
mixed, with a small part of the population engaged and the rest unengaged     
 
There is very little if any citizen engagement in efforts to solve local and other problems   
 
11. Compared to five years ago, is the participation of citizens in local affairs today greater, 
about the same, or less? 
Greater    
About the same   
Less     
 
12. The amount of trust that one finds across communities differs significantly. Which of the 
following would be the most appropriate characterization of your local community? 
 
The people in my community are generally mistrustful of each other    
 
The degree of trust and mistrust in my community is relatively equal    
 
The people in my community have a high degree of trust toward one another   
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 13. To what extent would the following statement fit your community? “I’ll do this for you now, 
knowing that somewhere down the road you’ll do something for me.” 
 
This is an appropriate characterization of nearly all of the citizens in my community   
 
This applies to a majority of the citizens in my community       
 
This applies to a minority of the citizens in my community       
 
This applies to very few citizens in my community        
 
14. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied or not at all satisfied with the following aspects of 
the activities of your city government? 
 Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not at all satisfied 
Feasibility of local 
projects 
   
Administrative 
coordination in your 
city government 
   
Qualification and 
diligence of the 
personnel in your city 
government 
   
Financial management    
Policy priorities of your 
city government 
   
Openness to 
consultation with local 
community organization 
   
 
15. Are you  a member of the City Council    
  a member of the city administration    
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